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A central feature of sexual harassment in the workplace is that it essentially involves two 
sides of a coin, that is to say, an impairment of dignity, self-esteem, self-worth, respect, 
ubuntu, individual autonomy, and equality from a positive aspect and freedom from insult, 
degrading treatment, disrespect, abuse of trust and unfair discrimination from a negative 
aspect. The overlap between equality and dignity as founding values of the Constitution, 
constitutionally entrenched rights, and values underpinning the limitation clause in the 
Constitution is explored with a view to illustrating why sexual harassment is unacceptable in 
an open and democratic South Africa. The central theme of the thesis is that the future of the 
law on sexual harassment lies in the adoption of a multi-dimensional approach which focuses 
on dignity/ ubuntu because there can never be equality without respect for dignity/ ubuntu 
which is an essential pillar in the celebration of self-autonomy and humanity in a democratic 
society. A central focus of the research is that the harm of sexual harassment gives rise to 
various remedies, which are not mutually exclusive. The plaintiff can use one or more of the 
available remedies because sexual harassment is potentially a labour issue; a constitutional 
rights matter; a delict; unfair discrimination and can even manifest itself as a specific offence 
in criminal law. 
A wide range of data collection methods were used including reference to South 
African judicial precedent; legislation; selected foreign case law; the Constitution; textbooks; 
journal articles; feminist theories; and international conventions. The aim is to underscore the 
impairment suffered by women through sexual harassment, which includes economic harm, 
psychological harm, unfair discrimination, work sabotage, unequal access to employment 
opportunities and abuse of organizational power by supervisors. The multiple facets of the 
harm of sexual harassment such as treating women as sub-human, un-equal and as sub-
citizens in total disregard of their constitutional rights, self-autonomy and ubuntu is 
highlighted in an effort to identify the essence of sexual harassment. The judicial tests, which 
determine whose perception of the nature of sexual harassment is decisive, are described. The 
focal point of the thesis advocates a judicial test for identifying sexual harassment, which is 
gender neutral, objective, and promotes the objects, purport, and spirit of the Bill of Rights by 
offering equal protection before the law. 
A critique of the current law on sexual harassment in South Africa is conducted in the 
light of the common-law principles of vicarious liability. An evaluation is made of how and to 
what extent the South African case law is compatible with Canadian and English authorities. 
This was done by broadening the scope of employment test to include approaches compatible 
with an abuse of power and trust; frolic of one's own; enterprise risk; mismanagement of 
duties; and abuse of supervisory authority and the sufficiently close nexus between the 
wrongful conduct and the employment. The United States supervisory harassment approach, 
which focuses on sexual harassment as an abuse of power or trust in employment relations, is 
critically regarded as having truly captured the essence of the risk of abuse inherent in the 
supervisor's delegated power. Statuton; vicarious liability in terms of labour law is 
underscored because it is distinct from the common-law principles of vicarious liability in 
creating an element of deemed personal liability on the part of the employer for failure to 
take steps and ensure the eradication of gender discrimination. It is observed that women 
cannot be liberated as a class (gender equality) if they are not liberated as autonomous 
individuals (dignity). It is concluded that South African law is in harmony with the Canadian 
and English authorities on sexual harassment in the workplace and has the potential to deal 
adequately with sexual harassment cases in the workplace but only if attention is paid to the 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to bring an endemic problem of sexual 
harassment, which has always been a private problem with women suffering 
in silence, into a public arena warranting legal intervention and legal redress. 
The focus is on sexual harassment in the workplace. Statistics indicate that 
sexual harassment is prevalent in the workplace and is a worldwide problem, 
which is not unique to South Africa.1 The harm of sexual harassment 'is 
receiving increasing attention, especially in the context of women's rising 
rates of participation in the labour force and enhanced legal and regulatory 
provisions' .2 
The research will focus on sexual harassment of women because 'the 
perpetrators are, overwhelmingly, men' and 'women hardly ever do this to 
men'.3 In South Africa, given the history of apartheid, the challenge is even 
greater because women have faced multiple barriers of colour, gender, and 
class. It will be highlighted that women can never be free of male domination 
1 United Nations Economic Commission' Addendum 1: 2003 Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Violence Against Women Developments in the area of violence against women (1994-
2002)' (6 January 2003) at 107-8, noted that the Women's Legal Centre estimated in July 2001 
that 76 per cent of women had experienced some form of sexual harassment and that 40 per 
cent of these women had quit their jobs or changed jobs as a result of the harassment. See 
http://www.eeoc.g:ov/stats/harass.html (accessed 16 November 2006). In 2005, 12,679 sexual 
harassment charges were filed with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, only 14.3% were filed by males. The United Nations Fact Sheet 'Ending 
Violence against Women: from Words to Action. Study of the Secretary-General' (9 October 
2006) has also noted that 'women experience sexual harassment throughout their lives' and 
'between 40 and 50 per cent of women in the European Union reported some form of sexual 
harassment in the workplace' . See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_harassment 
(accessed 16 November 2006) which states that 'a 2006 Government study in the United 
Kingdom revealed that 2 out of 5 sexual harassment victims in the UK are male, with 8% 
percent of all sexual harassment complaints to the Equal Opportunities Commission (Britain's 
EEOC), coming from men' . D Chappell and V Di Martino Violence at Work 3ed (2006) at 60-2 
note that sexual harassment 'is commonplace throughout the entire developing world' - 'a 
survey in Nigeria revealed that young female university graduates seeking employment are 
routinely required to grant sexual favours before their academic credentials can be evaluated' 
and 'in Hong Kong, China, 440 of the estimated 220, 000 foreign domestic workers had been 
raped by their employers' . 
2 United Nations General Assembly 'In-depth study on all forms of violence against women: 
Report of the Secretary-General' (6 July 2006) at 42. 





until they are treated with dignity and as equal to men in the workplace. This 
point is highlighted in the following extract: 
Implicit in the concept of freedom is the concept of equality, that men and women 
'naturally' constitute a universal fraternity and the attainment of human equality is a 
social goal. .. To concede inequality is to concede the right of the dominant to 
dominate, as a person, a class, a race, a gender or by dint of any other biological or 
technological advantage. The dilemma is that while freedom and equality are 
universally acceptable values, inequalities and non-freedom are endemic.4 
The former President Nelson Mandela stated at the opening of the first 
democratically elected Parliament in South Africa that 'it is vitally important 
that all the structures of Government, including the President should 
understand fully that freedom cannot be achieved unless women have been 
emancipated from all forms of oppression' .s The central theme of the thesis is 
that there can thus be no freedom or liberation if women are not free from all 
forms of bondage and inhumanity, and are treated as objects of men's 
autonomy in total disregard of their dignity and ubuntu, rather than subjects 
of their own self-autonomy. Samora Machel, the late President of the Front for 
the Liberation of Mozambique,6 affirmed that women's emancipation was an 
integral aspect of revolutionary struggle for a truly democratic state: 
The emancipation of women is not an act of charity, the result of a humanitarian or 
compassionate attitude. The liberation of women is a fundamental necessity for the 
revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the precondition for its victory. The 
main objective of the revolution is to destroy the system of exploitation and build a 
new society, which releases the potentialities of human beings ... This is the context 
within which women's emancipation arises. 7 
The thesis focuses on sexual harassment in the workplace in the 
context of an employer-employee relationship because sexual harassment is 
more likely to poison the workplace as a 'forum for pluralistic exchange and 
destroys the possibility of constructive engagement' .8 The aim of the thesis is 
4 Institute of Black Research: Black Women Workers' A Study in Patriarchy, Race and Women 
Production Workers in South Africa' (1991) at 12. 
5 Opening speech to the South Africa's first democratically elected parliament (24 May 1994). 
6 FRELIMO is the founding party of the Republic of Mozambique and has been in power 
since 1975. 
7 Opening address to the first conference of the Mozambique Women's Organization (1973). 
8 S Estreicher Sexual Harassment in the Workplace - Proceedings of New York University 51 51 








to bring the harm of sexual harassment under spotlight and highlight how 
sexual harassment pollutes the workplace, hinders career development, 
violates constitutional rights,9 and undermines the values of the Constitution. 
It will be emphasized that South Africa can never be an open and democratic 
society if women are not emancipated and are treated in total disregard of 
their self-autonomy; dignity; ubuntu; competence; skills; and integrity. 
The second chapter starts by defining sexual harassment in an effort to 
outline the parameters within which sexual harassment must occur to afford 
legal protection and to enable the plaintiffs to better identify sexual 
harassment when they experience it. An important feature of the thesis is to 
identify the problem of sexual harassment and help underscore the subject of 
sexual harassment in order to lay a foundation for the discussions that ensue 
in the remainder of the thesis. Sexual harassment 'the legal claim' has been 
defined by MacKinnon as 'a demand that state authority stand behind 
women's refusal to sexual access in certain situations that previously were a 
masculine prerogative'.10 The act of sexual harassment can also be defined as 
a violation of 'ubuntu' in that: 
Subordination of women to men is socially institutionalized, cumulatively and 
systematically shaping access to human dignity, respect, resources, physical security, 
credibility, membership in community, speech and power.11 
Having identified sexual harassment in chapter two, the third chapter 
explores the judicial tests of the reasonable man; the reasonable woman; the 
reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics; and the 
reasonable person in the position of the victim test, which determines whose 
perception of the nature of sexual harassment, is decisive. A judicial test, 
which is gender neutral; objectively determined; and promotes the spirit, 
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights thereby protecting the rights of 
women and men alike in the workplace, will be proposed. 
9 See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1° CA MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (1987) at 104-5. 












The fourth chapter deals with sexual harassment as a form of gender 
discrimination amounting to unfair discrimination in terms of section 6(3) of 
the EEA, and examines the essence of the wrong of sexual harassment 
(besides the fact that it happens to women because they are women). 
Attention will be given to feminist theories advanced by various writers on 
why sexual harassment is wrong taking into account the dynamics of the 
harm of sexual harassment that include economic harm, psychological harm, 
unfair discrimination, work sabotage, unequal access to employment 
opportunities and abuse of organizational power by supervisors. Gender 
discrimination is 'likely to inflict greater harm within the workplace than in 
the public square partly because of the close and ongoing personal 
engagement that the workplace compels' .12 
In chapter five, consideration will be given to finding the employer 
personally liable because of a breach of a non-delegable duty of care. Various 
remedies will be explored which are available to the victim of sexual 
harassment in terms of breach of the contract of employment; delict; the actio 
iniuriarum; and the constitutional protection of dignity which is entrenched in 
the Bill of Rights. A central focus of the thesis is the dignitary harm suffered 
because of sexual harassment and an infringement of a woman's physical self, 
personality rights, and woman's freedom to choose with whom she 
associates, intimately as suggested by Ehrenreich: 
Sexual harassment subjects an individual to behaviour that violates basic standards 
of decency and privacy; rather than choosing the people with whom she will become 
intimate, the victim of sexual harassment has sexual intimacies forced upon her by 
her harasser. l3 
The overlap and distinction between the scope of protection of dignity 
in delict and in terms of the Constitution will be emphasized. The positive 
steps, which have been taken by the Constitutional Court to protect the right 
to dignity, which is the cornerstone and founding value of the Constitution 
from which all other rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights flow, will be 
12 Estreicher op cit (n8) 374. 
13 R Ehrenreich 'Dignity and Discrimination: Towards a Pluralistic Understanding of 












outlined. The common-law tort remedy in the United States will be critically 
evaluated, and compared to the wider protection of dignity in South Africa in 
terms of the Constitution and under the actio iniuriarum. Chapter six will 
examine and review the existing labour law remedies of personal liability and 
statutory vicarious liability of the employer dealt with in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA)14 and the Employment Equity Actis ('EEA'). It will be 
highlighted how the promulgation of the 2005 Code of Good Practice on the 
Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases ('2005 Code') which forms part of the 
EEA, has added considerable value in outlining how and to what extent the 
employers must be pro-active in dealing with sexual harassment in the 
workplace. 
Furthermore, the thesis will critically evaluate whether the current 
labour law remedies are sufficiently developed to cope and deal with sexual 
harassment in the workplace. One of the focal points of the thesis is the 
statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA which creates a 
unique type of statutory vicarious liability and contains an element of deemed 
personal liability on the part of the employer for failure to take steps and 
ensure compliance with the EEA. It will be emphasized that the advantage of 
statutory vicarious liability is that it is neither a true reflection of common-law 
liability nor an equivalent to common-law vicarious liability. Furthermore, it is 
not subject to the rules of scope of employment and is uninformed by the 
delictual rules of vicarious liability. It will be highlighted that the employer 
will only successfully raise the affirmative defence in terms of section 60(4) of 
the EEA if it has taken pro-active steps to prevent sexual harassment rather 
than adopt a casual reactive approach and deal with sexual harassment as 
and when it occurs.16 
14 66 of 1995. 
1s 55 of 1998. 
16 See Y Slabbert Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (1994) Unpublished LLM Dissertation, 
University of Cape Town at 70, correctly supports the pro-active approach to sexual 
harassment 'to create public awareness of the incidence and impact of sexual harassment' and 

















Chapter seven analyzes the historical development of the remedy of vicarious 
liability in South Africa, United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. It will 
be highlighted how the courts in South Africa and in common-law jurisdictions 
narrowly and rigidly applied the principle of vicarious liability in a way that 
resulted in denying protection to the victims of sexual harassment for what is 
perceived as a 'frolic of one's own', 'personal', or 'not within the job 
description' of the perpetrator to harass employees. 
The thesis is a study of the law on sexual harassment in the South 
African workplace. However, a comparative study will be used in relevant 
and important aspects to show how and to what extent the developments in 
Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States were instrumental and 
persuasive in the common-law evolution of sexual harassment law in South 
Africa. This was done by broadening the 'scope of employment' test to 
include: approaches compatible with an abuse of power and trust; 'frolic of 
one's own'; enterprise risk; mismanagement of duties; and abuse of 
supervisory authority. The effect of the broadening of the scope of 
employment was thus to enhance legal recourse and protection, thereby 
bringing to fruition the constitutional promise to the victims of sexual 
harassment. 
The use of the comparative method in the thesis is desirable in the light 
of section 39 of the Constitution, which enjoins the courts to consider 
international law. Furthermore, 'there can be no doubt that it will often be 
helpful for our courts to consider the approach of other jurisdictions to 
problems that may be similar to our own'.17 In so doing, the courts can 
identify the best solution for South Africa and enhance the legal protection of 
the constitutional rights often violated by the wrong of sexual harassment. In 
addition, the essence of the Constitution as the highest law of the land, 
addressing the root of the problem and not just the consequences thereof after it has 
occurred'. 

















prescribes that all law must be infused with the values and the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution and thereby reflect the democratic change in 
the South African society. 
Watson correctly highlighted the use of 'comparative law as a method 
valuable in legal reform'18 and 'the prevalence and great importance of legal 
borrowing'.19 Kahn-Freund cautioned against a 'risk of rejection'20 on the use 
of comparative law as a tool of legal change because a use of a comparative 
method 'requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its 
social, and above all its political, context'.21 However, 'his warnings on the 
comparative method were largely unheeded' in South Africa.22 Watson23 
differed from Kahn-Freund's conservative approach on the use of 
comparative law and asserted that: 
Successful borrowing could be made from a very different legal system, even from 
one at a much higher level of development and of a different political complexion. 
What, in my opinion, the law reformer should be after in looking at foreign systems 
was an idea which could be transformed into part of the law of his country. For this a 
systematic knowledge of the law or political structure of the donor system was not 
necessary, though a law reformer with such knowledge would be more efficient. 
Successful borrowing could be achieved even when nothing was known of the 
political, social or economic context of the foreign law. 
Thompson has noted that Watson's view on legal transplants and legal 
reform in practice ' ... was applied to the hilt' in effecting Labour law reform 
in South Africa.24 
The development of a 'supervisory harassment' approach to sexual 
harassment in the workplace will also be examined in order to highlight how 
the United States has devised creative ways of expanding vicarious liability to 
18 A Watson 'Comparative Law and Legal Change' (1978) 37 Cambridge LJ 313 at 318. 
19 Watson op cit (n18) 322. 
20 0 Kahn-Freund 'On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 Modern Law 
Review 1 at 27. 
21 Ibid. 
22 C Thompson 'Borrowing and Bending: The Development Of South Africa's Unfair Labour 
Practice Jurisprudence' (1993) 6 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 183 at 184. 
23 A Watson 'Legal Transplants and Law Reform' (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 79. 


















capture the essence of the risk of abuse inherent in the supervisor's delegated 
power. In the context of supervisory harassment, it will be shown that sexual 
harassment in the workplace is more disturbing because 'the harasser is using 
his greater economic authority and resources to secure sexual access to 
women he otherwise would not have'.25 In the process, the thesis will 
highlight lessons, which South Africa may learn and borrow from foreign 
jurisdictions. 
Chapter eight will scrutinize the jurisdictional defence in terms of the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act26 ('COIDA') which 
deals with the substitution of compensation for other legal remedies. In the 
process, the thesis will highlight that compensation under the COIDA hinges 
upon whether sexual harassment can be considered to be 'in the course of' 
and 'arising out of' (which are not synonymous terms) the scope of 
employment. It will be shown that sexual harassment does not arise out of 
employment because it is neither a job description nor part of the modus 
operandi of the employment activities to form part of the terms and conditions 
of employment - even though it has been found to be in the scope of 
employment. It will be proposed that any attempt to exonerate the employer 
under the CO IDA must be discouraged. 
In Chapter nine, criminal remedies will be examined because the harm 
of sexual harassment contains elements of specific offences recognized as 
crimes in criminal law, thereby enabling the state to prosecute the perpetrator 
personally compared to civil remedies where the plaintiff can proceed against 
either employer or employee. Chapters five, six, seven, and eight are the 
central focus of the thesis which will examine and describe the scope and 
application of various remedies for sexual harassment in South African law, 
in terms of labour law, delict, criminal law and constitutional law, and the 
25 RB Siegel 'A Short History of Sexual Harassment' in Directions in Sexual Harassment Law CA 
MacKinnon and RB Siegel (2004) at 19. 





















ways in which they interact. The relationship and overlap between the 
remedies will be discussed in the light of their advantages, disadvantages and 
limitations since the remedies are not mutually exclusive; and approach/ es, 
which are best in dealing with sexual harassment, will be proposed. 
The thesis will conclude with a summary of the existing law on sexual 
harassment in the workplace, the shortcomings, and efficacies, making 
suggestions for the way ahead. Based on the detailed examination of the 
recent jurisprudence in the Constitutional Court and the High Court (relating 
to the scope of vicarious liability in general and sexual harassment in 
particular), a proposal for a more comprehensive approach to vicarious 




















Chapter Two - What is Sexual Harassment? 
2.1 Outline 
This chapter defines sexual harassment and endeavours to give meaning to 
the term 'sexual harassment' in an effort to contextualize the background to 
the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace. As a starting point in this 
chapter, 'it is important that sexual harassment be defined in clear and 
unambiguous terms so as to enable complainants to know the limits of the 
protection of the law'.1 Sexual harassment is 'any offensive conduct related to 
an employee's gender that a reasonable woman or man should not have to 
endure'.2 It will be discussed that sexual harassment 'is not a new 
phenomenon but it is receiving much greater attention because of an 
increasingly diverse workforce and changing attitudes to equal opportunities 
and to what is acceptable behaviour at work'.3 
2.2 The definition of sexual harassment 
In South Africa, guidance on the definition of sexual harassment is contained 
in the 2005 Code as follows: 
Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the rights of 
an employee and constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace, taking into account 
all of the following factors: 
• whether the harassment is on the prohibited grounds of sex and/ or gender 
and/ or sexual orientation; 
• whether the sexual conduct was unwelcome; 
• the nature and extent of the sexual conduct; and 
• the impact of the sexual conduct on the employee.4 
1 S Jagwanth, PJ Schwikkard and B Grant Women and the Law (1994) at 33. 
2 W Petrocelli and BK Repa Sexual Harassment on the Job 4ed (1998) at 1. 
3 T Stephens and J Hallas Bullying and Sexual Harassment: A Practical Handbook (2006) at 2. 






















It is worth noting that the above definition has a subjective component 
in that the impact of harassment on the plaintiff is of relevance. The conduct 
should amount to impairment of dignity.s This is a new feature in the 2005 
Code as there was no mention of impairment of dignity in the 1998 Code.6 
The 2005 Code thus introduces a potential delictual and human rights 
element into the definition of sexual harassment in that there is an 
acknowledgment that sexual harassment is an affront to dignity. The 
advantage with the 2005 Code is the subjective test for sexual harassment. 
The appropriate judicial test for impairment of dignity was outlined in 
De Lange v Costa7 where the court assessed the plaintiff's view of detriment 
from a reasonable person's point of view. It is proposed that the subjective 
test must be qualified by an objective assessment of sexual harassment as 
enunciated in the delictual test for impairment of dignity in De Lange.B In 
delict, there is an additional requirement as held in De Lange9 that one of the 
essentials to ground a successful action for iniuria is an intention on the part 
of the offender to produce the effect of his conduct. Unlike in delict, the 
intention of the perpetrator is not part of the test for sexual harassment in the 
EEA. 
The industrial court defined sexual harassment for the first time in a 
landmark case of J v M as follows: 
If one applies the dictionary meanings of words, sexual harassment would mean to 
trouble another continually in the sexual sphere. In the employment relationship the 
word has a slightly different connotation and is very broadly unwanted sexual 
attention in the employment environment .. . In its wider view it is, however, any 
unwanted sexual behaviour or comment which has a negative effect on the 
recipient.10 
It is suggested that sexual harassment is an annoyance, which pollutes 
professional relations in the workplace and makes it difficult for women to do 
s Item 5.4 2005 Code. 
6 1998 Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases, which formed 
part of the LRA. 
71989 (2) SA 857 (A). 
8 Supra (n7). See also ch 3 on the discussion of the judicial tests to sexual harassment. 
9 Supra (n7). 
10 (1989) 10 ILJ 755 (IC) at 7570-G. 
17 
their job. It is clear that inherent in sexual harassment is gender inequality 
because women are deprived of free and full participation in the labour 
market. 
2.3 Harassment 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act11 
(PEPUDA) seeks to eradicate unfair discrimination and harassment, and to 
promote the achievement of equality. In the context of sexual harassment in 
the workplace, the PEPUDA does not apply to the employer-employee 
relationship by virtue of section 5(3) which provides that the PEPUDA 'does 
not apply to any person to whom and to the extent to which the EEA applies'. 
The PEPUDA is therefore beyond the scope of this research. 
Guidance on the 'harassment' aspect of sexual harassment can be 
sought from the definition of 'harassment' as contained in section 1 of the 
Domestic Violence Act12 which defines 'harassment' to mean: 
Engaging in a pattern of conduct that induces the fear of harm to a complainant 
including-
a) repeatedly watching, or loitering outside of or near the building or place 
where the complainant resides, works, carries on business, studies or 
happens to be; 
b) repeatedly making telephone calls or inducing another person to make 
telephone calls to the complainant, whether or not conversation ensues; 
c) repeatedly sending, delivering or causing the delivery of letters, telegrams, 
packages, facsimiles, electronic mail or other objects to the complainant. 
The above definition highlights the point that conduct will amount to 
harassment if it is a pattern, persistent in nature, and repeated by the 
perpetrator. This view is consistent with the Law Commission 
recommendation that 'an element of repetition be included in a definition of 












stalking' .13 However, section 2 of the Stalking Bill defines stalking to include a 
single 'protracted' act. It is emphasized that what differentiates a single 
'protracted' act from a once off incident is that a single 'protracted' act may be 
sufficiently serious and comprehensive to constitute a hostile work 
environment and interfere with the plaintiff's work performance. The EEA is 
uninformed by external rules which define harassment since the letter and 
spirit of the EEA is to deter gender discrimination in the workplace and not 
merely minimize it to single ad hoc incidents of sexual harassment. It must be 
noted that the employer is enjoined, in terms of section 60(2) of the EEA, to 
ensure elimination of gender discrimination and any such culpable failure 
will result in deemed personal liability on the part of the employer in terms of 
section 60(3) of the EEA.14 
The 1998 Code stated that 'sexual attention becomes sexual harassment 
if the behaviour is persisted in, although a single incident of harassment can 
constitute sexual harassment'.15 The 2005 Code has correctly removed the 
reference to the 'persistent' nature of sexual harassment and states that 'a 
single incident of unwelcome sexual conduct may constitute sexual 
harassment' _16 It is suggested that the notable omission to the reference of the 
repeated nature of sexual harassment in the 2005 Code is because in 
interpreting and applying the EEA, the purpose of anti-discrimination and 
gender equality must be taken into account. It is for this reason that the 2005 
Code recognizes sexual harassment as a form unfair discrimination.17 
Women are therefore not expected to tolerate any level of unfair 
discrimination. It is suggested that a single act of sexual harassment is 
13 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 108 (Project 130) 'Stalking' (2004) at para 
1.34. See also Concise Oxford English Dictionary lled (2004) which defines sexual 
harassment as 'the repeated making of unwanted sexual advances or obscene remarks to a 
person, especially in the workplace'. 
14 See ch 6.2 on the discussion of the remedy of statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 
60 of the EEA. 
1s Item 3.2(a) 1998 Code. 
16 Item 5.3.3 2005 Code. 











sufficient to constitute gender discrimination because women have a right to 
work in a discriminatory-free environment and every single instance of 
gender discrimination is unfair discrimination, warrants legal, and employer 
intervention. 
2.4 Why men sexually harass women? 
It is important to understand the basis of sexual harassment to understand 
why men sexually harass women. It is submitted that the harm of sexual 
harassment is not primarily motivated by sexual desire but is mostly about 
power struggle between the sexes, mainly macho-power as is clear from the 
following observation: 
Sexual harassment has more to do with power relations than with sexual interest. For 
many it is a form of oppression, victimization or intimidation based on relationships 
of power and authority. In some instances abuse of power is linked only to 
hierarchical rank, but in many countries women's groups, workers' and employers' 
organizations and government agencies link abuse of power with the traditional 
status of women in society and observe that when harassed, a person's identity as a 
sexual being takes precedence over her identity as a worker.18 
The 'disparities in structural power within employment institutions are 
important, even central, to understanding sexual harassment' and 'a series of 
social and cultural arrangements have ensured, amongst other things, that 
women are continually evaluated primarily in terms of their sexuality' .19 
Sexual harassment is causally linked to power-relations in the workplace in 
that: 
Because workplaces are defined by vertical stratification and asymmetrical relations 
among supervisors and subordinates, individuals can use the power of their 
positions to extort sexual gratification from their subordinates.20 
Manipulation of organizational power is therefore a recipe for sexual 
harassment in that a supervisor uses his dominant position of authority to 
1s E Date-Bah Promoting Gender Equality at Work: Turning Vision into Reality for the Twentt;-first 
Centun; (1996) at 140. 
19 Jagwanth et al op cit (nl) 38-9. 










alter the conditions of employment of his subordinates. Hierarchical power in 
the workplace equips men with authority and bargaining power to exploit 
women in exchange for employment benefits and to impose economic harm 
for failure to comply with sexual demands. Sexual harassment is also an 
assertion of patriarchal power in that 'it is a spillover of male dominance from 
the home to the workplace, from the private to the public sphere'.21 
Patriarchal attitudes and gender-bias towards women also contribute 
to men asserting their masculinity through the organizational power in the 
workplace. This includes exerting authority, which often encompasses 
mismanagement of duties to put women at a detriment and disadvantaged 
position compared to their male counterparts. The effect of the employer's 
inaction in curbing abuse of such organizational power will serve to condone 
and encourage sexual harassment in the workplace and may result in 
constructive dismissal.22 It is for this reason that the plaintiff has a remedy of 
personal liability, common-law vicarious liability and statutory vicarious 
liability against the employer who rubberstamps sexual harassment in the 
workplace.23 
2.5 Same-sex harassment 
A conceptual obstacle to the concentration on male as opposed to female 
harassment is that the statutes are framed in gender-neutral approach, 
applying to both women and men. It is submitted that sexual harassment is a 
problem rooted in gender hierarchy and gender inequality in the workplace 
characterized by male dominance and female subordination whereby 'men 
who harass use their social, economic, organizational, and physical power to 
define how gender is to be structured in an organizational setting' _24 
21 JE Gruber and P Morgan In the Company of Men: Male Dominance and Sexual Harassment 
(2005) at 5. 
22 See ch 6.4.2 on the discussion of constructive dismissal. 
23 See chs 5-8 on the discussion of the remedies the plaintiff can bring against the employer. 












Furthermore, 'laws based on gender-neutrality tend to hide the realities of 
gender hierarchies' and are 'incapable of grasping the complex realities in 
which we live' .25 It is precisely this liberal gender-neutral approach, which 
devalues gender-based violence and oppression, because it does not explicitly 
acknowledge and recognize the power discrepancy between the sexes, in the 
workplace.26 
It is submitted that all persons are equal before the law, enjoy equal 
protection before the law, and are equally entitled to the Constitutional 
guarantees and liberties. Therefore, the law applies equally to members of the 
opposite sex and same sex. Conversely, sexual harassment does not only 
occur between members of the opposite sex but can occur between members 
of the same-sex. A legal claim to same-sex harassment lies in terms of the 
Constitution and the EEA, which outlaw unfair discrimination based on 
gender, sex or sexual orientation.27 Franke correctly states that: 
To understand sexual harassment as a regulatory practice that constitutes gendered 
subjects by inscribing, enforcing, and policing hetero-patriarchal gender norms is to 
provide a better account of what sexual harassment is and what it does in both 
different-sex and same-sex cases.28 
It is emphasized that same-sex harassment, sexual or not, serves to preserve 
the status quo in the workplace in that those who do not conform with the 
gender stereotypes and preconceived gender roles, are punished and 
discriminated against with a view to putting them in their place. Gregory29 
has correctly emphasized that: 
Same-sex harassment claims are mostly likely to succeed in two sets of circumstances. 
First, where the evidence points to a harasser who sexually desires the victim, such as 
when a gay or lesbian supervisor treats a same-sex subordinate in a sexually charged 
manner, it is reasonable to infer that the harasser acts in that fashion because of the 
victim's sex. Second, when it is established that the harassment was motivated by a 
25 S Baer 'Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German, 
and U.S. Law' in Directions in Sexual Harassment Law CA MacKinnon and RB Siegel (2004) at 
586. 
26 I am grateful to one of my examiners for highlighting this observation. 
27 Ss 9(3)-(4) Constitution and 6(3) EEA. 
28 KM Franke 'What is Wrong with Sexual Harassment' (1997) 49 Stan L Rev 691 at 772. 














belief that the victim did not conform to gender stereotypes, the courts are likely to 
attribute the victim's sex as a basis for the harasser's conduct 
It is suggested that same-sex harassment would be actionable because of 
discriminatory treatment suffered for failure to conform to patriarchal or 
heterosexual norms, which would not have occurred but for the victim's 
sexual orientation or gender. Therefore, indignity and inequality are suffered 
in same-sex harassment because of difference in belonging to a protected 
class. 
2.6 Forms of sexual harassment 
It is important that women must be able to recognize and identify sexual 
harassment when they experience it, hear it or see it. Sexual harassment can 
take many forms ranging from physical gestures and hints to verbal and non-
verbal conduct. The 2005 Code identifies five forms of sexual harassment and 
lists examples (not a closed list) of prohibited conduct, which would form 
part of these classifications - that is to say, physical,30 verbaI31 and non-
verbal,32 victimisation33 and quid pro quo.34 The industrial court identified 
forms of sexual harassment in a landmark case of J v Af35 as 'conduct which 
can constitute sexual harassment ranges from innuendo, inappropriate 
gestures, suggestions or hints or fondling without consent or by force to its 
worst form, namely rape'. 
It is essential that every company must have a sexual harassment 
policy, which forms part of the conditions of employment, and breach thereof 
should constitute misconduct warranting dismissal. The employer must also 
train and educate the staff on the contents of the sexual harassment policy and 
30 Item 5.3.1.1 2005 Code. 
31 Item 5.3.1.2 2005 Code. 
32 Jtem 5.3.1.3 2005 Code. 
33 Jtem 5.3.2.12005 Code. 
34 Item 5.3.2.2 2005 Code. 









must give clear examples of prohibited conduct.36 It is submitted that 
examples of prohibited conduct and interaction with employees during 
training programmes will help distinguish between what is acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour in the workplace. 
The 2005 Code also bears a resemblance to the United States sexual 
harassment law in that it recognizes the quid pro quo harassment in terms of 
which there is an element of reciprocity where sexual favours are made a term 
of employment in exchange for better employment opportunities.37 For 
example, quid pro quo harassment would be present where a supervisor says 
to a female subordinate, 'sleep with me, and you will be guaranteed a salary 
increase and/ or a promotion'. Similarly, a quid pro quo sexual harassment is 
present where a supervisor says to his female subordinate, 'if you do not 
sleep with me, I will withhold employment benefits and opportunities from 
you'.38 
Quid pro quo harassment is rife between the supervisor and his 
subordinates. Abuse of power in the workplace is aggravated by the fact that 
employees are at the supervisor's mercy and are economically dependent on 
their jobs for survival and livelihood.39 It follows therefore that sexual 
harassment in the workplace context will result in an extreme form of 
emotional distress and career regression. It is suggested that quid pro quo 
harassment could be prevented by an employer training the supervisors and 
holding them accountable to a higher than normal ethical standard, because 
36 Ss 5.3.1.1-3 2005 Code - examples of verbal, non-verbal and physical conduct that constitute 
sexual harassment. 
37 English law also outlaws a quid pro quo type of sexual harassment in section 6(1) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975, which makes it illegal for employers to discriminate on grounds 
of sex in the provision of access to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training in the 
workplace. See ch 7.4 on the discussion of vicarious liability in the United States. There are 
two types of sexual harassment in the United States - that is to say, quid pro quo and hostile 
environment harassment. 
38 Quid pro quo harassment is akin to extortion because the harasser intimidates his victims by 
promising good career prospects if they comply with his sexual demands, and threatens work 
sabotage and a tangible employment detriment for non-compliance. 






of potential abuse of authority and potential threat to alter the terms of 
employment when dealing with subordinates. It is recommended that 
supervisors be held accountable for misconduct because of mismanagement 
of organizational power. Furthermore, 'the problem of sexual harassment 
should also be dealt with in staff orientation, education, and training 
programmes' .40 
The 2005 Code has now correctly included sexual favouritism under 
quid pro quo and made victimisation a separate form of harassment whereas it 
was a component of sexual favouritism in the 1998 Code.41 Sexual favouritism 
is a sub-category of quid pro quo harassment in that the common factor in both 
is that a tangible employment action will ensue because of compliance or 
failure to comply with sexual demands. It is suggested that the legislature 
should have included both sexual favouritism and victimisation as part of quid 
quo pro in the 2005 Code. It is argued that victimisation is part of quid pro quo 
in that there is an element of reciprocity and a tangible employment detriment 
ensues when a competent employee is denied employment opportunities for 
failure to comply with the sexual demands. 
A possible explanation on why the 2005 Code treats victimisation 
separately is the fact that it is a more serious form of sexual harassment, 
which encompasses making the workplace unbearable for subordinates who 
refuse to heed to the supervisor's sexual advances. Another distinguishing 
feature between 'victimisation' and 'sexual favouritism' is that in 
victimisation the plaintiff deteriorates in her work progress, work prospects, 
and work satisfaction. In sexual favouritism, the plaintiff climbs up the 
corporate ladder and prospers. Put this way, a tangible employment 
detriment weighs heavier than a tangible employment benefit. 
40 J Grogan Workplace Law Bed (2005) at 181. 














Electronically transmitted messages, with sexual explicit contents, can 
amount to sexual harassment. In Singh v Island View Storage Ltd42 the 
commissioner recognized that sexually explicit messages can create a hostile 
and uncivilised working environment and thus protected the victims of 
sexual harassment and upheld the perpetrator's dismissal. The applicant was 
dismissed for sending a sexually explicit e-mail on the company's 'intranet' to 
three female colleagues in contravention of the company's email policy, 
which forbade transmission of sexually explicit messages and pictures. The 
perpetrator claimed that he had done so as a joke, and that his dismissal was 
unfair because other employees indulged in similar practices. 
The commissioner found that dismissal was justified since the 
applicant had shown no remorse; on the contrary he had gone out of his way 
to insult and belittle the complainants during the disciplinary inquiry and 
constantly referred to them as 'bitches' and used obscene language during the 
proceedings.43 It is interesting to note that the applicant claimed that he had 
sent sexually explicit messages and pictures as a joke but such defence was 
dismissed. In labour law, one can conclude that a defence of a 'joke' is not 
available to the respondent because the 2005 Code specifically lists sex-related 
jokes as a form of sexual harassment thereby negating any possibility on the 
part of the legislature to let' sex-related jokes' slip the sexual harassment net.44 
In delict, on the other hand, a defence that the respondent was merely joking 
is available to rebut the presumption of animus iniuriandi and unlawfulness if 
a reasonable bystander would have regarded the uttered words as a joke.45 
Following the court judgment in Singh, 46 the 2005 Code officially 
recognizes electronic transmission of sexual explicit pictures or objects, as a 
42 [2005] 1 BALR 98 (CCMA). 
43 Supra (n42) at 99. 
44 Item 5.3.1.2 2005 Code. 
45 See Masch v Leask 1916 TPD 114 at 116, where the court held that for the defence that the 
words complained of were uttered in jest without malice and animus iniuriandi to succeed, 
'the words must be accepted as such by the by-standers' and the defendant must prove that 
'it could be taken up in no other light by a reasonable person'. 













form of sexual harassment. It is recommended that the employer must 
introduce an email policy forming part of the conditions of employment, 
which provides that electronic transmission of sexual graphics or content 
amounts to email policy abuse, and is considered a form of sexual 
harassment. 
2.7 Unwelcome conduct 
The 2005 Code defines sexual harassment as 'unwelcome conduct of a sexual 
nature'47 and it does not define what unwelcome conduct is. Guideline can be 
sought from the now repealed 1998 Code which stated that the 'unwanted 
nature of sexual harassment distinguishes it from behaviour that is welcome 
and mutual' .48 The European Commission Code of Practice also states: 
The essential characteristic of sexual harassment is that it is unwanted by the 
recipient, that it is for each individual to determine what behaviour is acceptable to 
them and what they regard as offensive.49 
The test advanced by both the 2005 Code and European Commission is 
subjective in that it states that it is for each individual to determine behaviour 
that is acceptable to them and what they regard as offensive meaning 'one 
man's meat is obviously another woman's poison'. so However, it is argued 
that 'this can cause problems where the claimant is particularly sensitive'Sl 
hence the need to qualify the subjective criterion with an objective dimension. 
The relevant question that should be asked therefore is: 'would a reasonable 
47 Item 4 2005 Code. 
48 Item 3(1) 1998 Code. 
49 Article 2 European Commission Recommendation and Code of Practice 'Protection of the 
Dignity of Women and Men at Work' 92/131/EEC (1991). 
50 www.bartleby.com The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy 3ed (2002). One man's meat is 
another man's poison means 'What is good for one person may be bad for another; what is 
pleasant to one person may be unpleasant to another' . 










person find the behaviour unacceptable by normal standards of behaviour 
and did that complainant find it caused them upset?'52 
The United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson 
drew a distinction between consent and welcomeness and held that: 
The fact that sex-related conduct was "voluntary", in the sense that the complainant 
was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment 
suit brought under Title VIL The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the 
alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome" .53 
It is highlighted that the correct inquiry is whether the respondent, by her 
conduct, indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not 
whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary. 
It is suggested that unwelcomeness is a broader concept than lack of 
consent in that as much as lack of consent indicates unwelcomeness, a person 
can consent to conduct without welcoming it, but one cannot welcome 
conduct without simultaneously consenting to it. It is observed that what 
differentiates consent from welcomeness is that consent involves free 
participation in the activity which is assumed to be according to the 
participant's will (welcome). Hence, indication that conduct is 'unwelcome' 
differentiates consent from unwelcomeness. Therefore, there is a continuum 
between voluntary submission, consent (agreement) and welcomeness 
(approval). 
There is also distinction between 'consent' and 'welcome' in the wrong 
of sexual harassment in delict and labour law. The concept of 'welcomeness' 
is unique to the wrong of sexual harassment in labour law since it properly 
accounts for the disparity of power in the workplace, threat of sabotage and 
victimisation which usually forces the plaintiff to submit ( consent) to sexual 
advances which are unwanted. 
52 Ibid. See also De Lange supra (n7) on the subjective and objective test to an impairment of 
dignity. See ch 3 on the discussion of the judicial tests to sexual harassment. 










In Sadulla v Jules Katz & Co Ltd54 S and his female colleague, K engaged 
in sex talk and K subsequently alleged sexual harassment and reported the 
conversation to management. The court held that Kand S were both engaged 
in a conversation, which took place between two willing and consenting 
adults and which in no way amounted to sexual harassment or sexual 
aggression, as there was no real aggressor and a real victim.55 It is argued that 
there is a thin line between consent and unwelcomeness in that voluntary 
participation in the conduct signals welcomeness unless the plaintiff makes it 
clear through her conduct, and not lead the perpetrator to reasonably believe 
that his conduct is 'welcome'. 
The enquiry of 'unwelcomeness' is a necessity in the context of sexual 
harassment because there is potential for consensual intimate relationships in 
the workplace on the one hand; and yet there is gender discrimination and an 
impairment of dignity where such sexual conduct is unwelcome, on the other 
hand. It is emphasized that the 2005 Code requirement that the plaintiff 
indicate 'unwelcomeness' does not unduly restrict the remedy. Instead, it 
serves to guard against a flood of frivolous actions where conduct was 
objectively welcome. 
One could ask why it be required that the plaintiff declare the 
unwelcomeness of the conduct when the test of unwelcomeness is objective. It 
is submitted that a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff cannot 
allege unwelcomeness in the absence of her conduct to the contrary. Another 
reason why it is mandatory for the plaintiff to indicate unwelcomeness is the 
fact that section 60(1) of the EEA states that 'the alleged conduct must 
immediately be brought to the attention of the employer'. It is argued that 
reporting the incident of sexual harassment gives the employer an 
opportunity to remedy and correct the alleged conduct, failure of which will 
541997 (18) ILJ 1482 (CCMA). 









result in statutory vicarious liability on the part of the employer in terms of 
section 60(3) of the EEA. 
It is suggested that the remedy of statutory vicarious liability as 
contained in section 60 of the EEA will thus not be available for the plaintiff 
who has chosen not to report the alleged gender discrimination. Reporting 
sexual harassment therefore gives the employer an opportunity to do 
something about sexual harassment in the workplace and take steps to protect 
the plaintiff against sexual harassment. Furthermore, reporting sexual 
harassment helps build up a strong case for the plaintiff who is faced with the 
problem that it 'usually occurs without witnesses, behind closed doors, so in 
court one word stands against the other'. 56 
It is emphasized that if women do not indicate unwelcomeness but 
instead continue to endure harassment, then the EEA legislative intent of 
promoting the women's cause against sexual harassment and 'challenging 
gender and sexual norms in the workplace' ,57 will be in vain. The plaintiff is 
required to take steps to make it clear that the conduct complained of, is 
unacceptable.58 It is submitted that 'simply ignoring the perpetrator and not 
responding'59 as outlined in the 2005 Code, is not a viable option because 
suffering in silence creates a wrong impression that the plaintiff tacitly 
approves of the wrongful conduct. In addition, by suffering in silence the 
plaintiff is shielding the harasser more than she is endeavouring to protect 
herself. 
56 KS Zippe! The Politics of Sexual Harassment: A Comparative Study of the United States, the 
European Union, and Germany (2006) at 46. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Item 5.2.1 2005 Code states that there are different ways in which an employee can evince 
that conduct is unwelcome, including non-verbal conduct such as walking away or simply 










The 2005 Code introduces a new notion, which accounts for the fact 
that given cultural differences, 60 it may be difficult for the plaintiff to be 
assertive, stand up for herself against the perpetrator, and indicate 
'unwelcomeness'. There are instances where the inherent abuse of authority 
involved in sexual harassment makes it difficult for the plaintiff to indicate 
unwelcomeness because the perpetrator is a person of authority who might be 
revered. It is recognized that no one is above the law and no perpetrator is 
untouchable. The 2005 Code makes provision for such potential difficulties 
where the perpetrator is a person of seniority, by stating that: 
Where a complainant has difficulty indicating to the perpetrator that the conduct is 
unwelcome, such complainant may seek the assistance and intervention of another 
person such as a coworker, superior, counsellor, human resource official, family 
member or friend. 61 
In a more recent rape case of S v Zuma, Dr Friedman's evidence 
concluded that: 
The shock at being awoken from sleep by the man she regarded as a father figure, 
naked with an erect penis, and his intentions clear, was such a shock, she was 
trapped, terrified and helpless and was unable to respond in any way other than 
freeze.62 
The court rejected the complainant's evidence that there was a 
father/ daughter relationship between her and the accused.63 This means that 
there was no father/ daughter relationship (abuse of parental authority) 
which would have made the complainant susceptible to being exploited by 
the accused. Van der Merwe J further rejected Dr Friedman's evidence and 
concluded that the complainant did not freeze during sexual intercourse but 
found that consensual sex took place between the complainant and the 
accused.64 
60 Cultural differences include notions of respect and reverence. For example, in an African 
culture women are brought up to be passive and submissive to men. Therefore, standing 
one's ground and being assertive is perceived as rude and unladylike. 
61 Item 5.2.3 2005 Code. 
62 2006 (7) BCLR 790 (W) at para 65. 
63 Supra (n62) at para 108. 




The court further held that: 
After the 'rape' the complainant was in a position to immediately phone the world 
and to tell them about it but she instead decided to report to her close friends in 
terms indicating that no rape had taken place.65 
Van der Merwe J made an important observation that 'the complainant was in 
a position to immediately phone the world' - meaning nothing stopped or 
prevented her from complaining about the alleged rape. In the context of 
sexual harassment, it is clear from the Zuma66 case that the plaintiff should not 
feel 'helpless', disempowered or incapacitated to act and women must be 
assertive and exercise their constitutional and labour right not to be subject to 
unfair discrimination. 67 It is submitted that if victims of sexual harassment 
want the benefit of the protection of the law, they must speak up and effect 
the change they want to see in the workplace. It is stressed that women can no 
longer continue playing victims, feel helpless and voiceless thereby enforcing 
the subordinate status of women in the society. It is suggested that the fight 
against sexual harassment will be won when women stop viewing themselves 
as existing in the shadow of men and functioning as a weaker gender. 
It is argued that reasonable steps, which indicate unwelcomeness, can be 
by words or conduct and can include anything from the following: 
a) changing the subject; 
b) walking out of the door;68 
c) making it clear to the harasser that his conduct is not a joke but is 
offensive and unacceptable; 
d) seeking intervention of the third party if the plaintiff fears 
victimisation or retaliation because of the nature of relationship 
between the plaintiff and the perpetrator; 
65 Supra (n62) at para 161. 
66 Supra (n62). 
67 S 9 Constitution ands 6(1) EEA. 
68 In Reed and Bull Information Systems Ltd v Stedman (1999) IRLR 299 EAT, the court held that 
it is not necessary for a woman to make a public fuss to indicate her disapproval; walking out 
of the room might be sufficient. 
32 
e) writing to the perpetrator advising him to stop the harassing and 
threatening to take further action if his conduct persists; and 
f) laying a complaint or grievance with the relevant authority. 
The requirement of welcomeness means that: 
Law requires skills of contention - including standing one's ground - and persuasion 
- including touching and moving others onto one's ground - abilities that are still 
widely stigmatized, even demonized in women.69 
This extract highlights that the law alone will not transform the workplace if 
women do not make use of the remedies available to assert and protect their 
rights in the workplace. 
2.8 Conduct of a sexuaVnon-sexual nature 
The 2005 Code defines sexual harassment as 'unwelcome conduct of a sexual 
nature'70 thus adopting a view that sexual harassment is motivated by sexual 
desire and so overlooking the dynamics involved in what drives men to 
sexually harass women. It is observed that the flaw with the 2005 Code sexual 
nature paradigm is that it presupposes women as sex objects and overlooks 
the discriminatory impact of sexual harassment on women as women 
(gender), as autonomous human beings, as equal workers and as ambitious 
professionals. 
The 2005 Code emphasizes such gender stereotypes by regressing to a 
point of stating that conduct must be of a sexual nature - thereby instilling the 
very gender stereotypes which the EEA and the Constitution seeks to 
eradicate. It is argued that sexual harassment is not merely conduct of a 
sexual nature but includes disparate gender-based conduct, which sabotages 
women's progress and advancement in the workplace solely because of their 
gender. The 2005 Code correctly captures sexual harassment as a form of 
69 CA MacKinnon Women's Lives, Men's Laws (2005) at 107. 





unfair discrimination which is prohibited on grounds of sex and/ or gender 
and/ or sexual orientation but narrows the scope of application by defining 
the test for sexual harassment to only cover 'conduct of a sexual nature' .71 
The fact that harassment was on grounds of gender is one of the factors 
taken into account once it has been established that conduct was of a sexual 
nature.72 This makes it more demanding to prove sexual harassment where 
discriminatory conduct was not of a sexual nature but was primarily 
motivated by gender or sexual orientation, which nevertheless constitutes a 
form of unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA.73 It is noted that on the face 
of it, this suggests that any form of discrimination based on sex, gender or 
sexual orientation (for example, refusing to employ a woman because she is a 
woman) is capable of being regarded as 'sexual harassment'. This surely is not 
the legislative intention because not every form of discrimination based on 
gender amounts to 'sexual harassment'. It is emphasized that sexual 
harassment is a specific form of discriminatory conduct amounting to unfair 
discrimination which is outlawed in terms of section 6(3) of the EEA, and 
defined as a guideline in item 4 of the 2005 Code. The aim of the EEA is to 
outlaw gender discrimination and remove gender stereotypes instilled by 
sexual harassment. 
It is submitted that the plaintiff can still succeed by invoking item 2.1 
of the 2005 Code which reiterates that it is instructive only as a 'guide'74 and 
does not give rise to enforceable legal rights and obligations. Furthermore, the 
Code merely contains 'instructive guidelines to be followed and not binding 
in law' and it follows that the employer 'cannot be penalised for its failure to 
implement these recommendations' .75 Therefore, the 2005 Code does not take 
71 Items 3-4 2005 Code. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ss 6(1) and 6(3) EEA. 
74 See Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Ptt;) Ltd & another [1997] 10 BLLR 1320 (LC) at 
1325, where Landman AJ held that the Code is relevant as a guide 'to those who apply and 
supervise industrial justice' and does not give rise to legal rights and obligations. 
















away rights and recourse the plaintiff has in terms of section 60 of the EEA. 
However, compliance with the 2005 Code is relevant as evidence when 
establishing unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA and in determining the 
extent to which the employer discharged its duty of care and obligations in 
accordance with the provisions of section 60(2) of the EEA. It is highlighted 
that the common feature between the 2005 Code and United Kingdom the 
Code of Practice on Sex Discrimination in Employment76 is that: 
The Code, which is not legally binding but which can be introduced as evidence in all 
sex discrimination cases, provides that employees should be advised to use the 
internal procedures where appropriate, but that this is without prejudice to the 
individual's rights to apply to an industrial tribunal. 77 
It emphasized that the 2005 Code's justification for what appears to be an 
excessively narrow interpretation of the term 'sexual' in item 4, is 
questionable and renders it in conflict with section 6(3) of the EEA and thus 
since the 2005 Code is relevant as only a 'guide' - ultra vires. Caution must 
thus be exercised against an excessively narrow interpretation of the term 
'sexual' in the context of item 4 of the 2005 Code, which limits harassment to 
conduct motivated exclusively by sexual desire. It is submitted that sexual 
desire is not a requirement to ground a sexual harassment claim as it was 
correctly held by Scalia J in Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc that 
'harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an 
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex' _78 
An instructive definition of sexual harassment is in the European 
Commission Code of Practice, which defines sexual harassment as: 
76 Issued in 1985 by the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) in terms of section 58(A)(l) 
of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
77 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 'Report on Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace in EU Member States' (June 2004) at 38. See also item 2.1 of the 2005 Code which 
states the Code is instructive as a 'guide'. See also item 7.3 of the 2005 Code on the 
evidentiary relevance of the pro-active steps taken by the employer. - which states that the 
adoption of a sexual harassment policy and the communication of the contents of the policy 
to employees, should, amongst other factors, be taken into consideration in determining 
whether the employer has discharged its obligations in accordance with the provisions of 
section 60(2) of the Employment Equity Act (EEA). 












Unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, or other conduct based on sex affecting the 
dignity of women and men at work. This can include unwelcome physical, verbal or 
non-verbal conduct ... 79 
It is interesting to note that the above definition is different to the South 
African definition of sexual harassment as contained in the 2005 Code. The 
European Commission Code of Practice not only acknowledges conduct of a 
sexual nature as constituting sexual harassment, but also includes 'other 
conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work'. The 
2005 Code only defines sexual harassment as unwelcome conduct of a sexual 
nature and does not refer to other forms of conduct, which are not of a sexual 
nature.so 
It is submitted that conduct of a 'non-sexual' nature includes conduct 
which affects women as workers and human beings (not as merely sexual 
beings), and which is an obstacle to their career progress and economic 
prosperity. Sexual harassment includes gender-based conduct, which 
denigrates the worker based on his or her gender and includes the following 
coercive behaviour: 
• Over or covert behaviour used to control, influence or affect a person's job, career or 
status; 
• Explicit/ implicit promise of career advancement in exchange of sexual favours; 
• Explicit/ implicit promise of recruitment in exchange of sexual favours; 
• Threatening of dismissal if sexual favours are not granted; and 
• Making work difficult if sexual favours are not granted.Bl 
The 2005 Code acknowledges sexual harassment as a form of gender 
discrimination yet it does not define it to include other forms of 'non-sexual' 
conduct based on gender, which violate the rights of an employee.82 The 
disadvantage of the 2005 Code sexual nature paradigm is that it is 'under 
inclusive and too narrow in its attempts to weed out sexual harassment' in the 
79 Article 2 European Commission Recommendation and Code of Practice above (n43). 
so Item 4 2005 Code. 
Bl D Chappell and V Di Martino Violence at Work 3ed (2006) at 18. 









workplace.83 Other writers also support the European Commission Code of 
Practice: 
The strength of this definition lies in the manner in which sexual harassment is 
conceptualised ... This de-emphasises the supposedly sexual aspect of harassment, to 
concentrate on the question of power which MacKinnon and others have argued is at 
the heart of sexual harassment. It also allows those acts of harassment which are not 
explicitly sexual (such as sexist jokes and comments) and which are the cornerstone 
of 'hostile environment' harassment to be covered more explicitly.84 
Schultz rightly opines a reconceptualization of sexual harassment to 
recognize the 'non-sexual' forms of sexual harassment which includes work 
sabotage which has the 'function of denigrating women's competence for the 
purpose of keeping them away from male-dominated jobs or incorporating 
them as inferior, less capable workers'.85 In order to conceptualize the harm of 
sexual harassment properly, it is proposed that its definition must include 
'non-sexual' forms of harassment, which are gender related, but not of a 
sexual nature. Sexual harassment is still an appropriate legal term even 
though it includes 'non-sexual' forms of conduct which entail abuse of 
masculine power - sexual means 'gender' as interchangeably used with 'sex' 
to describe male and female sexes. 
2.9 Conclusion 
It is concluded that sexual harassment can be defined as unwelcome conduct, 
which offends a reasonable person in the position of the victim.86 It essentially 
involves two sides of a coin amounting to an impairment of dignity, self-
esteem, self-worth, respect, ubuntu, individual autonomy and equality from a 
positive aspect; and freedom from insult, degrading treatment, disrespect, 
abuse of trust and unfair discrimination from a negative aspect. The 2005 
83 AB Cochran Sexual Harassment and the Law: The Mechelle Vinson Case (2004) at 199. 
84 Jagwanth et al op cit (nl) 50. 
85 S Estreicher Sexual Harassment in the Workplace - Proceedings of New York University 51st 
Annual Conference on Labor (2001) at 92. 









Code, albeit relevant as only a 'guide', is to be applauded for following the 
European Commission Code of Practice definition of sexual harassment, 
which captures the essential harm of sexual harassment as constituting an 
affront to dignity of workers in the workplace, which was not mentioned in 
the 1998 Code. The 2005 Code has not only broadened the definition to 
capture the essence of the harm of sexual harassment as constituting an 
affront to dignity of women but has stated that it constitutes 'a barrier to 
equity' in the workplace.87 However, the actio iniuriarum achieves the general 
civil law protection of dignity and the 2005 Code relates to the elimination of 
sexual harassment in the workplace (employment equity). 
'Equity' is an important concept in the 2005 Code, which can be 
understood in the light of the preamble of the EEA, which is to achieve true 
democracy in the workplace by eliminating all traces of discrimination, which 
are a barrier to equality and to economic advancement of workers. Le Roux, 
Orleyn and Rycroft have stated that the new requirement that 'sexual 
harassment constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace' could allow 
employers to escape liability even if the victim has suffered no tangible job 
detriment.BB 
It is emphasized that the statement of 'barrier to equity' does not 
burden the victim by requiring her to evince a tangible job detriment. This is 
merely a blanket statement of what the harm of sexual harassment 
encompasses in the employment context and is in line with the spirit of the 
EEA, which outlaws any conduct, which causes disharmony in the workplace 
and is contrary to equal participation of all in the labour market. 'Barrier to 
equity' does not imply a tangible job detriment to the plaintiff and perhaps Le 
Roux, Rycroft and Orleyn interpret it rather restrictively in the employment 
context. The 2005 Code must not be interpreted narrowly - but rather in the 
87 Item 4 2005 Code. 
88 R le Roux, T Orleyn and A Rycroft Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and 







light of the spirit of the EEA which is to eliminate unfair discrimination, 
promote productivity and economic progress of the labour force.89 
The time has come for women to break their silence and speak out 
against gender discrimination, and signal 'that they no longer have to put up 
with it, because sexual harassment is not just a nuisance but also an injustice 
and illegal' .90 The fight against sexual harassment cannot be won if women 
are not pro-active in fighting for their rightful place in the workplace and 
asserting their right to a sexual harassment free environment. The 2005 Code 
has defined the scope of sexual harassment to enable women to identify the 
experience and wrong of sexual harassment. 
89 See the preamble to the EEA. 







Chapter Three - Test for Sexual Harassment - A Subjective or Objective 
Approach 
3.1 Outline 
In applying the test for sexual harassment, the issue before the courts is: from 
whose perception of the nature of sexual harassment is decisive? This chapter 
explores various tests to sexual harassment with a view to proposing a 
judicial test that is gender neutral, objectively determined, in harmony with 
the precepts of the Constitution and gives effect to the letter and spirit of the 
EEA. 
3.2 The reasonable man test 
This section will examine the application of the reasonable man test as a 
standard used to assess sexual harassment and will highlight how the 
reasonable man test is not adequate to successfully provide redress to victims 
of sexual harassment. Bernstein correctly rejects the male-central approach 
implicit in the reasonable man test and maintains 'a reasonable person 
standard implicitly denies that women and men are likely to react differently 
to sexual invitations, innuendo, teasing, or displays in the workplace' .1 
In Baskerville v Culligan International Co2 the court applied a reasonable 
man test and drew a line between severe or pervasive conduct, which is 
deeply offensive and sexually harassing that causes discriminatory terms or 
1 A Bernstein 'Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect' (1997) 111 Haro L Rev 445 at 465. A 
male-central approach of the law to the concept of reasonableness in the case of the defence of 
private defence, especially in domestic abuse cases was adopted in S v Engelbrecht 2005 (2) 
SACR 41 (W) at para 327, where a battered wife killed her husband 'in self-defence' -
Satchwell J held that where an accused relies on the justification of 'self-defence' for killing an 
abusive spouse, the court must assesses whether the accused acted lawfully from an objective 
point by deciding what ' the fictitious reasonable man, in the position of the accused and in 
the light of all the circumstances would have done' . 





conditions of employment and, on the other hand, conduct which is vulgar or 
mildly offensive tinged with sexual innuendo. The court held that that the 
concept of sexual harassment was designed to protect working women from 
the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women 
and was not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity.3 
The court then found that 'Mr Hall, whatever his qualities as a sales 
manager, is not a man of refinement; but neither is he a sexual harasser' .4 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that he never touched the 
plaintiff or invited her to have sex with him, or to go out on a date with him. 
Furthermore, the court held that he never said anything to her that could not 
be repeated on prime-time television.s 
It is submitted that the court did not appreciate the sensitivity of sexual 
harassment in poisoning the workplace for women workers. Instead, the court 
implied that a certain degree of sexual harassment must be tolerated and 
condoned because it was of the view that the concept of sexual harassment 
was not meant to clean up the workplace of all the obscenity and vulgarity. 
Viewed this way, the court considered sexual harassment to be an inherent 
risk in the workplace, which should be assumed by women to a certain extent. 
The court thus failed to apply its mind to the principles of ethics, dignity, and 
gender equality, which should be upheld in the workplace. 
In Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co6 the female plaintiff complained of a 
work environment that was a den of erotica and had pictures of nude and 
semi-nude women on calendars, on desks and on wall papers. The male co-
workers also used crude language evidencing anti-female sentiments, and 
routinely referred to women as 'whores, cunt, pussy, and tits' .7 Applying the 
reasonable man test, the court held that the male co-worker's obscenities 
3 Supra (n2) at 430. 
4 Supra (n2) at 431. 
s Ibid. 
6 805 F 2d 611 (6th Cir 1986). 
7 Supra (n6) at 624. 
41 
although annoying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the 
psyches of the plaintiff or other female employees and as such did not 
interfere with her work performance.s The court held that a plaintiff may not 
prevail in the absence of conduct which would interfere with that 
hypothetical reasonable individual's work performance and affect seriously 
the psychological well-being of that reasonable person under like 
circumstances. 9 In justifying its conclusion, the court held that Title VII was 
not meant to bring a magical transformation in the social mores of American 
workers.10 
It is observed that the court was thus of a view that sexual harassment 
is tolerable to the extent to which it does not affect work performance and 
psychological well-being of the plaintiff. The court's message is that the 
plaintiff is expected to endure sexual harassment until it is so grave that it 
affects her health and results in poor work performance. The court 
overlooked the fact that sexual harassment is forbidden behaviour, which is 
not supposed to happen in the workplace. It is emphasized that no person 
enters the workplace either to be sexually exploited or to have her rights 
unjustly eroded. It should be enough that sexual harassment affects the 
productivity of the employee to the extent that it interferes with her ability to 
properly execute her duties. 
The reasonable man test has thus served to trivialise the harm of sexual 
harassment on women by rendering discriminatory and pervasive behaviour 
as acceptable within professional relations at work and has failed to account 
for the impact of sexual harassment from a viewpoint of the victim. Another 
injustice evident in applying a reasonable man test is Caleshu v Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith.11 The complainant claimed that over five-month period 
her superior forcibly french-kissed her on two occasions and touched her 
s Supra (n6) at 622. 
9 Supra (n6) at 620. 
10 Supra (6) at 626. 




thigh on two occasions while outside office, and told her off-colour jokes. 
Despite the fact that some of the acts of sexual harassment constituted 
indecent assault, the court dismissed the complainant's claim for sexual 
harassment on grounds that the conduct complained of was 'trivial'.12 
In Scott v Sears, Roebuck & Co13 the court also failed to address the 
shortcomings of a reasonable man test and adopt a reasonable woman test, as 
suggested by the dissenting judgment in Rabidue - that is to say, 'the 
perspective of the reasonable victim which simultaneously allows courts to 
consider salient sociological differences as well as shield employers from the 
neurotic complainant'.14 In this case, a female mechanic alleged that she was 
harassed by her co-workers through repeated propositions, winking at her, 
sexual innuendo, offers of massage, and slaps on her buttocks. She was asked 
'what will I get for it' when she asked her male co-worker for advice and one 
of her male co-workers also told her that she must 'moan and groan' while 
having sex. 
The court held that the sexual harassment that the plaintiff was 
subjected to was not so 'severe or debilitating' to poison the plaintiff's 
working conditions.is It submitted that South African law is more sensitive to 
the plaintiff than in the United States. In South African law, there is no 
stringent requirement that the plaintiff must first establish that the conduct 
complained of was 'sufficiently severe or pervasive' .16 This requirement has 
often been construed by the United States courts to mean that for sexual 
harassment to be actionable, it must be so grave as to make it impossible for 
the plaintiff to resume with her normal duties. It is argued that given the high 
unemployment rate in South Africa, women are left with no choice but to 
12 Supra (n11) at 1083. 
13 798 F 2d 210 (7th Cir 1986). 
14 Supra (n6) at 626. The dissenting judgment envisioned that the perspective of a reasonable 
woman properly conceptualizes the harm of sexual harassment in that it accounts for 
sociological differences between males and females and their different reactions to similar 
situations. 
1s Supra (n13) at 213-4. 






continue working albeit under difficult work conditions. It is stressed that it 
would be double punishment to expect women to suffer gender 
discrimination and at the same time not offer equal protection of the law until 
the plaintiff has put up with sexual harassment to a certain degree of severity. 
In Staton v Maires County17 the charge was for rape, which is the most 
gruesome form of sexual harassment. The court dismissed her claim for 
sexual harassment and concluded that she might have invited sexual 
intercourse. The court reasoned that although the act of intercourse was 
shown to have affected her psychological well-being, she was able to work 
regular shifts after the incident, and there was no testimony to the effect that 
she was distressed or unable to perform her duties. It is argued that the court 
did not give effect to the true intention of the Congress as evinced in Title VII, 
which outlaws sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination.is 
The court also did not give effect to the grammatical meaning of the 
EEOC guidelines which state that the conduct must have the effect of 
'unreasonably interfering with the work performance'19 as opposed to 
rendering the individual unable to do her work as the court concluded. The 
fact that the plaintiff continued to work regular shifts, on whose livelihood 
she depended, does not mean that it was not difficult for the plaintiff to 
perform her work. The court found that the plaintiff suffered psychologically 
and yet still concluded that she might have invited sexual intercourse instead 
of establishing whether she 'welcomed' it. It is argued that the plaintiff could 
have brought a separate criminal charge of rape. 
It is submitted that the problem with the reasonable man test which 
makes it unacceptable is that it tends to be male biased and is not sensitive to 
what women find offensive which may not be offensive to men. The use of 
the reasonable man standard to evaluate sexual harassment claims: 
17 868 F 2d 996 (8th Cir 1989). 
18 S 703(a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 42 USC§ 2000e-2. 












can validate male-perpetrated norms and that risk is aggravated by the fact that the 
judges who interpret and enforce sexual harassment laws are mostly men who may 
themselves be guilty of bias, or possibly even harassment.20 
It is established that the reasonable man test is thus a narrow approach, 
which is contrary to the audi alteram partem21 maxim, which looks at the 
reaction of both males and females instead of assuming on behalf of women 
that the wrongful conduct is unobjectionable. The reasonable man test should 
be rejected because it serves to reinforce the status quo of gender 
discrimination without addressing the core issues underlying the wrong of 
sexual harassment. 
Problems with applying a reasonable man test are evident in the 
outcome of the decisions because the courts apply a male standard in judging 
whether conduct of sexual harassment was offensive. The reasonable man test 
therefore 'fails to account for the wide divergence between most women's 
views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men'; and enables the 
defendants and courts to 'sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behaviour 
fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men'.22 
3.3 The reasonable woman test 
This section examines 'the reasonable woman' test, will explore its 
advantages, and will conclude with reasons why it must be rejected. It is 
submitted that it will be impossible to comprehend the nature of harm of 
sexual harassment on women if the courts do not adopt an objective test, 
which looks at a reasonable woman. 
20 OS Brenneman 'From a Woman's Point of View: The Use of a Reasonable Woman Standard 
in Sexual Harassment Cases' (1992) 60 U Cin L Rev 1281 at 1306. 
21 Audi alteram partem means 'hear the other side.' Available at 
http://www.lib.uct.ac.za/law /Info/latin.htm#D (accessed 23 March 2006). 











In Ellison v Brady23 the plaintiff received 'bizarre' love letters from her 
male co-worker. The court adopted a reasonable woman test and held that 
Ellison's reaction was not idiosyncratic or hyper-sensitive. The court found 
that a reasonable woman could have had a similar reaction and would have 
found defendant's conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions 
of employment and create abusive working environment.24 The court justified 
its reasoning as follows: 
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a 
sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to 
systematically ignore the experiences of women. The reasonable woman standard 
does not establish a higher level of protection for women than men. .. Instead, a 
gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to participate in 
the workplace on an equal footing with men. By acknowledging and not trivializing 
the effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards 
ensuring that neither men nor women will have to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in 
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living.25 
The court's reasoning is compatible with a reasonable person in the position 
of the victim test discussed in chapter three because it includes an emphasis 
on the views and experiences of women. However, a gender-conscious test is 
not compatible with a gender-blind examination because it involves paying 
special attention to 'gender' as opposed to an objective assessment of the 
circumstances. The court then sent out a strong message in summing up its 
reasoning and held as follows: 
We hope that over time both men and women will learn what conduct offends 
reasonable members of the other sex. When employers and employees internalize the 
standard of workplace conduct we establish today, the current gap in perception 
between the sexes will be bridged.26 
It is argued that the implications of a reasonable woman test are that 
the law recognizes the harm and exploitation of women in the workplace and 
in the society. The result is to take an objective viewpoint of a reasonable 
woman, and combine it with the victim's subjective viewpoint and in so 
doing guard against the flood of litigation, which would ensue, should a 
23 924 F 2d 872 (9th Cir 1991). 
24 Supra (n23) at 880. 
25 Supra (n23) at 879-80. 







solely subjective test be adopted. It is observed that the advantage in applying 
the reasonable woman test thus gets to embrace and appreciate the experience 
of women as evident in cases of domestic violence and battered woman 
syndrome. The rationale for the reasonable woman test is that it accounts for 
and protects the vulnerable status of women in our society and seeks to bring 
reform to the status quo of ignoring the extent to which women suffer the 
harm of sexual harassment. 
Brenneman favours the reasonable woman test to determine whether 
the conduct complained of has risen to such a level to constitute actionable 
harassment because it 'discards the male biased definition of acceptable 
behaviour and substitutes a viewpoint that acknowledges the effects of sexual 
harassment on women' .27 Nel similarly endorses the reasonable woman test 
because it 'would not only result in a fair evaluation of the conduct, but 
would also promote an understanding and awareness of what conduct 
offends reasonable members of the opposite sex' .2s 
It is submitted that the reasonable woman test looks at harm from a 
viewpoint of a woman and puts into perspective what that woman felt and 
went through when she experienced sexual harassment using a feminist 
approach of a reasonable woman test as a yardstick. This is the case because a 
reasonable woman test regards sexual harassment as follows: 
a) as gender discrimination; 
b) as an injury to women as human beings; 
c) as an affront to dignity; 
d) as an injury to women as workers with equal participation in the 
labour market as men; and 
27 Brenneman op cit (n20) 1296. 
28 SS Nel 'A Comparative Review of the Law Regarding Sexual Harassment in the Workplace' 









e) as an injury to women as members of a female gender with equal 
rights, power and job opportunities as men. 
It is emphasized that the same can be said about same-sex harassment 
between gays. Same-sex harassment can be inflicted to perpetuate gender 
stereotypes and put gay men or suspected gay men in their place when 
viewed as non-conformists to the traditional male norms. It is argued that in 
same-sex harassment a person is discriminated against not because of gender, 
but because of his sexual orientation which is viewed as failure to conform to 
gender norms (for instance, gender stereotype statements like calling a gay 
person 'a sissy' or 'a faggot'). The problem with the reasonable woman test is 
that it fails to account for same-sex harassment and is inflexible in that it 
assumes that men are not sexually harassed. Viewed this way, the test has the 
'potential to further both paternalism and essentialism'.29 The shortcoming of 
the reasonable woman test is that it leaves open the question of what test 
would be used in the woman on man harassment or same-sex harassment 
involving males because in such circumstances, a reasonable woman test 
would be inappropriate. 
It is submitted that the extent of harm is the same and gender non-
discrimination has the same protection of law between gays as when sexual 
harassment occurs between members of the opposite sex.30 It is concluded 
that the reasonable woman standard must be rejected because: 
[I]t appears to act as a mere panacea, lulling advocates for sexual harassment victims 
into believing that courts have made a significant change in the standard when it is 
likely to have little effect on the outcomes of real cases.31 
29 TM Beiner Gender Myths v Working Realities: Using Social Science to Reformulate Sexual 
Harassment Law (2005) at 203. 
30 Item 5.1.2 2005 Code ands 6(1) EEA. 













3.4 The reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics test 
This section will examine the 'reasonable person with the same fundamental 
characteristics' test, used in the United States to assess whether conduct is 
severe or pervasive enough to found sexual harassment. In Fuller v City of 
Oakland32 the court suggested a standard, which determines hostility and 
pervasiveness of sexual harassment from a perspective of a 'reasonable 
person with the same fundamental characteristics' as the victim. The court 
viewed this test as a middle ground between a reasonable man test and a 
reasonable woman test. 
The problem with the 'reasonable person with the same fundamental 
characteristics' test is defining the ambit of those fundamental characteristics 
to be taken into account. It is emphasized that the fundamental characteristics, 
which can be taken into account, are infinite and largely subjective such as a 
victim's experiences, upbringing, education, race, religion, socialization, and 
conservative attitudes. It is submitted that a reasonable person with the same 
fundamental characteristics is the victim herself because her reaction is 
assessed from her viewpoint because it takes the victim as the harasser found 
her. This test is not instructive to South Africa and must be rejected. 
3.5 The reasonable person in the position of the victim test 
This section advocates the use of the 'reasonable person in the position of the 
victim' test. The reasonable woman test can be viewed as reverse 
discrimination similarly that a reasonable man test is rejected. The reasonable 
woman test tends to 'gender' women and entrenches gender stereotypes, 
which the EEA seeks to eradicate. It is for this reason therefore that it is 
proposed that South Africa should adopt a viewpoint of a 'reasonable person 
in the position of the victim' when dealing with sexual harassment. It is 














argued that gender discrimination must be actionable, as long sexual 
harassment would have placed a reasonable person in the position of the 
victim in an objectively discriminatory employment terms and conditions. 
In Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services Inc,33 the court established that 
an employer may be liable for harassment by a supervisor or co-worker who 
is the same gender as the target of the harassment, provided the plaintiff was 
discriminated against on grounds of gender. The legal standards governing 
same-sex claims, the court held, are identical to those used to evaluate a claim 
for the opposite sex harassment. Title VII is violated when the conduct 'is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's 
employment and create an abusive working environment' .34 Justice Scalia 
reiterated that 'the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all 
the circumstances' .35 
The reasonable person in the position of the victim is a subjective and 
objective test. It is subjective to the extent that if the victim does not 
subjectively perceive the working environment to be detrimental, the plaintiff 
has not suffered gender discrimination, and there is no EEA violation. The 
subjective component is there to sympathise with the victim by assessing the 
harm of sexual harassment from the victim's subjective viewpoint. The 
objective component seeks to curb a flood of litigation by the faint-hearted 
victims. The subjective and objective components therefore balance each other 
to ensure an equitable result. Objectivity assesses the victim's reaction using a 
standard of a reasonable person - whether objectionable conduct created an 
objectively abusive environment. 
The essence of EEA is that it forbids discriminatory conduct on 
grounds of sex, gender or sexual orientation which is an affront to dignity and 
33 118 S Ct 998 (1998). 
34 Supra (n33) at 1001 citing Harris v Forklift Systems Inc 510 US 17 (1993) at 21. 





















gender equality in the workplace and objectively alters the terms and 
conditions of employment of the plaintiff. The 2005 Code similarly recognizes 
same-sex harassment as a form of discrimination on grounds of sex, gender 
and sexual orientation.36 The reasonable person in the position of the victim 
test is thus a fair test since same-sex harassment in now recognized in our 
law. The reasonable woman test falls short of covering same-sex harassment 
as it presupposes sexual harassment only takes place between members of the 
opposite sex. 
Le Roux, Rycroft and Orleyn opine that a 'reasonable victim' standard 
is a more appropriate standard since both women and men can be victims of 
sexual harassment.37 They reject the reasonable person test as complex and 
ask 'whether can the same reactions be expected of a woman in a rural setting 
as one in an urban setting?' The same question can be asked of the 'reasonable 
victim' test whether the same reactions can be expected of a rural woman 
(victim) compared to an urban westernised woman (victim). It is observed 
that the reasonable victim test presupposes that the plaintiff is a 'victim' 
before a finding whether sexual harassment is indeed actionable and it defeats 
the whole purpose of introducing objective criteria. 
Oncale3B reasserted that the 'reasonable person' determination requires 
careful consideration of the social context in which particular behaviour 
occurs and is experienced by the individual who is the target of the alleged 
harassment. This means that the reasonable person in the position of the 
victim test takes into account the context of harassment, and the 
circumstances surrounding the target of harassment. 'In the position of the 
victim' is relevant in determining whether sexual harassment was severe 
36 Item 5.1.2 2005 Code. 
37 R le Roux, T Orleyn and A Rycroft Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and 
Processes (2005) at 31-2. See also C Garbers 'Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: 
Different Approaches, Persistent Problems' (2002) 14 SA Mere LJ 371 at 395 where the writer 
supports the use of the 'reasonable victim' test and suggests that harassment must be looked 
at from the perspective of the victim. 
38 Oncale supra (n33) at 1003. 
I 
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enough to ground an actionable claim, to ensure that the objective standard of 
a reasonable person is not applied in vacuum but from the perspective of a 
'reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under similar or like 
circumstances'. 39 
The reasonable person in the position of the victim is not the same as a 
reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics test. A 
reasonable person in the position of the victim signifies intent to take into 
account surrounding external circumstances to the victim compared to 
characteristics which are internal to the victim and which are therefore 
subjective. Characteristics are innate traits and qualities of the victim, which 
are subjective, and therefore the reasonable person with the same 
fundamental characteristics as the victim is a biased test.40 It is submitted that 
the victim's hypersensitivity and attitude to men based on her experience are 
characteristics. 
It is submitted that the courts will define the 'position of the victim' on 
a case-by-case basis by balancing the subjective and objective aspects of the 
legal claim. In so doing, the court will apply a purposive approach to uphold 
the principles of dignity and equity entrenched in the EEA and the 
Constitution. The subjective aspect accounts for the effect of sexual 
harassment from the victim's viewpoint. The objective aspect assesses the 
effect of sexual harassment from the perspective of a reasonable person in the 
39 Highlander v KFC National Management Co 805 F2d 644 (6th Cir 1986) at 650. 
40 See Nichols v Frank 42 F 3d 503 (9th Cir 1994) at 512, where the court applied the reasonable 
person with the same fundamental characteristics as the plaintiff and held: 
Under this approach also, it is proper for the fact-finder to consider the fundamental 
or immutable characteristics of the individual bringing the charge. But here, in 
addition, the fact-finder may consider other individual traits or characteristics known 
to the accused that may make the victim especially or uniquely susceptible to quid pro 
quo sexual harassment. A defendant may be liable under the subjective test if he 
intentionally takes advantage of some particular fear or weakness that afflicts the 
accuser. By the same token, characteristics of and information about the accused 
which are known to the accuser may become part of the mix. A showing that either 





position of the victim. It is emphasized that in applying 'a reasonable person 
in the position of the victim' test, the judicial enquiry will include an objective 
assessment of the following factors: 
a) time and place where sexual harassment occurred; 
b) whether it unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work 
performance; 
c) impairment of dignity; 
d) how sexual harassment impaired the plaintiff's health and 
psychological welfare; 
e) the power/ trust relationship between the victim and the offender; 
f) how the words were uttered taking into account the gestures of the 
perpetrator; and 
g) the objective severity of harassment. 
The reasonable person in the position of the victim therefore means a 
reasonable person would have believed she was subjected to sexual 
harassment, and would have found, as the plaintiff did, that it had altered her 
condition of employment. This standard is also appropriate in cases where a 
sex-worker, whose trade involves inviting sexual advances, is sexually 
harassed. This is so where a sex-worker is 'off-duty' and a man nevertheless 
takes advantage and forces himself onto the sex-worker. The test would be 
whether a reasonable person in the position of the victim (sex-worker) would 
have believed that she was violated and subjected to sexual harassment. This 
test is therefore appropriate because of its flexibility and ability to be 
accommodated to different set of facts and circumstances. 
It is established that the reasonable person in the position of the victim 
test is fair, gender neutral and is neither male nor female specific but assesses 
conduct from a reasonable worker's viewpoint who finds herself/himself 


















harassment, a victim will be able to use a 'reasonable person in the position of 
the victim' test in that it is not gender specific and avails itself to all victims of 
sexual harassment. It is concluded that this test fits well within the feminist 
cause for the elimination of all barriers faced by women in the workplace and 
treating women with equal humanity and respect. The essence of the feminist 
cause is the elimination of second-class status often accorded to women in the 
workplace, and the restoration of equality and dignity often impaired by the 
wrong of sexual harassment. The gender-neutral test is a compromise in that 
neither uses the benchmark of a reasonable man nor of a reasonable woman, 
but instead treats both genders on par. In any case, the reasonable woman test 
was advanced as an alternative to the male-biased and discriminatory 
'reasonable man' test. 
The problem with adopting the reasonable woman test as expounded 
by feminist theorists is that it reinforces the perception that women are 
victims and sorry-cases who need special sympathy and yet all persons are 
equal before the law. As much as the use of a gender-neutral test does not 
recognize the gender hierarchy and power imbalance inherent in the 
workplace, it is nevertheless compatible with the values and fundamental 
rights entrenched in the Constitution by de-emphasizing and neutralizing 
gender-based prejudice. In conclusion, the disadvantage with the reasonable 
woman test/ reasonable man test is that: 
a) It emphasizes femininity/ masculinity; 
b) It advances one gender at the expense of the other; and 
c) It is contrary to the constitutional principle against gender 














In South Africa, a subjective test41 is applied in certain cases (labour law) but 
not in delict where the De Lange v Costa42 objective test of dignity applies. In J 
v M43 the court adopted a subjective test using the viewpoint of the victim 
when it defined sexual harassment as 'unwanted sexual behaviour or 
comment, which has a negative effect on the recipient'. In Reddy v University of 
Natal44 the court also applied a subjective test when it defined sexual 
harassment as 'any unwanted sexual behaviour or comment, which has a 
negative effect on the recipient'. It is concluded that these are not true 
subjective tests because the negative effect on the recipient could be 
considered objectively by the courts. It is suggested that the decisive factor is 
therefore not the response of the recipient, but rather a response of a 
reasonable person in his/her position. 
The use of an entirely subjective test may lead to a potential floodgate 
of litigation and is capped in delict under the objectively assessed impairment 
of dignity. Guidance can be obtained from delict where a subjective 
impairment of dignity must be satisfied first, and then an objective 
assessment ensues. The conduct complained of must objectively be insulting 
and therefore wrongful in addition to the subjective element where the 
plaintiff feels offended.45 A subjective and objective test bridges the gap 
between different perceptions of what is harmless to one and harmful to 
another by adopting a middle ground of a reasonable person in the 
circumstances of the victim. The reasonable person in the position of the 
41 J v M (1989) 10 ILJ 755 (IC) at 757 and Reddy v UniversihJ of Natal 1998 (1) BLLR 29 (LAC) at 
31-2. 
42 1989 (2) SA 857 (A). 
43 J v M supra (n41) at 757. 
44 Reddy supra (n41) at 31-2. 













victim test is compatible with De Lange, 46 which advances an objective test of 
impairment of dignity and the reasonable person in the position of the victim 
test and is in harmony with the Constitution.47 
It is emphasized that the objective test guards against a floodgate of 
frivolous claims whilst taking into account the legal convictions of the 
community and the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Furthermore, it is argued that since common-law vicarious liability is a no-fault 
liability as far as it relates to the employer, the objective test helps keep 
liability of the employer within manageable and reasonable bounds. 
It is submitted that a subjective test might lead to a flood of litigation 
where hypersensitive people claim to have suffered sexual harassment even 
though the conduct is not objectively offensive. This test takes into account 
the totality of the circumstances and determines whether the conduct 
complained of was subjectively perceived by the plaintiff; and whether a 
reasonable person in the position of the victim would have found the conduct 
offensive, as the plaintiff did. The objective element 'in the position of the 
victim' further ensures that the test is not applied in vacuum in total 
disregard of the reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under 
comparable circumstances. 
The reasonable person in the position of the victim test is gender blind 
or gender neutral, objectively determined and thus gives effect to the spirit of 
the EEA, which outlaws gender discrimination as a form unfair 
discrimination and protects both women and men subjected to sexual 
harassment. Furthermore, the reasonable person in the position of the victim 
test is proposed in the interest of justice because it is consistent with the 
Constitution in that it gives equal protection of the law for both women and 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Dendy v UniversihJ of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and others [2005] 2 All SA 490 (W) at 
para 29, where the High Court held the De Lange v Costa hybrid test which consists of a 





















men (gender neutral) and promotes the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill 















Chapter Four - A Case for Regarding Sexual Harassment as Gender 
Discrimination 
4.1 Outline 
This chapter will explore various theories advanced for regarding sexual 
harassment as gender discrimination and contextualize what is exactly wrong 
with sexual harassment. It is important that the principles of gender 
discrimination must be outlined to show how and to what extent they have 
captured the harm of sexual harassment beyond a mere explanation that 
sexual harassment constitutes gender discrimination because it happens to 
women as women. 
'Gender' and 'sexual' are used interchangeably to highlight the multi-
facets attendant in the harm of sexual harassment which include an 
impairment of dignity; unfair discrimination; violation of constitutional 
rights; economic harm; and work sabotage. 'Sexual' conduct is primarily 
motivated by sexual desire and entails treating women as sex objects. 'Non-
sexual' forms of sexual harassment have the effect of treating women in the 
workplace as sub-human, sub-citizens and sub-workers on the basis of 
'gender' and often includes 'non-sexual' conduct which makes it difficult for 
them to pursue their careers and be productive in their jobs, and often lead to 
constructive dismissal. Sexual harassment amounts to gender discrimination 
because it promotes gender hierarchy at work and creates Chinese-walls 
between male career-progress, which is unhindered, and female career-
progress, which is suppressed. 
The Office of the Status of Women noted that 'although gender 














sufficient to achieve equality in women's participation in the paid labour 
force'.1 
4.2 What is discrimination? 
The term 'discrimination' is defined in article 1 of the United Nations 
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against Women2 
to mean: 
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex (emphasis added) 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of 
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
It is emphasized that the above definition uses 'on the basis of sex' to 
denote gender as a basis of discrimination, and not 'sexual conduct' in the 
sense of conduct primarily motivated by sexual desire. It is conceded that the 
difficulty appears to be the fact that the term 'sexual' is being used 
interchangeably in a narrow as well as a broad sense because 'sex' is used in 
'the dual sense of biological sex and social gender' and in the 'third sense of 
sexuality' .3 It is also clear from the above definition that inherent in 
discrimination is differential treatment 'on the basis of sex' (gender) without 
legal justification which has an adverse effect of eroding the freedom of 
women, and free enjoyment and exercise of their human rights. 
MacKinnon states that the discrimination aspect in sexual harassment 
is evident in the fact that sexual harassment results in both sexual exploitation 
of women and 'economic exploitation' of women thereby 'enforcing women's 
1 Office on the Status of Women 'South Africa's National Policy Framework for Women's 
Empowerment and Gender Equality' (2000). 
2 UN General Assembly 'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women' (1979). 















second economic-class status' .4 A case for regarding sexual harassment as 
gender discrimination is correctly conceptualized by MacKinnon as: 
a practice of inequality on the basis of gender, an integral act of subordinate civil 
status because of sex, a practice of treating a person as less than fully socially human 
because that person is a woman or a man, a status-based treatment of hierarchy, of 
dominance, that is illegal.5 
Sexual harassment has a discriminatory effect on women because they 
suffer work sabotage, unequal work opportunities, sexual and economic 
exploitation, and victimisation based on their gender. The effect of gender 
discrimination is evident from a human resource perspective, because the 
harm of sexual harassment can 'cause a decline in employee performance and 
productivity' and ultimately result in 'higher recruitment and training costs, 
loss of skilled people, potential labour relations breakdown and high 
litigation costs' .6 
4.3 Statutory prohibition of gender discrimination 
In South Africa, the legal basis of a claim for sexual harassment is in terms of 
section 6(1) and 6(3) of the EEA, which outlaws sexual harassment as a form 
of unfair discrimination based on gender, which reads as follows: 
1) No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, 
in any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social 
original, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, 
belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth 
2) 
3) Harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is prohibited 
on any one, or a combination of grounds of unfair discrimination listed in 
subsection (1). 
The EEA therefore makes it unlawful to discriminate on grounds of 
gender in an effort to achieve gender equality in the workplace by eliminating 
4 MacKinnon op cit (n3) 177. 
5 CA MacKinnon Women's Lives, Men's Laws (2005) at 186. 
6 PS Nel, PS van Dyk, GD Haasbroek, HB Schultz, T Sono and A Werner Human Resources 












all gender discriminatory barriers to equal participation in the workplace. 
Harassment must be discriminatory in order to violate the EEA since gender 
is designated as a protected class. Levy and Paludi correctly suggest that the 
behaviour or environment created by harassment must have the 'effect of 
making success on the job more difficult for one gender than the other' .7 
It is highlighted that the EEA (in terms of section 9(4) of the 
Constitution) gives effect to and regulates the constitutional prohibition of 
unfair discrimination in the employment context, and thus becomes the 
primary (in practice, exclusive) point of reference in dealing with 
discrimination in this context. In Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks SA 
(Pty) Ltd and OthersB the Constitutional Court held that: 
Where ... the Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation to give effect to the 
constitutional rights guaranteed in the Constitution, and Parliament enacts such 
legislation, it will ordinarily be impermissible for a litigant to found a cause of action 
directly on the Constitution without alleging that the statute in question is deficient 
in the remedies that it provides .... And where a litigant founds a cause of action on 
such legislation, it is equally impermissible for a court to bypass the legislation and to 
decide the matter on the basis of the constitutional provision that is being given effect 
by the legislation in question. 
This does not detract from the need to interpret the EEA 'in compliance with 
the Constitution'9 and infuse the prohibition of 'sexual harassment' with the 
principle of upholding the fundamental right to dignity and equality. 
Furthermore, 'the need to eliminate unfair discrimination does not 
arise only from Chapter 2 of our Constitution' but 'also arises out of 
international obligation' .10 Therefore, the EEA 'must be interpreted in 
compliance with'11 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 
(No. 111) of 1958 on discrimination (Employment and Occupation), which is 
7 AC Levy and MA Paludi Workplace Sexual Harassment 2ed (2002) at 28. Discrimination on 
grounds of gender is also outlawed in terms of section 6(3) of the EEA, in addition to sections 
9(3)-(4) of the Constitution. 
8 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 437. 
9 S 3(a) EEA. 
10 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 51. 








binding on South Africa since it was ratified in 1997.12 This Convention 
contains an instructive definition of 'discrimination', which is defined as 
follows: 
any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or 
· 13 occupation ... 
The abovementioned definition of 'discrimination' must therefore assist in 
delineating the meaning of 'harassment' in the employment context because 
sexual harassment is a form of 'sex' discrimination, which falls squarely 
within the provisions of Convention No. 111. Furthermore, Chappell and Di 
Martino emphasize that in examining the ILO member States' reports on 
Convention No. 111, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations noted that 'sexual harassment 
undermines equality at work by calling into question integrity, dignity and 
the well-being of workers' .14 
It is noted that in any event, even though South Africa has ratified 
Convention No. 111, the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work 'commits Member States to respect and promote principles 
and rights in four categories, whether or not they have ratified the relevant 
Conventions' .1s The four core principles are the following: 
... freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining, the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child 
labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.16 
Therefore, South Africa is duty bound in terms of its international obligations 
in Convention No. 111 and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, to adopt measures, which address and challenge the 
12 See section 231(2) of the Constitution which states that an international agreement is 
binding on the Republic of South Africa once it has been ratified. 
13 Article 1, 1 (a) of Convention 111 concerning Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation), 1958. 
14 D Chappell and V Di Martino Violence at Work 3ed (2006) at 266-7. 



















elimination of sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation. 
The 2005 Code recognizes sexual harassment as a form of gender 
discrimination and is prohibited on grounds of sex and/ or gender and/ or 
sexual orientation.17 This does not only broaden the scope for regarding 
sexual harassment as gender discrimination, but also includes same-sex 
harassment as a form of sexual harassment and unfair discrimination. In 
dealing with issues of unfair discrimination in employment, section 3 of the 
EEA enjoins that the 2005 Code must be taken into account when dealing with 
sexual harassment, which constitutes gender discrimination under the section 
6(3) of the EEA. 
In the United States, sexual harassment is recognized as a form of 
gender discrimination and is outlawed in Title VII, which prohibits 
employment discrimination based sex.18 The feminist theory instigated by 
Catherine MacKinnon in her book 'Sexual Harassment of Working Women' -
(1979) on regarding sexual harassment as a case for gender discrimination 
was of fundamental importance in transforming the law on sexual harassment 
in the United States, which has led to successful litigation of sexual 
harassment cases. 
4.4 Why sexual harassment is a case of gender discrimination? 
Rubenstein rightly opines that sexual harassment is a case of 'employment 
discrimination' as follows: 
17 Item 3 2005 Code. 
18 S 703 (a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 

















That it takes place in the context of unequal power, that underlying the sexual 
advance is the mutual knowledge (whether made explicit or remaining implicit) that 
the man is in the position to apply job-related sanctions, is the reason why sexual 
harassment is properly viewed as an employment discrimination.19 
It is submitted that some men may seek to preserve their 
organizational power and masculinity in the workplace in an attempt to 
sabotage women's economic independence and maintain their own economic, 
gender and political superiority in employment. The essence of legislation 
outlawing gender discrimination is 'whether members of one sex are exposed 
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of 
the other sex are not exposed'.20 Sexual harassment is a form of 
discrimination, which tends to perpetuate gender bias and discriminatory 
treatment of women by placing women 'in a cage rather than on a pedestal'.21 
Women suffer sexual harassment because of their gender and MacKinnon 
advances three reasons to justify this point: 
First, the exchange of sex for survival has historically assured women's economic 
dependence and inferiority as well as sexual availability to men. Second, sexual 
harassment expresses the male sex-role pattern of coercive sexual initiation toward 
women, often in vicious and unwanted ways. Third, women's sexuality largely 
defines women as women in this society, so violations of it are abuses of women as 
women.22 
Sexual harassment reaches the proportions of sex discrimination 
precisely because the conduct is disproportionately more offensive or 
demeaning to one sex as was held in the American case of Robinson v 
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc23 where demeaning pictures of naked women were 
pinned up in the workplace. In addition to visual material, there was graffiti 
directed at the employee, sexually explicit material placed in the employee's 
personal toolbox, and co-workers repeatedly made comments of a sexual 
nature to the employee and her co-workers. 
19 M Rubenstein 'The Law of Sexual Harassment at Work' (1983) 12 ILJ lat 2. 
20 Harris v Forklift Systems Inc 510 US 17 (1993) at 25. 
21 Frontiero v Richardson 411 US 677 (1973) at 684. 
22 MacKinnon op cit (n3) 174. 











The court held that the female welder at a shipyard was discriminated 
against based on the existence of a hostile work environment and but for fact 
of her gender, she would not have been the object of harassment. The court 
added that the presence of pictures sexualized the work environment to the 
detriment of all female employees. Sexual harassment is gender 
discrimination because it discriminates against women based on the 
membership of a protected category of gender. It is emphasized that sexual 
harassment has a discriminatory effect because it subordinates women to 
men. MacKinnon correctly outlines the discriminatory nature of sexual 
harassment in that it 'perpetuates the interlocked culture by which women 
have been kept sexually in thrall to men and at the bottom of the labour 
market' and results in the two forces converging - that is to say, 'men's control 
over women's sexuality and capital control over employee's work lives'.24 
4.5 Hostile Environment harassment as a case of gender discrimination 
Gender discrimination is not limited to quid pro quo type of sexual harassment 
necessitating the victim of sexual harassment to prove a tangible employment 
action or pecuniary loss because of sexual harassment. 
An analysis of the United States cases is instructive in establishing how 
sexual harassment can create a hostile environment for the plaintiff thereby 
amounting to gender discrimination. In the United States, a hostile type of 
sexual harassment can amount to gender discrimination without requiring the 
plaintiff to evince 'tangible loss' of 'an economic character'. It is for this reason 
that the court in Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson'25 rejected the petitioners 
argument to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for sexual harassment on grounds 
that in prohibiting discrimination with respect to 'compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges' of employment, the Congress was concerned with a 
24 MacKinnon op cit (n3) 174. 
















'tangible loss' of 'an economic character' , not with; 'purely psychological 
aspects of the workplace environment'. The court held that the language of 
Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination and that the 
phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a 
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women in employment.26 
In Harris v Forklift Systems Inc27 the court correctly recognized the link 
between job segregation on grounds of gender, a hostile work environment, 
and 'non-sexual' forms of sexual harassment, not motivated by sexual desire 
but nevertheless serving to undermine the competence of women as workers. 
The court also noted that the plaintiff need not prove that the discriminatory 
conduct unreasonably interfered with her performance or productivity and 
actually made it difficult for her to do the job thus offending gender equality 
in the workplace.2s 
The court held that a discriminatory hostile work environment, even 
one that does not seriously affect employee's job performance, discourages 
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their 
careers.29 The court reasoned that in order to establish a 'hostile environment 
sexual harassment' it suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to 
the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the 
harassment so altered working conditions as to make it more difficult to do 
the job.30 It is submitted that it is sufficient that sexual harassment affects the 
plaintiff's work morale and results in difficult working conditions. 
It is suggested that in South Africa it matters not whether the plaintiff 
has suffered an additional tangible employment action to succeed in proving 
26 Ibid. 
27 Supra (n20). 
28 Supra (n20) at 25. 
29 Supra (n20) at 22. 
















a case of gender discrimination. In Henson v City of Dundee31 the court held 
that sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for 
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the 
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. The court noted that a 
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for 
the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living could be as 
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.32 The court 
was of the view that sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee because of 
her sex is a pattern of behaviour that inflicts disparate treatment upon a 
member of one sex with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment. The court thus concluded that there is no requirement that an 
employee subjected to such disparate treatment prove in addition that she has 
suffered tangible job detriment. 
In Barnes v Costle33 the court dismissed the complainant's case for 
gender discrimination when her job was abolished because she had repulsed 
her male superior's sexual advances. The court held that she was 
discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused 
to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor. On appeal, the court found in 
favour of the complainant, reversed the district court summary judgment, and 
recognized the conditioning of employment enhancement on granting of 
sexual favours as sex discrimination. The Appeal Court held that but for her 
womanhood, her participation in sexual activity would never have been 
solicited. The court reasoned that to say that she was victimized in her 
employment simply because she declined the invitation is to ignore the 
asserted fact that she was invited only because she was a woman subordinate 
to the inviter in the hierarchy of agency personnel. 34 
3t 682 F 2d 897 (1982) at 902. 
32 Ibid. 
33 561 F 2d 983 (DC Cir 1977). See also Bundy v Jackson 641 F 2d 934 (DC Cir 1981), where the 
court accepted that hostile environment harassment amounts to gender discrimination which 
the woman would not have suffered but for her gender. 













It is concluded that sexual harassment is therefore a form of gender 
discrimination in that: 
a) it unfairly prejudices women and men by virtue of their membership to 
a protected class - that is to say, gender;35 
b) it materially discriminates on the working conditions, terms and 
benefits of employment for women; and 
c) it is a barrier to gender equality in the workplace. 
It is submitted that the key test in gender discrimination is that 'but for' 
her gender, she would not have suffered detrimental working conditions. 
This means that membership of a protected class is causally linked to sexual 
harassment. Sexual harassment amounts to gender discrimination when 
women suffer a disadvantage because they are women, and irrespective of 
whether the employee suffers a tangible employment action because of unfair 
discrimination. 
4.6 What is wrong with sexual harassment? 
The fundamental issue of equality is not whether one is the same or different; it is not 
the gender difference; it is the difference gender makes .... To be on the bottom of a 
hierarchy is certainly different from being on the top of one, but it is not simply 
difference that distinguishes the two. It is, in fact, the lesser access to resources, 
privileges, credibility, legitimacy, authority, pay, bodily integrity, security, and 
power that makes the two unequal.36 
It is argued that sexual harassment instils gender stereotypes to the detriment 
of harmonious relations between men and women in the workplace, because 
women are judged, treated, related to as women, not as human beings and 
workers worthy of ubuntu, respect, and dignity. Franke opines that what is 
wrong with sexual harassment as constituting gender discrimination is that it 
is a 'technology of sexism' which 'perpetuates, enforces, and polices a set of 
35 Ss 6 (1) EEA and 9 Constitution. 










gender norms that seek to feminize women and masculinize men'.37 It is 
argued that sexual harassment focuses on women's sexuality, which is 
unrelated to their ability, potential, and merit to do the work. It is emphasized 
that sexual harassment serves to disadvantage women and preserves the 
order of things in the workplace thereby undermining precepts of gender 
equality, which are guaranteed in the Constitution.38 
Mowatt states that sexual harassment occurs 'when a woman is 
expected to engage in sexual activity in order to obtain or keep her 
employment, or obtain promotion or other favourable working conditions'. 39 
The example highlighted by Mowatt40 that sexual harassment occurs when a 
woman is coerced to engage in sexual activity in order to obtain tangible 
employment benefits can be equated with forced prostitution where a woman 
is paid money in exchange for sex. It is submitted that in the case of sexual 
harassment a woman engages in sexual intercourse with a man in return for 
fringe benefits, which is prostitution in disguise because there is an economic 
quid pro quo element present. It is suggested that sexual harassment amounts 
to gender discrimination because women are expected to use their gender as a 
bargaining chip to secure employment benefits or suffer economic harm if 
they withhold sexual access to their supervisors. 
MacKinnon opines that sexual harassment is wrong because it violates 
the workers' 'right to work in an environment that is not discriminatorily 
oppressive, one in which they can be productive and survive materially free 
of sexual exactions' .41 Therefore, sexual harassment makes it difficult for 
women to receive fair recognition for their hard work but instead 
employment benefits are based on their sexual compliance/non-compliance. 
Abrams opines that gender discrimination is wrong because it 'disadvantages 
37 KM Franke 'What is Wrong with Sexual Harassment' (1997) 49 Stan L Rev 691 at 696. 
38 Sees 9 Constitution. 
39 JG Mowatt 'Sexual Harassment - New Remedy for an Old Wrong' (1986) 7 ILJ 637 at 638. 
40 Ibid. 








its victims as workers'42 and 'helps perpetuate the workplace as a site of male 
control',43 where 'gender hierarchy is the order of the day and masculine 
norms structure the working environment'.44 Abrams asserts that sexual 
harassment is aggravated by the fact that it compromises: 
the potential opportunities implicit in work, such as a greater economic self-
sufficiency and the exploration of new roles, career opportunities and new 
conceptions of the self not linked to stereotyped expectations.45 
Franke opines that 'construed according to formal equality principles, 
the wrong of sex discrimination amounts to dissimilar treatment of otherwise 
similarly situated workers' .46 It is submitted that where women are treated 
differently than their male counterparts, they are being discriminated against 
on their terms, privileges, and conditions of employment because of their 
gender. Ehrenreich correctly suggests a human rights approach and argues 
for distinguishing 'between the dignitary nature of the harm of workplace 
harassment and the discriminatory context in which much harassment 
occurs'47 because: 
By focusing on the nature of the harm of sexual harassment, sexual harassment is 
viewed as wrong not because it wrongs women, but because such treatment would 
deeply wrong any human being, regardless of sex.48 
It is submitted that the dignitary nature of the harm of sexual harassment is 
the core of discrimination because women as workers, rightful citizens, and 
human beings with self-autonomy must be vindicated and not marginalised 
as sex objects because of their gender. The discriminatory context enquiry, 
which vindicates gender equality, is thus secondary to protection of dignity 
and liberation of women as human beings. MacKinnon opines that sexual 
harassment is wrong because 'it deprives women of personhood by relegating 
42 K Abrams 'The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment' (1998) 83 Cornell L Rev 1169 at 
1218. 
43 Abrams op cit (n42) 1198. 
44 Abrams op cit (n42) 1219. 
45 Abrams op cit (n42) 1219-20. 
46 Franke op cit (n37) 712. 
47 R Ehrenreich 'Dignity and Discrimination: Towards a Pluralistic Understanding of 
Workplace Harassment' (1999) 88 Geo LJ 1 at 53. 
48 Ehrenreich op cit (n47) 21. 
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them to subservience through jointly exploiting their sexuality and their 
work' .49 Sexual harassment perpetuates sexism, amounts to abuse of 
masculine power, inflicts economic and dignitary harm on women and is 
'non-work-relevant, harmful behaviour aimed disproportionately a women' .50 
4.7 Relationship between equality and dignity 
Thus women are transforming the definition of equality not by making ourselves the 
same as men, entitled to violate and silence, or by reifying women's so-called 
differences, but by insisting that equal citizenship must encompass what women 
need to be human, including a right not to be sexually violated and silenced.51 
This section deals with the overlap between the rights to equality and dignity; 
and the values of equality and dignity in an effort to contextualize the harm of 
sexual harassment against the background of the Constitution. There is an 
ongoing debate on the relationship between dignity and equality in the 
context of the Constitution. Albertyn and Goldblatt suggest that the value of 
dignity should not inform the right to equality but that the right to equality 
should be 'primarily informed by the value of equality' untrammelled by any 
considerations of the value of dignity.s2 
Fagan similarly suggests that dignity does not lie 'at the heart of the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination'53 but that equality should be understood 
in its context as being based on the partial infringement of an 'independent 
constitutional right or a constitutionally-grounded egalitarian principle' .54 
The writer is therefore of the view that the essence of equality is to uphold the 
'protection of all independent constitutional rights' whereas the effect of the 
49 MacKinnon op cit (n3) 177. 
50 JE Gruber and P Morgan In the Company of Men: Male Dominance and Sexual Harassment 
(2005) at 119. 
51 MacKinnon op cit (n36) 48. 
52 C Albertyn and B Goldblatt 'Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality' (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 254. 
53 A Fagan 'Dignity and Unfair Discrimination: A Value Misplaced and a Right 
Misunderstood' (1998) 14 SAJHR 220 at 224. See also Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) 
BCLR 446 (CC) at para 79, where Ngcobo J held that 'dignity is an underlying consideration 
in the determination of unfairness'. 







dignity-analysis of unfair discrimination is to elevate the protection of only 
one right - that is to say, right to dignity, above all other constitutional 
rights.ss Davis also states that 'equality is too central a concept to be relegated 
to a secondary meaning' and: 
The Court needs to look at equality as a value which seeks to promote a democratic 
society that recognizes and promotes difference and individual as well as group 
diversity and thereby exhibit a commitment to ensuring that all within society enjoy 
means and conditions to participate significantly as citizens. 56 
Cowen strongly supports an intimate relationship between dignity and 
equality. She disagrees with the proposition advanced by Albertyn and 
Goldblatt,57 and opines that 'the value of equality - as a comparative concept 
- cannot alone support the equality right, and that the place of dignity as its 
kingpin can be defended' .ss Cowen therefore believes in the transformative 
power of the value of dignity, which 'informs the meaning of other rights'59 
and its pivotal role 'to guide and serve the Court's equality jurisprudence'.60 
Liebenberg defends the value of dignity in giving meaning to socio-economic 
rights and argues that 'respect for human dignity requires society to marshal 
its resources and respond strongly to situations in which certain groups are 
unable to gain access to basic socio-economic needs' .61 The writer recognizes a 
link between elevating the value of dignity and the essence of socio-economic 
rights and opines that 'the consequences of the deprivation will be severe 
( either in terms of threats to life or health) and erode the foundations for 
further development of people's capabilities'. 62 
ss Fagan op cit (n53) 247. 
56 DM Davis 'Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence' (1999) 116 SALJ 398 at 413-4. 
57 Albertyn and Goldblatt op cit (n52). 
58 S Cowen 'Can "Dignity" Guide South Africa's Equality Jurisprudence' (2001) 17 SAJHR 34 
at 54. 
59 Cowen op cit (n58) 55. 
60 Cowen op cit (n58) 58. 
61 S Liebenberg 'The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights' (2005) 





It is submitted that the views advanced by Cowen63 and Liebenberg64
 
are convincing in that the value of dignity informs all other rights protected in 
the Bills of Rights. This value will be nullified if the impairment of dignity 
aspect of sexual harassment (where women are deprived of their 'ubuntu', 
liberty, autonomy, and livelihood) is not acknowledged. It is underscored that 
women will thus be deprived of the promise of the constitutional protection 
of their rights if they are treated as less of human beings in the workplace and 
are denied their freedom of choice and freedom to reach their maximum 
potential in their careers. Furthermore, the resultant effect of sexual 
harassment is that women can never enjoy and assert their equality if they are 
treated as sex objects subject to unfair discrimination; and their human worth, 
'ubuntu' and self-respect is transgressed. 
MacKinnon states that: 
Sexual harassment rulings gave women sex equality rights they had lacked, and in so 
doing provided legally enforceable standards that promoted self-respect and 
entitlement to inviolability and dignity that women did not have before. 65 
This statement correctly presupposes that without protection of human 
dignity, women suffered inequality. Dignity is a human attribute which is 
violated when a person is subjected to treatment which is 'degrading or 
humiliating or to conduct which treats a person as subhuman'.66 Dignity 
'interfaces with many, and indeed implies respect for all, of a person's 
rights'67 and is thus 'a source of a person's innate rights to freedom and to 
physical integrity, from which a number of other rights flow'.68 It is stressed 
that gender discrimination (a form of unfair discrimination) is differential 
treatment (violation of equality) which simultaneously impairs the person's 
63 Cowen op cit (n58). 
64 Liebenberg op cit (n61). 
65 MacKinnon cit (n5) 172. 
66 A Cachalia, H Cheadle, D Davis, N Hayson, P Maduna and G Marcus Fundamental Rights in 
the New Constitution (1994) at 34. 
67 Ibid. 





fundamental dignity as an autonomous human being, as highlighted in the 
following passage: 
The value of dignity is thus of central importance to understanding unfair 
discrimination. Unfair discrimination is differential treatment that is hurtful or 
demeaning. It occurs when law or conduct, for no good reason, treats some people as 
inferior or incapable or less deserving of respect than others. 69 
It is emphasized that there can never be equality without respect for 
dignity hence sexual harassment in the workplace has been conceptualized as 
an affront to dignity and as such an obstacle to gender equality. Dignity is 
underscored because it is the alpha and omega7D of the Constitution and a 
foundation of all other human rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. The 
Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane and Another71 reiterated that 
'recognizing a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth 
of human beings', deserving of 'respect and concern'. Dignity focuses on 
sexual harassment as an individual harm in that every person has an 
individual right to dignity and as such sexual harassment is a violation of 
individuality, humanity and self autonomy. 
It is emphasized that the relationship and overlap between equality 
and dignity is relevant because sexual harassment is a form of gender 
discrimination and an affront to dignity of women as human beings. Sachs J 
in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice72 
endeavoured to outline the scope of equality as being 'based on the impact 
that the measure has on a person because of membership of an historically 
vulnerable group that is identified and subjected to disadvantage by virtue of 
certain closely held personal characteristics'. Furthermore, Sachs J defined 
equality to mean 'equal concern and respect across difference' and 'affirms 
69 Currie and de Waal op cit (n68) 244. 
70 Alpha and omega means: 1. The first and the last: 'I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning 
and the ending, saith the Lord' (Revelation 1:8). 2. The most important part. Available at 
www.dictionary.com (accessed 23 March 2006). 
71 [1995] 6 BCLR 665 (CC) at para 328. 





that difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation, stigma, 
and punishment'. 73 
It is for this reason that if there is no differentiation, then there can be 
no question of violation of the right to equality in section 9 of the 
Constitution.74 However, Sachs J correctly emphasized that the question of 
dignity 'is central to the question of equality'.75 In the context of sexual 
harassment, it is argued that dignity is central to the restoration of equality. 
How can one assert and celebrate equality when one cannot celebrate and 
enjoy one's humanity/ ubuntu? Sachs J concluded that inequality exists 'not 
simply through group-based differential treatment, but through 
differentiation which perpetuates disadvantage and leads to the scarring of 
the sense of dignity and self-worth associated with membership of the 
group' .76 Therefore, 'the commonality that unites them all is the injury 
imposed upon people as a consequence of their belonging to certain groups'.77 
It is submitted that although equality is an independent right and 
value entrenched in the Constitution, it must not be interpreted as being of 
secondary importance as correctly stated by Davis,78 Albertyn and 
Goldblatt.79 Instead, it is suggested equality and dignity as essential pillars of 
the Constitution, fundamental rights, and values entrenched in the 
Constitution are interrelated, in harmony with each other, and do not exist in 
vacuum. Furthermore, it is emphasized that both equality and dignity are 
kingpins in transforming and democratizing the workplace. Viewed in this 
context, sexual harassment is best conceptualized in an interrelated approach 
as a violation of dignity suffered because of difference on the basis of gender. 
Women are thus treated with indignity and as second-class citizens, by virtue 
73 National Coalition supra (n72) at para 132. 
74 Currie and de Waal op cit (n68) 236. 
75 National Coalition supra (n72) at para 128. 
76 Ibid. 
77 National Coalition supra (n72) at para 126. 
78 Davis op cit (n56). 












of difference. Central to equality is restoring dignity, which is violated 
because of difference on grounds of gender. Conversely, central to dignity is 
restoring equal respect and ubuntu denied to women by virtue of membership 
to a protected class as Goldstone J correctly held in President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another v Hugo so that: 
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the 
purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a 
society in which all human rights will be accorded equal dignity and respect 
regardless of their membership of particular groups. 
Similarly, in Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and Another81 Ackermann, O'Regan and 
Sachs JJ recognized the coherence between dignity and equality, and held that 
unfair discrimination 'principally means treating persons differently in a way 
which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are 
inherently equal in dignity'. 
It is submitted that dignity affirms the individual essence of women as 
human beings primarily. Equality affirms women as a protected class 
vulnerable to exploitation because of gender and therefore eliminates 
disparate treatment by promoting respect of genders at an equal level. 
Equality therefore focuses on sexual harassment as a group harm and class 
action, which is an obstacle to gender equality in the workplace. Equality 
seeks to eliminate unfair discrimination, which is based on immutable 
personal characteristics listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution.82 Equality 
looks at sexual harassment at a macro level of gender discrimination 
concerned with freedom and liberty of women, and focuses on equal access, 
equal treatment, and equal opportunities in the workplace. It is underscored 
that women cannot be liberated as a class (gender equality) if they are not 
liberated as autonomous individuals (dignity). 
80 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at para 41. 
81 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at paras 31-3. 
82 S 9(4) Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination on the following listed grounds: race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 











Baer correctly summed up the coherence between dignity and equality 
in the context of sexual harassment, as follows: 
Sexual harassment law, then, looked at from a comparative perspective, seems to be 
at its best when grounded in this interrelated approach. The question is not 'dignity' 
or 'equality?' but what features the law has to offer to guarantee individual dignity 
on an equal basis for all. 83 
Viewed in this context, equality and dignity are not in conflict with each other 
but are coherent and central to the legal redress of gender discrimination and 
the elimination of sexual harassment in the workplace. Sachs J correctly 
stressed in National CoalitionB4 that the equality and dignity concepts 'should 
not be seen as competitive but rather as complementary'. 
4.8 United Kingdom approach to sexual harassment 
Prior to October 2005, in the United Kingdom, sexual harassment was not 
specifically prohibited or legally defined in terms of the legislation. Instead, a 
claim for sexual harassment was based on grounds of gender discrimination 
contained in section 1 of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 ('SDA'), as the 
United Nations noted that: 
Neither the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) nor the Employment Rights Act (1996) 
explicitly regulate sexual harassment, but many instances of sexual harassment will 
amount to sex discrimination for the purposes of the 1975 Act and the courts refer to 
the EC Code of Practice on the Dignity of Women and Men at Work (92/131/EC) for 
guidance on the definition of sexual harassment-BS 
In English law, this meant that for sexual harassment to be actionable it 
must amount to gender discrimination. Ishmael and Alemoru correctly stated 
that there might be acts which might be considered as constituting sexual 
harassment by the victims but which will not necessarily amount to 
83 S Baer 'Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German, 
and U.S. Law' in Directions in Sexual Harassment Law CA MacKinnon and RB Siegel (2004) at 
595. 
84 Supra (n72) at para 125. 
85 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 'Report on Sexual Harassment in the 













discrimination under the SDA.86 It is argued that this re-enforces the 
conclusion that sexual harassment is more than just gender discrimination 
and has many other facets which include violation of self, impairment of 
dignity, invasion of privacy and violation of the freedom to choose with 
whom one has intimate relations. 
In Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcelli,B7 two male colleagues carried 
out a deliberate campaign of vindictiveness against Porcelli, some of it of a 
sexual nature, with an objective to force her to leave her job. The Employment 
Appeal Tribunal rejected the respondent's argument that they would have 
treated a man, whom they disliked, in exactly the same way as Porcelli. The 
tribunal reasoned that if the form of the unfavourable treatment or any 
material part of it, which is meted out, included a significant element of a 
sexual character to which a man would not be vulnerable, the treatment is on 
grounds of the woman's sex. In terms of Porcelli,BB it is therefore sufficient to 
establish that discrimination was based on gender and it is not necessary to 
prove that a male counterpart would have received similar treatment. The 
tribunal was thus of the view that sexual harassment amounts to gender 
discrimination in that it happens to women solely because of their gender, 
irrespective of whether it would have been directed at a comparable man. 
In another Employment Appeal Tribunal case of Reed and Bull 
Information Systems Ltd v Stedman,89 the complainant alleged gender 
discriminatory constructive dismissal because of sexual harassment. The 
tribunal held that the enquiry is firstly whether the alleged victim has been 
subjected to a detriment and, secondly, was it on the grounds of sex. The 
tribunal held that: 
It seems to us important at the outset that 'sexual harassment' is not defined by 
statute. It is a colloquial expression, which describes one form of discrimination in 
86 A Ishmael and B Alemoru Harassment, Bullying and Violence at Work: A Practical Guide to 
Combating Employee Abuse (1999) at 179. 
87 [1986] IRLR 134. 
88 Ibid. 



















the workplace made unlawful by s.6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Because it is 
not a precise or defined phrase, its use, without regard to s.6, can lead to confusion. 
Under s.6 it is unlawful to subject a person to a ' detriment' on the grounds of their 
sex. Sexual harassment is a shorthand for describing a type of detriment. The word 
detriment is not further defined and its scope is to be defined by the fact-finding 
tribunal on a common-sense basis by reference to the facts of each particular case. 
The question in each case is whether the alleged victim has been subjected to a 
detriment and, second, was it on the grounds of sex. 90 
The tribunal noted that the motive and intention of the alleged discriminator 
is not an essential ingredient although it will often be a relevant factor to take 
into account. Therefore, lack of intent is not a defence. The tribunal held that 
the second question must always be asked, but in a sexual harassment case, 
the answer will usually be quite clear without resort to a comparator, actual 
or hypothetical. 
In the light of Reed,91 it has been established that sexual harassment 
may constitute a detriment in the United Kingdom and absence of intent is 
not a defence. The English tribunals accept a subjective concept of 'detriment' 
and do not require fault (intention) on the part of the perpetrator before a 
sexual harassment claim can succeed. Absence of intent to discriminate on 
grounds of gender is similarly not a defence in South Africa in terms of the 
anti-discrimination legislation as contained in the EEA. It is argued that lack 
of intent is only relevant when pursuing a delictual remedy for the 
impairment of dignity. It is not necessary in order to successfully invoke 
gender discrimination to compare whether a male would have reacted the 
same or would have found the act or words offensive. That is, it is sufficient 
when proving gender discrimination to find that sexual harassment was 
experienced by the woman by virtue of her gender. It is established that a 
90 Reed supra (n89) at 302. The English Court of Appeal considered the meaning of 
detrimental treatment in Peake v Automotive Products Ltd [1978] QB 333 at 240, where Slynn LJ 
reasoned that it 'involves an element of something which is inherently adverse or hostile to 
the interests of the persons of the sex which is said to be discriminated against'. In addition, 
in Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1980] QB 87 at para 22, Lord Justice Brandon held that 











detriment is therefore a form of indignity, prejudice, disadvantage, or 
disparate treatment suffered by women because of their gender. 
It is clear from the above case law that the English tribunals made great 
strides, in the absence of the definition of 'sexual harassment', to provide 
redress for the victims and fit it within the ambit of direct discrimination 
under the SDA. The progress made in promoting equality and dignity at 
work was hindered by Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield Secondary Schoo[,92 
which unanimously held that the use of a comparator in a sex discrimination 
claim was inescapable.93 In this case, the appellant was subjected to a 
sustained campaign of sexual harassment at work because she was a lesbian. 
The House of Lords rejected the outcome in Porcelli to the extent that it 
suggested that 'if the form of the harassment is sexual, that of itself constitutes 
less favourable treatment on the ground of sex'.94 The House of Lords 
distinguished between the form and reason for the harassment and held that: 
The fact that the harassment is gender specific in form cannot be regarded as of itself 
establishing conclusively that the reason for the harassment is gender based: 'on the 
ground of her sex'. It will certainly point in that direction ... The gender specific form 
of the harassment will be evidence, whose weight will depend on the circumstances, 
that the reason for the harassment was the sex of the victim. 95 
Lord Hope held that 'there is no escape, then, from the need to resort to 
a comparison'96 and concluded that 'the finding is that the pupils would not 
have treated a hypothetical male teacher more favourably' .97 Lord Scott 
conceded that 'the appellant suffered what could reasonably be described as 
sexual harassment'98 and reasoned that: 
[T]he 1975 Act is an Act to combat discrimination. It is not an Act to combat 
harassment. 99 
92 [2003] UKHL 34. 
93 The House of Lords considered the sexual harassment claim under section l(l)(a) of the 
SDA which provides that a person discriminates against a woman if 'on the ground of her sex 
he treats her less favorably than he treats or would treat a man' . 
94 Pearce supra (n92) at para 16. 
95 Pearce supra (n92) at para 17. 
96 Pearce supra (n92) at para 94. 
97 Pearce supra (n92) at para 95. 
98 Pearce supra (n92) at para 116. 
















The House of Lords thus found that there was no discrimination on ground of 
sex because a hypothetical homosexual male comparator would have been 
similarly treated. Samuels has correctly criticized the outcome of Pearce100 
because it: 
. . . places too much emphasis on the mindset of the harasser. This is unsound as 
discrimination law is supposed to focus on the objective reason for the conduct rather 
than the subjective intention behind it. Moreover, it is too easy for the harasser to 
argue that he is not discriminating against a woman because he would treat a man 
equally badly, albeit that the method of the harassment would be different, and 
therefore escape liability. This approach accepts anti-social behaviour that is 
generally understood to disadvantage women in the workplace.101 
The effect of Pearce1D2 was thus to introduce the use of a comparator 
and made it more demanding to successfully prove sexual harassment in that 
the plaintiff had to prove not only that she suffered sexual harassment, but 
that she was treated less favourably than a similarly situated male 
comparator. The House of Lords thus failed to uphold the precepts of equality 
by insisting on the use of a fictitious comparator thereby diluting the harm 
suffered by marginalizing it in finding that the male comparator would have 
been similarly treated. The effect of this finding is to ignore the power 
imbalance and male dominance, which are at the core of sexual harassment 
thereby making it impractical for any woman to institute a successful sexual 
harassment claim under the SDA. 
It is submitted that the principle established in Pearce103 is two-fold: 
firstly, if an employer would harass both a man and a woman in the same 
way, then there is no unlawful discrimination (for instance, a pornographic 
display that both sexes find objectionable). Secondly, discrimination law 
requires less favourable treatment, so that if a man, like a woman, would not 
have endured the conduct, there is no gender discrimination. In South Africa, 
a contrasting factor, which compares treatment to a male, is not a prerequisite 
rno Ibid. 
1CJl H Samuels 'A Feminist Perspective on the Law of Sexual Harassment' (2004) 12 Feminist 
Legal Studies 181 at 192. 


















for a finding of gender discrimination because the Constitution and the EEA 
are so firmly grounded in principles of dignity and equity that this conclusion 
could be avoided. It is thus not necessary in South Africa to establish that a 
similarly situated male would have endured or put up with a similar 
treatment. It suffices in terms of the Constitution and EEA that women must 
establish a discriminatory treatment based on their gender.104 
It is submitted that difference on the basis of gender is what makes 
women a target of sexual harassment, which makes it improbable that a male 
comparator would have similarly received less favourable treatment. It is 
argued that the use of the male comparator is thus not to treat like with the 
like but compares the incomparable where no commonality exists. Pearce105 is 
distinguishable in the South African context where the courts are duty bound 
in terms of section 39 of the Constitution, to develop common law and 
interpret legislation to accord with the precepts of the Constitution. The effect 
of the finding in Pearce106 in the South African context would in all 
probability, have been challenged as unconstitutional in that it had the effect 
to perpetuate and institutionalize gender discrimination in violation of the 
values and fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution. 
Relief came when the SDA was amended in October 2005 to remove 
the use of a comparator by the introduction of a definition of sexual 
harassment in section 4Al07 of the SDA as follows: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person subjects a woman to harassment if 
(a) on the ground of her sex, he engages in unwanted conduct that has the purpose 
or effect 
(i) of violating her dignity, or 
104 S 9 Constitution and s 6 EEA. 
10s Supra (n92). 
106 Ibid. 
107 The introduction of section 4A in the SDA was designed to implement the European 
Commission equal treatment directive 2002/73/EC of 23,ct September 2002, requiring 
Member States specifically to outlaw sexual harassment. This led to the insertion of a specific 
definition of sexual harassment into the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 /EEC (see art 
2 of directive 2002/73/EC) and provided for the 5th October 2005 as the final date for 





(ii) of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment for her, 
(b) he engages in any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature that has the purpose or effect 
(i) of violating her dignity, or 
(ii) of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment for her, or 
(c) on the ground of her rejection of or submission to unwanted conduct of a kind 
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), he treats her less favourably than he would treat 
her had she not rejected, or submitted to, the conduct. 
It is noteworthy from the above definition that section 4A of the SDA outlaws 
not only conduct 'of a sexual nature', but also the widespread discriminatory 
conduct which is rooted 'on the ground of sex'. The introduction of the 
specific offence of sexual harassment in the SDA will eliminate the need to 
squeeze sexual harassment within sex discrimination in the SDA, which was 
narrowly interpreted in PearcelOB as necessitating the onerous use of a 
comparator. This is a victory in the fight against sexual harassment in the 
workplace and will elevate the protection of equality and dignity of workers 
in the workplace. It is submitted that the introduction of section 4A in the 
SDA has helped contextualize sexual harassment by acknowledging the 
characteristic features of the wrong; the attendant intolerable effect on the 
plaintiff; and the harm of the impairment of dignity inherent in sexual 
harassment. 
4.7 Conclusion 
It is concluded that sexual harassment is a case of gender discrimination in 
that it prejudices women and disrupts women's career advancement and 
progress in a way that men's careers are not disrupted. It is for these reasons 
that sexual harassment makes the 'employment experience as a whole more 
injurious, more stressful, more insecure, and less economically beneficial for 
women than for men, for reasons having nothing legitimately to do with the 









job or with women's performance'.109 Sexual harassment is wrong as unfair 
discrimination and involves an impairment of dignity, which infringes the 
self-esteem, ubuntu, worth, and integrity of women as human beings; as 
citizens with guaranteed rights in the Constitution; and as workers with a 
right to free participation in the labour market. 




















Chapter Five - Personal Liability of the Employer for Sexual Harassment 
5.1 Outline 
A central theme of the thesis is that the future of the law on sexual harassment 
lies in the adoption of a multi-dimensional approach, which focuses on 
dignity /ubuntu. The essence of a multi-dimensional approach recognizes that 
the harm of sexual harassment gives rise to various remedies in delict, labour 
law, constitutional and criminal law which are not mutually exclusive and the 
plaintiff can use one or more of the available remedies, depending on which 
area of law the cause of action is grounded. At the heart of the proposed 
expansive approach, lies an emphasis on dignity/ ubuntu in all the remedies 
because the harm of sexual harassment is first comprehended as being 
inimical to dignity/ ubuntu, which is an essential pillar in the celebration of 
freedom, self-autonomy, and humanity in a democratic society. 
The choice of the remedies depends on the jurisdiction of the court 
which is competent to adjudicate the matter; scope of protection; and 
maximum compensation and damages payable. Chapters five (personal 
liability of the employer), six (statutory vicarious liability), seven (common-law 
vicarious liability) and eight Gurisdiction) may be regarded as the heart of the 
thesis in that they explore statutory and common law rights and remedies 
which exist side by side in the context of sexual harassment as a case of unfair 
discrimination against employees. It is highlighted that the use of the term 
'employer' in the thesis refers to a natural person or juristic person, whether 
an institution, corporation or governmental entity, 'who receives services 
from an employee or is assisted in the conduct of its business by an 
employee'.1 Du Toit et al note that unlike the previous LRA, none of the 
1 D Du Toit, D Bosch, D Woolfrey, S Godfrey, C Cooper, GS Giles, C Bosch and J Rossouw 
















labour statutes defines the term 'employer' .2 In outlining remedies, 
comparative methods with other foreign jurisdictions will be used. Given the 
fact that the development of sexual harassment law in South Africa is still in 
its infancy, Thompson correctly highlighted that 'to arrive quickly at 
workable solutions on the full spectrum of labour law issues they [the courts] 
were virtually obliged to raid foreign systems'.3 It will be highlighted how the 
courts in South African made use of borrowing to effect legal reform that 
ensured the development of statutory and common-law remedies to sexual 
harassment and thereby enhanced the protection of constitutional rights 
violated by sexual harassment. 
It is submitted that the use of comparative law in a similar context is 
not new in South Africa as Thompson has noted that comparative law has 
informed the courts a great deal on the development of South Africa's unfair 
labour practice jurisprudence and correctly suggested its innovative use as 
follows: 
Firstly ... Very often it was an idea rather than a doctrine (let alone a complete 
system) that was adopted. Provided the import had some minimum level of 
congruency with the local system, there was always a chance the court could be 
persuaded to adopt it. Secondly, the fact that a particular foreign legal rule had 
developed at all indicated that it embodied a workable proposition for at least certain 
environments. Foreign law, then, operated as a substitute for indigenous 
investigation of a more evidential nature on whether a practice was serviceable in 
economic terms. With little adaptation, a functional equivalent of an othenvise alien notion 
could be construed (my emphasis). Thirdly, and relatedly, at a time of great change 
and uncertainty, the identification of a foreign precedent reassured the court that it 
was not being asked to do something preposterous. 4 
This chapter deals with personal liability of the employer as 
one of the remedies available to the plaintiff. It is highlighted that personal 
liability arises by virtue of the employer's non-delegable duty of care because 
of the following: 
2 Ibid. 
3 C Thompson 'Borrowing and Bending: The Development of South Africa's Unfair Labour 
Practice Jurisprudence' (1993) 6 Int J Comp Lab Law Ind Relat 183 at 204. 


















a) The entrenched rights and statutory obligations on the elimination of 
unfair labour practice, gender discrimination and promotion of equal 
participation in the workplace in terms of the EEA, LRA and the 
Constitution; 
b) The duty of care which exists in delict; 
c) The constitutional and common-law protection of dignity; and 
d) The duty of care to protect the welfare of the employee, which arises 
from the employment contract between the employer and the 
employee. 
The victim of sexual harassment may thus proceed against the employer 
on grounds of both personal liability and vicarious liability of the employer 
based on the wrongful act committed by an employee. 
5.2 Personal liability of the employer in delict 
Guidance on what entails personal liability of the employer can be obtained 
from Weddle who has defined the substance of the non-delegable duty as 
follows: 
A non-delegable duty is an affirmative duty of care that cannot be discharged merely 
by non-negligently delegating another person to perform the duty. Non-delegable 
duties are a function of a special relationship between the person who owes the duty 
and the one to whom the duty is owed. The duty, if breached, creates liability for the 
person who owes the duty (the employer), although it is the conduct of agents which 
breaches the duty.5 
It is submitted that personal liability of the employer in delict is based on the 
existence of the common-law duty of care, which is owed by the employer to 
the employee. A finding of personal liability is distinguishable from statutory 
personal liability in terms of the EEA, which is based on the breach of 
statutory duties and obligations owed by the employer to the employee. 
5 JS Weddle 'Title VII Sexual Harassment: Recognising an Employer's Non-delegable Duty to 

















The employer's duty of care, which gives rise to personal liability of 
the employer, based on negligence, has its origins in the English law and was 
outlined in Wilson & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English6 where Lord Wright held: 
The obligation is fulfilled by the exercise of due care and skill. But it is not fulfilled 
by entrusting its fulfilment to employees, even though selected with due care and 
skill. The obligation is threefold, the provision of a competent staff of men, adequate 
material, and a proper system and effective supervision. 
Lord Maugham added to the above remarks on the nature of employer's 
personal negligence and held as follows: 
In these cases, it was held that it was contrary to all probability to assert, or to 
assume, that the employee contracted on the basis that he was aware of risks in 
respect of these matters, or that he impliedly agreed to take them upon himself.7 
The duty of care means that the employer 'owes a personal obligation 
to the employee that reasonable care will be exercised to provide safety in 
employment'.s Therefore, 'an unsafe workplace due to careless acts and faults 
of his own marks the beginning but not the end of employer's liability'.9 It is 
emphasized that the nature of the employer's obligation and duty of care is 
personal to the employer and if not discharged gives rise to the employer's 
own personal negligence. This is distinct from no-fault, strict liability in terms 
of vicarious liability. 
In Wilson & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v EnglishlD the court outlined the nature 
of the employer's non-delegable duty of care as follows: 
The true question is what is the extent of the duty attaching to the employer? Such a 
duty is the employer's personal duty, whether he performs, or can perform, it 
himself, or whether he does not perform it, or cannot perform it, save by servants or 
agents. A failure to perform such a duty is the employer's personal negligence ... 
It is observed that in English law, the employer's non-delegable duty is linked 
to its common-law duty of care to ensure the safety of its employees and a safe 
working environment. Breach of this common-law duty renders the employer 
personally liable. Fleming states the employer's non-delegable common-law 
duty in English law as follows: 
6 [1937] 3 All ER 628 at 640. 
7 Supra (n6) at 645. 
8 HH Glass, MH McHugh and FM Douglas The LiabilihJ of Employers in Damages for Personal 
Injury 2ed (1979) at 5. 
9 Ibid. 












Today it is well established that an employer, besides being vicariously liable for the 
causal negligence of his servants toward one another, also owes an overriding 
managerial responsibility to safeguard them from unreasonable risks of personal 
injury in regard to the fundamental conditions of employment - the safety of plant, 
premises and method of wor k.11 
It is argued that the duty to ensure the safety of employees and a safe 
working environment includes ensuring that the workplace is not polluted by 
sexual harassment since sexual harassment not only violates gender equality 
and dignity, but also affects the safety of the employees because it inflicts 
psychological harm on them. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Media 24 Limited, Gasant Samuels v Sonja Grobler12 extended the 
employer's duty to protect the employee from physical harm caused by 
physical hazards to cover the duty to protect the psychological welfare of the 
employee. 
The nature of loss covered under personal liability of the employer is 
broader in that a finding of negligence on the part of the employer renders 
him liable for the economic loss, physical consequences, and psychological 
harm suffered by the plaintiff. Sentimental loss would fall under the actio 
iniuriarum and be based on intention not negligence. It must be noted that if 
the claim is brought under the common-law, then the common-law principles 
would have to be satisfied. 
Grabler (SCA)13 established that the employer is under duty of care by 
virtue of the legal convictions of the community, which require an employer 
to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of its employees in the 
workplace and to compensate the plaintiff for harm, should it negligently fail 
to do so. The effect of this finding widened the net of the employer duties and 
personal liability. The duty of care is imposed on the employer independent 
of the existence of the contract of employment or statutory remedy in section 
11 JG Fleming The Law of Torts 9ed (1998) at 559-60. 
12 [2005] 7 BLLR 649 (SCA) at para 65. 











60 of the EEA.14 The delictual and contractual rights exist side by side and the 
employer must satisfy the requirements of delictual liability for sexual 
harassment independent of the contract of employment (contractual liability). 
At common-law, however, there can be no employment relationship, and 
therefore no employer liability, but for 'the existence of the contract of 
employment'. 
In the English case of McDermid v Nash Dredging Ltd,15 the court 
considered an issue of a non-delegable basic personal duty of the employer to 
take reasonable care to conduct its operations as not to subject those 
employed by him to unnecessary risk. The court held that the employer was 
personally liable for its neglect, not on a vicarious basis, but because the 
agent's omission to adopt a safe working environment is a breach of the 
employer's duty. The important principle developed in McDermid,16 which is 
of relevance to South Africa is that preventing sexual harassment is within the 
responsibility of the employer and the employer has a non-delegable duty to 
ensure a sound and safe working environment, which is free from hostility 
and sexual harassment. The employer cannot turn a blind eye to sexual 
harassment with the hope that responsibility and liability will vest on its 
supervisors thereby totally exonerating itself from the duty to eliminate 
gender discrimination in the workplace. 
In South Africa, the EEA is also instructive in setting out what is 
expected of the employer to discharge its duty of care in ensuring compliance 
with the statutory prohibition against unfair discrimination in the workplace. 
An employer is duty-bound in terms of section 60 of the EEA to be pro-active 
and take measures to prevent, not to merely correct and be reactive to sexual 
harassment as and when it occurs. Bernstein17 provides guidance on the scope 
of the employer's non-delegable duty to prevent and remedy sexual 
14 Supra (n12) at para 70. 
1s [1986] All ER 676. 
16 Ibid. 









harassment in terms of section 60 of the EEA, in that 'the employer must be 
seen as an agent as well as a principal; its responsibilities direct and non-
delegable arise from its own obligations not to promote or condone a hostile 
environment'. 
In Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis1B the court held that 
the employer is under a common-law duty to protect an employee against 
victimisation and harassment which causes physical or psychiatric injury -
apart from statutory obligations or contract of employment. W was raped and 
buggered by a fellow officer in her police residential accommodation when 
they were both off duty. She complained about the attack but claimed that no 
proper investigation had taken place. Instead, she was ostracised, harassed, 
victimised and threatened because of lodging a complaint, and had suffered 
psychiatric injury as a result. 
W brought an action against the police commissioner for negligent 
failing to deal with her complaint and allowing a campaign of harassment by 
other officers. The court held that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages if 
she is able to establish that the negligence of the defendant caused her to 
suffer injury. The court made a curious observation, (which distinguishes this 
case from K v Minister of Safety and Security19 where the Constitutional Court 
held that the policemen were under a general duty to protect the public) that 
in any event the plaintiff was not suing as a member of the public but as 
someone in an 'employment' relationship with the respondent.20 
Accordingly, the court held that the commissioner's breach of personal 
duty, although those engaged in performing his duty did the acts, was not 
one, which plainly and obviously had to fail, and the appeal was thus 
allowed. It is interesting to note that the court did not touch on the occurrence 
of rape in dealing with the breach of duty of care but merely dealt with the 
1s [2000] 1 WLR 1607 (HL) at 1616. 
19 [2005] 8 BLLR 749 (CC). 








failure on the part of the employer to protect the plaintiff against the risk of 
harm of retaliation after she had lodged the complaint. The court indicated 
that it would not have reached a similar conclusion had the plaintiff been a 
member of public. The court highlighted the proximity of relationship 
between the employer and employee in finding grounds to establish an 
existence of a duty of care and negligence on the part of the employer. The 
court reasoned that breach of duty would be present if the employer fails in 
its duty where he knows or could foresee that sexual harassment would 
occur, and fails to take steps to correct it when it is in its power to do so.21 
The court added that the breach of employer's duty will also be present 
where the employee has complained but the employer does not take steps to 
protect the employee when he could foresee a retaliatory conduct ensuing.22 It 
is argued that this fact will be relevant in constructive dismissal cases where 
an employer turns a blind eye to complaints of sexual harassment and fails to 
offer reasonable support which eventually leads the victim to resign as a 
result of a hostile environment ensuing. It is submitted that the employer 
often delegates the performance of its duties to its agents. This duty remains 
in the province of the employer to be carried out and fulfilled whether or not 
it is delegated to an agent. Weddle has rightly noted that the courts and 
commentators have overlooked the principle of employer's non-delegable 
duties.23 The principle of employer's non-delegable duty 'imputes the acts or 
omissions of agents to the employer, but also considers whether those acts, 
taken together, breach the employer's, rather than the agent's duty'.24 
In South Africa, the negligence standard is sufficient to find personal 
liability on the part of the employer. The South African authors Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser25 state that the criterion is 'whether the reasonable person 
21 Supra (n18) at 1612. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Weddle op cit (n5) 743. 
24 Ibid. 










in the position of the defendant would have foreseen that his conduct might 
cause damage to the plaintiff'. In establishing a breach of duty of care in 
South Africa, 'the court considers whether the wrongdoer exercised the 
standard of care that the reasonable person would have exercised in order to 
prevent damage'.26 In other words, the enquiry is whether the employer failed 
to take reasonable care to prevent damage and ensure elimination of unfair 
discrimination in the workplace. South African law is comparable to the 
approach of the English writers on negligence who assert that an enquiry on 
the breach of duty of care by the employer involves an examination of four 
issues: 
a) That there was a risk of injury which was reasonably foreseeable. (The 
forseeability issue.) 
b) That there were reasonably practicable means of obviating such risk. (The 
preventability issue.) 
c) That the plaintiff's injury belonged to the class of injuries to which the risk 
exposed him. (The causation issue.) 
d) That the defendant's failure to eliminate the risk showed a want of reasonable 
care for the plaintiff's safety. (The issue of reasonableness.) 27 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser have summarised the English approach to 
establish employer's breach of duty of care as being two fold - that is to say, 
one must establish 'whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care 
(the 'duty-issue'); and thereafter whether there was a breach of this duty (the 
'negligence-issue')' and negligence is present 'if both questions are answered 
in the affirmative' _2s 
Section 60 of the EEA is an extension of a delictual duty of care. Breach 
of this duty thus makes the employer personally liable for breach of both the 
letter and spirit of the EEA, which promotes equality and fair treatment in the 
workplace, and for breach of its non-delegable duty to ensure a working 
environment free from harassment, indignity, and unfair discrimination. The 
principle of the employer's non-delegable duty to ensure a non-
26 Ibid. 
27 Glass et al op cit (n8) 16. 









discriminatory environment is also echoed in the 2005 Code which states that 
employers are duty bound to 'create and maintain a working environment in 
which the dignity of employees is respected'.29 Breach of this duty does not 
make the employer vicariously liable but makes him personally liable since 
the nature of the duty makes the employer personally responsible to ensure 
compliance thereof. 
In J v M30 the court also highlighted sexual harassment as a form of 
misconduct and thus recognized a non-delegable duty on the part of the 
employer to ensure that its employees are not subjected to this form of 
misconduct in the workplace and held as follows: 
Sexual harassment, depending on the form it takes, will violate that right to integrity 
of body and personality which belongs to every person and which is protected in our 
legal system both criminally and civilly. An employer undoubtedly has a duty to 
ensure that its employees are not subjected to this form of violation within the 
workplace ... It creates an intimidating, hostile and offensive work environment ... An 
employer clearly has an interest in ensuring a happy work environment as that leads 
to higher productivity. An employer has a further interest in stopping sexual 
harassment. 
The courts tend to place too much emphasis on vicarious liability and 
neglect to underscore the basis of personal liability of the employer for sexual 
harassment. It is submitted that there is potential scope for personal liability 
of the employer in South Africa because section 60(2) of the EEA imposes a 
regulatory burden on the employer to take all necessary steps to eliminate 
discriminatory practices in the workplace. The advantage with personal 
liability is that it focuses on the conduct of the employer and its negligent 
failure to take reasonable steps to remedy and prevent sexual harassment. 
Unlike vicarious liability, personal liability of the employer is thus not based 
on its agent's negligent discharge of its duties within the scope of 
employment. 
29 Item 6 2005 Code. 






In Ntsabo v Real Security CC31 the employer was found personally liable, 
in that the respondent did or 'at best ought to have foreseen the development 
of hostile and intolerable working environment' as a result of inaction to 
rectify the situation after Ntsabo had lodged a complaint. The conclusion of 
the court in finding the employer both vicariously and personally liable will 
not confuse the principles of vicarious and personal liability, which are two 
distinct areas of law. The court finding is consistent with section 60 of EEA 
which contains a form of deemed fault on the part of the employer in that the 
employer is found liable for its culpable failure to remedy sexual harassment 
once it has come its attention, in which case the perpetrator's gender 
discrimination will be deemed to the employer's gender discrimination.32 
Section 4 of the EEA states that, the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
provisions applies to 'all employees and employers'. This creates scope for 
both personal liability on the part of the employer, as well as statutory 
vicarious liability of the employer in terms of section 60 of the EEA for 
wrongful acts committed by its employees. For the employer, 'fighting the 
belief that "this is no place for woman" is a must to deal properly with sexual 
harassment'.33 The common-law duty of care and section 60(2) of the EEA also 
enjoin the employer to take all necessary steps to eliminate discriminatory 
practices in the workplace. 
5.2 Delictual remedy under the actio iniuriarum 
An alternative remedy for sexual harassment is a delictual remedy available 
under the Roman Dutch law actio iniuriarum, which is founded on the 
31 [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) at 93. This is consistent with United States Court of Appeals 
judgment in Burlington Industries Inc v Ellerth 524 US 742 (1998) at 759, where the court held 
that direct liability on the part of the employer will ensue with respect to sexual harassment 
'if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.' 
32 See ch 6.2 on the discussion of statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA. 






protection of human dignity, entrenched in the Constitution.34 The basis 
underlying the delict of dignitary harm is that it 'injures "personality 
interests" rather than one's physical well-being'.35 The concept and nature of 
dignitary harm as an infringement on the victim's personality rights in the 
context of sexual harassment making it intolerable and unwelcome 
behaviour, was correctly summarised by Ehrenreich: 
[A]ll individuals share in 'personhood', are autonomous and unique, and are entitled 
to be treated with respect. Actions that would humiliate, torment, intimidate, 
pressure, demean, frighten, outrage, or injure a reasonable person are actions that can 
be said to injure an individual's dignitary interests and, if sufficiently severe, can give 
rise to causes in tort. 36 
Ehrenreich' s view that conduct is injurious if it would have impaired a 
reasonable person's dignitary interests is consistent with the objective test of 
impairment of dignity as enunciated in De Lange v Costa.37 
The 2005 Code states that the impact of sexual conduct should 
constitute an impairment of the employee's dignity taking into account the 
circumstances of the employee and the respective positions of the employee 
and the perpetrator in the workplace.38 The factors outlined by the 2005 Code 
which should be taken into account when assessing whether the impact of 
conduct amounted to impairment of dignity, suggest an objective criteria. The 
2005 Code thus recognizes potential scope for a civil action of the actio 
iniuriarum against the employer. The impairment of dignity as outlined in the 
2005 Code can be understood to mean that guidance on what constitutes 
' impairment of dignity' may be determined according to the principles of the 
actio iniuriarum. 
34 S 10 Constitution. 
35 R Ehrenreich ' Dignity and Discrimination: Towards a Pluralistic Understanding of 
Workplace Harassment' (1999) 88 Geo LJ l at 22. 
36 Ibid. 
37 1989 (2) SA 857 (A). 











The right to dignity 'embraces only the subjective feeling of dignity or self 
- respect or the personal sense of self-worth: person's pride in his own moral 
value' _39 Melius De Villiers identified the nature of dignity to be defined as: 
that valued and serene condition in his social or individual life which is violated 
when a person is, either publicly or privately, subjected by another to offensive and 
degrading treatment, or when he is exposed to ill-will, ridicule, disesteem or 
contempt.40 
In order to found a successful action for damages for impairment of dignity, 
there must be: 
a) an unlawful, 
b) Impairment of dignity, perpetrated with 
c) Animus iniuriandi.41 
Once the plaintiff proves impairment of dignity, then an inference of 
unlawfulness and an inference of animus iniuriandi arise. 
5.2.1 Impairment of dignity 
The impairment of dignity is central to the harm of sexual harassment and 
consists of insulting and offending that person.42 This can be understood in 
the context as laid out by Burchell43 who states that dignity can be described 
positively as a person's right to 'self-respect, mental tranquillity and privacy' 
and negatively, as a 'person's right to freedom from insulting, degrading, 
offensive or humiliating treatment and to freedom from invasion of privacy'. 
39 J Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser Neethling's Law of Personality 2ed (2005) at 28. 
40 J Burchell and J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) at 746 citing M De Villiers The 
Roman and the Roman Dutch Law of Injuries (1989) 24. See also Matthews and others v Young 1922 
AD 492 and R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62 on what the impairment of dignity entails. 
41 J Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression (1998) at 327. See also National Media 
Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) and 1999 (1) BCLR 1 (SCA) - negligence is not 
sufficient for the actio iniuriarum except for defamation by the media where failure to observe 
due care and caution must be satisfied. 
42 In the United Kingdom, the court in Reed and Bull Information Systems Ltd v Stedman (1999) 
IRLR 299 EAT also viewed sexual harassment as being an infringement of a human right to 
dignity and held that a characteristic feature of sexual harassment is that it undermines the 
victim's dignity at work and creates an 'offensive' or ' hostile' environment for the victim and 
an arbitrary barrier to sexual equality in the workplace. 









In PSA obo Ferreira and Another v Department of Labour« the arbitrator 
recognized sexual harassment as a violation of dignity which 'constitutes a 
grave disrespect for another human being and as such is a very serious form 
of misconduct'. The arbitrator held that considering the case law on sexual 
harassment and the gravity of the applicants' conduct, the respondent had a 
valid and fair reason for a dismissal and found that their dismissal was 
substantively fair. The arbitrator also found that their dismissal was 
procedurally unfair because the lengthy delay in convening disciplinary 
hearing and in informing employee of outcome was inherently prejudicial 
and unfair. Nevertheless, the arbitrator found the applicants to be 'architects 
of their own misfortune'45 and declined to award compensation for 
procedural unfairness. The arbitrator sent a strong message and held as 
follows: 
Every man and woman, including those with a sexually active background, still has 
the right to accept some advances and to reject others; it is every person's right to 
make that choice. To think or expect otherwise is disrespectful and goes against the 
grain of basic decency.46 
The arbitrator found that they breached the element of trust in that 
they could no longer be trusted in the company of the victim or of other 
female employees. It is argued that sexual harassment is unethical and 
poisons the workplace to a point where it is not in the interests of either 
business or female colleagues to be in the company of an untrustworthy 
harasser who fails to treat his colleagues with respect, integrity, and dignity. 
A constructive principle developed from this case is that sexual harassment is 
indecent and disrespectful behaviour, which can constitute an offence 
warranting dismissal. 
It is emphasized that the right to accept or reject sexual advances 
amounts to a manifestation of individual autonomy, which is an integral facet 
of dignity or privacy. Furthermore, the wrong of sexual harassment 
44 [2004] 8 BALR 1001 (GPSSBC) at 1012. 
45 Ibid. 




disrespects the plaintiff's freedom of choice to choose whom she wants to be 
intimate with, and violates the plaintiff's autonomy and personhood, which 
are integral to 'dignity'. It is observed that the PSA47 case really captures an 
essential part of this thesis - that is to say, that sexual harassment essentially 
involves an impairment of dignity (that is to say, self-esteem, self-worth, 
respect, ubuntu and individual autonomy) and equality from a positive 
aspect; and freedom from insult, degrading treatment, disrespect, abuse of 
trust and unfair discrimination from a negative aspect. The concept of 
'ubuntu' is: 
a metaphor that describes the significance of group solidarity, on survival issues, that 
is so central to the survival of African communities, which as a result of the poverty 
and deprivation, have to survive through brotherly group care and not individual 
self-reliance.48 
It is argued that dignity overlaps with 'ubuntu',49 which includes treating a 
person as a human being with respect and integrity. Ubuntu is broader than 
the concept of dignity in that 'personal dignity is one of the most important 
principles of ubuntu'SO and 'in its most fundamental sense it stands for 
personhood and morality' .51 A distinguishing feature between 'dignity' and 
'ubuntu' is an element of African humanism in ubuntu whereby an individual 
does not exist in vacuum, but co-exists with other human beings thereby 
promoting tolerance and mutual respect. Therefore, ubuntu is a building 
block, which is essential in cementing human relationships in the workplace. 
The concept of ubuntu can also be understood in the light of the Constitution 
whereby human rights, interests, and abilities of women are celebrated and 
respected. 
Ubuntu has been defined to mean: 
47 Ibid. 
1. Ubuntu is the humanistic experience of treating all people with respect, granting 
them their human dignity. 
48 L Mbigi and J Maree Ubuntu: The Spirit of African Transformation Management (2005) at 1. 
49 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002) - 'Ubuntu' is a spirit of fellowship, 
humanity, and compassion, especially as associated with African society. 
50 MJ Bhengu Ubuntu: The Essence of Democracy (1996) at 18. 







2. Ubuntu means humanness. Being human encompasses values like universal 
brotherhood for Africans, sharing, treating and respecting other people as human 
beings. 
3. Ubuntu is humanism. It is a belief in the centrality, sacredness, and foremost 
priority of the human being in all our conduct, throughout our lives.52 
It is highlighted that sexual harassment negates the essence of 'ubuntu' which 
entails treating women with respect and humanity; and as equal fellow 
participants in the labour market deserving of an equal opportunity to realize 
their career objectives in the workplace. The emphasis on 'ubuntu' in the 
context of sexual harassment is the absence of discrimination, indignity, and 
inequality in the workplace and underscores promoting morality 
('harassment free' environment) and treating women as co-workers, equals, 
and fellow human beings. 
The essence of ubuntu thus involves enabling women to live life to the 
fullest as free individuals capable of making their own choices of intimate 
partners and capable of being masters of their own career paths and career 
success - unhindered by obstacles of gender discrimination in the workplace. 
When women are treated with ubuntu, the employer will benefit through 
collaborative teamwork between men and women in the workplace, and 
women will be able to reach their utmost potential and productivity beyond 
the boundaries imposed by gender discrimination. 
A central focus of ubuntu in eradicating sexual harassment in the 
workplace is that it promotes 'wellbeing'; humanity; integrity; consideration; 
unity; selflessness; respect; and moral norms and values. Mokgoro J in S v 
Makwanyane gave content to the concept of 'ubuntu' and defined it as follows: 
Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it 
translates as personhood and moralitt;. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues 
so central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of group 
solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and 
collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. 53 
52 Bhengu op cit (n50) 5. 
53 [1995] 6 BCLR 665 (CC) at 772. See also Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) at para 68 in 










It follows therefore that sexual harassment is an impairment of liberty 
and is inimical to the value of dignity against which the Constitution is 
premised. It is thus unlikely that a limitation clause contained in section 36 of 
the Constitution54 will be 'reasonable' and 'justifiable' in the context of sexual 
harassment given the attendant encroachment on ubuntu, dignity and gender 
equality which involves a complete negation of dignity and not mere 
limitation thereof. It is highlighted that despite the importance of dignity as a 
right, a constitutional founding value and a value to be taken into account in 
applying the limitation clause, the right to dignity is 'not absolute and section 
36 of the Bill of Rights recognizes that it may be limited in appropriate 
circumstances'. 55 Similarly, in delict the concept of dignity is qualified by the 
concept of 'reasonableness' when dealing with the objective test of dignity 
outlined in De Lange.56 
The subjective appreciation of the harm is relevant to the judiciary 
enquiry of the impairment of dignity before evaluating it within objective 
limits. Burcheil57 has suggested in the case of impairment of dignity, that 
unless the subjective impairment is experienced and established, it is highly 
unlikely that a case of impairment of dignity will result in litigation. This 
means that the subjective element must first be established and then it must 
democracy the basic constitutional value of human dignity relates closely to ubuntu or botho, 
an idea based on deep respect for the humanity of another' . Sachs J at paras 113-6 also 
highlighted the unifying factor of ubuntu as 'representing the element of human solidarity 
that binds together liberty and equality to create an affirmative and mutually supportive triad 
of central constitutional values'. 
54 The limitation clause in section 36(1) of the Constitution reads: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including- (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance 
of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the 
relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose. 
See also ch 5.3 on the discussion of constitutional protection of dignity. 
55 Nugent JA at para 28, in Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka and Another 2004 
(2) BCLR 120 (SCA). 
56 Supra (n37). 












be assessed whether a person of ordinary sensibilities would have been 
similarly been offended by such conduct. 
The hybrid test, which consists of subjective (plaintiff's subjective 
appreciation of the harm) and objective (court's impartial enquiry into the 
harm) assessment of the infringement of dignity was developed in De Lange58 
where Smallberger JA summarised the law as follows: 
Because proof that the subjective feelings of an individual have been wounded, and 
his dignitas thereby impaired, is necessary before an action for damages for iniuria can 
succeed, the concept of dignitas is a subjective one. But before that stage is reached it 
is necessary to establish that there was a wrongful act ... In determining whether or 
not the act complained of is wrongful, the Court applies the criterion of 
reasonableness - the 'algemene redelikheidsmaatstaf' .. . This is an objective test. It 
requires the conduct complained of to be tested against the prevailing norms of 
society (i.e. the current values and thinking of the community) in order to determine 
whether such conduct can be classified as wrongful. To address the words to another 
which would wound his self-esteem but which are not, objectively determined, 
insulting ( and therefore wrongful) cannot give rise to an action for injuria ... For 
words to be injurious they must infringe one of the 'absolute rights of personality' . 
Viewed this way, De Lange59 is consistent with the 'reasonable person in the 
position of the victim'60 test whereby the objectionable conduct, taking into 
account the boni mores of the community viewed against the backdrop of the 
Constitution, must be such that it would have offended a reasonable person in 
the same position as the victim. Similarly in Sokhulu v New Africa Publications 
Ltd and others, 61 Goldstein J applied De Lange v Costa rule and held that there 
cannot be an impairment of dignitas without unlawfulness and the question 
whether this requirement is satisfied or not is an objective one answered 
against the backdrop of the Constitution, by having regard to the prevailing 
norms of society. 
58 Supra (n37) at 862A-G. The High Court in Dendy v University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
and others [2005] 2 All SA 490 (W) at para 29, took the view that the De Lange v Costa hybrid 
test which consists of a subjective and objective assessment of infringement of dignity, was 
consistent with the Constitution. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See ch 3.5 on the discussion of the reasonable person in the position of the victim test. 











MacKinnon62 echoes similar sentiments and suggests a standard of 
whether the 'conduct would have been offensive to the person of ordinary 
sensibilities'. She further states that if it would have been, then the employer 
is 'liable for all damages caused to this individual, whether she is unduly 
sensitive or not'.63 The objective test thus serves to ensure that frivolous 
actions are not brought before the court where the conduct complained of, is 
neutral and therefore not wrongful and cannot under any circumstances 
convey an injurious or insulting signification.64 
In Harris v Forklift Systems Inc65 the Supreme Court of the United States 
adopted a subjective and objective hybrid test and summed up its judicial 
enquiry as follows: 
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or 
abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not 
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually 
altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation. 
It is submitted that these United States cases of abusive environment where 
the test is both subjective (personal effect on the plaintiff) and objective 
(factual, impartial and unbiased judicial enquiry) can be used as an analogous 
support for the same approach to dignity in South Africa. This is so because 
hostile work environment also constitutes impairment of dignity. However, 
hostile work environment is a narrower concept than 'dignity'. In South 
Africa, the test of dignity includes an important objective element, which 
should be satisfied - that is to say, objectively determined the conduct 
complained of must be insulting and therefore wrongful.66 
62 CA MacKinnon Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sexual Discrimination (1979) 
at 167. 
63 Ibid. 
64 The objective aspect of the hybrid test to impairment of dignity was applied in Matiwane v 
Cecil Nathan, Beattie & Co 1972 (1) SA 222 (N) where Milne J found that the letter to the 
plaintiff used a language and expressed sentiments likely to humiliate an ordinary reasonable 
man and that the letter in question was insulting and subjected the plaintiff to ignominious 
treatment. 
65 510 US 17 (1993) at 21-2. 





















It is established that the delictual criterion for sexual harassment is 
ultimately objective. The labour law test for sexual harassment is subjective in 
that 'impact of the sexual conduct on the employee' is one of the factors to be 
taken into account.67 The subjective criterion is further qualified by an 
objective criterion, which stipulates that when assessing the impact of 
conduct, it should amount to an impairment of the employee's dignity taking 
into account the following factors: 
a) the circumstances of the employee; and 
b) the respective positions of the employee and the perpetrator in the workplace.68 
Burchell69 opines that the law must cap the potential flood of litigation 
especially 'in the sphere of employment, where a mere tactful letter, which 
contains valid reasons for dismissal, may be the only way of performing the 
unenviable task of terminating services'. He rightly cautions that: 
[I]f a wholly subjective test of dignity is applied in the law of delict, then any 
hypersensitive person who feels insulted by the statement, which would not insult a 
person of ordinary sensibilities, would be able to recover damages.70 
This view concurs with the approach adopted in Ndamse v University 
College of Fort Hare71 where Munnik J, on an issue of breach of contract 
reasoned that a wrongful dismissal or suspension is not per se an iniuria for 
which damages other than damages flowing from the breach of contract can 
be claimed. The court went on to acknowledge that the manner of a wrongful 
dismissal may constitute iniuria, in which case the plaintiff must set out facts, 
other than mere fact of dismissal, which constitutes iniuria.72 It is submitted 
that an impairment of dignity is wide enough to include procedural 
unfairness because of the unfair labour practice even though the plaintiff 
suffered no economic loss. An impairment of dignity can thus arise where the 
dismissal was procedurally unfair flowing from the 'the employer's failure to 
67 Jtems 4 and 5.4 2005 Code. 
68 Jtem 5.4 2005 Code. 
69 JM Burchell 'Dignitas - Subjective or Objective' (1977) 94 SALJ 5 at 7. 
7o Ibid. 




















afford him an opportunity to be heard'73 and 'by reason of the manner in 
which his dismissal was effectuated' .74 
This view is compatible with the finding in Walker v Van Wezel75 where 
Ramsbottom J held that the 'communication itself must be of an insulting or 
offensive nature, and by addressing those words to the plaintiff the defendant 
must be subjecting him to ignominious, offensive, or degrading treatment'. 
The court went on to caution that when frivolous actions are brought because 
of words, which cannot under any circumstances convey an injurious 
signification it is the duty of the courts to put a stop to the action.76 
Bernstein advocates a judicial test of a respectful person in sexual 
harassment cases, which describes sexual harassment 'as a type of incivility' 
or 'disrespect'77 and defines respect as a 'sense of recognition of a person's 
inherent worth', which is 'owed to all persons'.78 It is highlighted that 
Bernstein proposition is informative in the context of dignity, which entails 
the right to be treated with respect. The use of the respectful standard in 
sexual harassment cases is instructive in giving the content to the ideal of 
equality behind the EEA as well as 'the ideal of individual autonomy behind 
dignitary-tort law' .79 In other words, respect is about treating people with 
ubuntu, dignity, equal respect, worth and esteem. It is for this reason that the 
harm of sexual harassment strikes at heart of equality, women's dignity, 
worth and esteem. 
The words or conduct must be material to ground wrongfulness and 
the effect thereof must be such that it conveys an injurious and offensive 
substance. In summary, firstly - the conduct under review must be 
subjectively insulting and offensive taking into account the plaintiff's 
73 Sibiya v NUM [1996] 6 BLLR 794 (IC) at 804. 
74 Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board [2005] 2 BLLR 115 (LAC) at 117. 
1s 1940 WLD 66 at 71. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Bernstein op cit (n17) 450. 
78 Bernstein op cit (n17) 452. 




















perspective. Secondly, the plaintiff's subjective perspective must be assessed 
objectively to determine whether the conduct complained of is insulting and 
in conflict with the court's conception of 'contemporary bani mores'.BO Thirdly, 
the conduct complained of must be 'prima facie wrongful'.81 Another 
aggravating factor in establishing unlawfulness in the impairment of dignity 
flowing from the harm of sexual harassment is the fact that sexual advances 
'made by a supervisor to a subordinate and/ or were made on a persistent 
basis'.82 It is submitted that supervisory harassment is more injurious because 
it is linked to a tangible employment action and involves abuse of trust and 
organizational power. 
5.2.2 Animus iniuriandi 
Animus iniuriandi must be established in order to ground a successful action 
for iniuria. There must be intention to impair dignity. The intention must be 
actual or legal intention in the form of dolus eventualis in that the defendant 
must have either known that such infringement is wrongful or foreseen the 
consequences of his conduct - that is to say, might unlawfully impair the 
plaintiff's dignity.83 Animus iniuriandi 'is presumed to exist as soon as the 
wrongfulness of the insulting conduct has been proved' .84 
In terms of the 2005 Code, the focus is on the recipient of the wrongful 
conduct. It is submitted that the irrelevance of state of mind means that the 
delictual defence of absence of animus iniuriandi negating intention to inflict 
harm, is absent in labour law. In Jackson v National Institute for Crime 
Prevention and Rehabilitation of OffendersBSJansen JA held that the distinction 
between innocent words and per se injurious 'rest upon some objective 
so Burchell and Milton op cit (n40) 754. 
81 Neethling et al op cit (n39) 195. 
82 Burchell supra (n41) 336. 
83 Burchell and Milton op cit (n40) 757. De Lange supra (n37) at 861C-D. 
84 Neethling et al op cit (n39) 197. 




















standard to enable an inference of animus iniuriandi to be drawn'. The court 
thus held that the: 
use of words not injurious (objectively considered), even if they in fact violate a 
plaintiff's subjective feelings, could hardly, by itself, provide any basis for inferring 
animus iniuriandi on the part of the speaker or writer.86 
The court reasoned that the facts did not disclose presence of animus 
iniuriandi on the part of the defendant and that objectively, the words 
communicated by the defendant did no more than convey to the plaintiff that 
the defendant is anxious not to leave any stain on her record and offered her 
instead, a chance of resigning.87 It is submitted that if the conduct or words 
were not insulting objectively assessed, it follows therefore that no inference 
of animus iniuriandi can be drawn. It is established that the test of animus 
iniuriandi is subjective but the inference can be drawn from objective facts and 
circumstances. Animus iniuriandi is thus a distinguishing factor between a 
claim for impairment of dignity in delict and under section 50(2)(b) of the 
EEA - where fault is not part of the enquiry when claiming payment of 
damages for impairment of dignity. It is concluded that it is more demanding 
to claim impairment for dignity under the actio iniuriarum than in terms of 
section 50(2)(b) of the EEA - even though payment of damages for 
impairment of dignity is not capped in both delict and the EEA. 
In short therefore, animus iniuriandi means that the defendant either 
directs his will to infringe the plaintiff's feelings of dignity (in other words, to 
insult her) in the knowledge that such infringement is (possibly) wrongful.BS It 
is argued that this means that it is sufficient that the defendant possesses dolus 
eventualis, which is foresight of the possibility of unlawfulness of his conduct. 
It follows that if 'direction of the will or consciousness of wrongfulness is 
absent, intention is lacking' and the court will dismiss the action for iniuria.89 
86 Ibid. 
87 Jackson supra (n85) at 14. 





















Most importantly, animus iniuriandi can be inferred from objective 
circumstances. 90 
5.2.3 Defences to rebut animus iniuriandi 
Defences are available to rebut presence of animus iniuriandi on the following 
grounds: 
(i) Mistake, or 
(ii) Jest 
(i) Mistake 
If the defendant is under a bona fide mistaken impression that his conduct is 
lawful, then he lacks 'consciousness of wrongfulness, an essential part of intent -
and therefore also intent - is absent as a result of this mistake'.91 
(ii) Jest 
The defendant can rebut the presumption of animus iniuriandi where he or she 
uttered the insulting words as a joke if a 'reasonable bystander' would have 
'regarded the words as a joke'.92 The defence of lack of animus iniuriandi 
serves to exclude intention and knowledge of unlawfulness. 
Campanella argues that a negligence test should be adopted as a 
sufficient form of fault in rebutting mistaken belief of 'welcomeness' because 
90 See Stockett v Tolin 791 F Supp 1536 (SD Fla 1992) where the court inferred intention from 
the objective circumstances and held that the cumulative behaviour of Tolin's conduct 
constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
91 Neethling et al op cit (n39) 164. See Minister van veiligheid en sekuriteit en 'n ander v Kyriacou 
2000 (4) SA 337 (0) where the court held that on the facts of the case it was clear that the 
police officers throughout believed bona fide that the deportation report which contained 
defamatory remarks, was compulsory and that they were merely carrying out an instruction 
from higher authority. The court concluded that the respondent had accordingly not 
succeeded in proving that the police officers had animus iniuriandi. 























it is 'possible to harass another person negligently'. 93 The writer further 
opines that: 
The practical consequences of adopting negligence as a standard of fault is that it 
becomes much more difficult for the accused person to raise the defence that he 
believed that his advances would be welcomed, because now he would have to show 
not only that such belief was genuine but also that it was reasonable - in the sense 
that the average employee in his position would have had the same belief.94 
It is argued that subjective intention (plus knowledge of unlawfulness) is 
sufficient to ground the actio iniuriarum. Since animus iniuriandi can be 
inferred from the objective circumstances, there is no need to expand the test 
to include negligence. Animus iniuriandi is thus presumed to exist when 
unlawfulness has been established on the part of the defendant. It is also dealt 
with by the concept of dolus eventualis, which looks at the offender's foresight 
of the possibility of the unlawfulness of his conduct when he inflicts sexual 
harassment. Foresight of even a remote possibility and nevertheless going 
ahead recklessly would appear to be sufficient to establish dolus eventualis. 
5.2.4 Damages under the actio iniuriarum 
Windeyer J expressed the difficulty in assessing and quantifying non-
patrimonial damages under the actio iniuriarum in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons 
Pty Ltd95 that damage to a personality right 'cannot be measured as harm to a 
tangible thing is measured'. Windeyer J stated that compensation by damages 
operates in two ways - that is to say, as a vindication of the plaintiff to the 
public and as consolation to him for a wrong done.96 It is submitted that 
payment of damages is therefore not concerned only with pure economic loss, 
but in the context of sexual harassment includes intangible loss. Therefore, 
damages serve to console the plaintiff for the impairment to her dignity. 
93 J Campanella 'Sexual Misconduct - Is there strict liability for harassers' (1994) 15 IL/ 491 at 
495. 
94 Campanella op cit (n93) 496-7. 





In Grobler97 the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that as a result of 
sexual harassment, Grobler suffered from 'post-traumatic stress disorder' and 
thus dismissed the appeal with costs thereby confirming the High Court 
award of R150 000 for general damages. It is submitted that under the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act98 (hereinafter 
referred to as 'COIDA'), Grobler would not have been able to claim for pain 
and suffering and for stress related injury because the event that triggered 
post traumatic was not in the scope of employment.99 The COIDA in any 
event compensates for physical injuries, medical costs, and pecuniary 
benefits, which are capped in terms of minimum and maximum amounts 
payable and not for emotional injuries often sustained in sexual 
harassment. loo 
Calculation, computation and assessment of general damages in the 
absence of pecuniary loss as is the case with impairment of dignity, is an 
onerous exercise. Judge Wilcox J in Hall & Ors v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd & 
Orsl01 expressed the onerous task of putting price on dignity by stating that 
'damages for such matters as injury to feelings, distress, humiliation and the 
effect on the claimant's relationships with other people are not susceptible of 
mathematical calculation' . The Federal Court of Australia held that: 
Damage is not to be ignored or discounted simply because the effect of the conduct 
on the complainant is unusually severe' but instead ' the rule is the same as in other 
areas of tort law: a sexual harasser takes his victim as he finds her.102 
Impairment of dignity is thus not capable of being quantified in monetary 
terms for the purpose of awarding damages. The task is made difficult by the 
non-economic factors, which should be taken into account in the assessment 
of damages. The award for damages is decided on a case-by-case basis and is 
<n Supra (n12) at para 60. 
98 130 of 1993. 
99 Supra (n12) at para 70. 
100 S 16 and schedule 4 COIDA. 
101 (1988) 20 FCR 217 at para 42. 




















discretionary to the court, which will take all facts and circumstances into 
account in arriving at a fair and just assessment of general damages. 
It is argued that the court will take into account the following factors in 
reaching a delictual assessment for common-law damages which are the same 
factors considered by the court when awarding damages in terms of section 
50(2) (b) of the EEA: 
a) Abuse of power in a dependency and trust relationship;103 
b) Failure by employer to act;104 
c) Whether the plaintiff has suffered a tangible employment action or a 
hostile environment harassment;lDS 
d) Side-effects of trauma caused by sexual harassment;106 
e) Retaliation against employee once she has complained; 
f) Failure by the plaintiff to take advantage of the preventative and 
remedial mechanisms in place in the workplace. 
The court must not make an award for damages which 'shocks one's 
conscience and cries out to be voided' but must be based on a 'reasoned 
assessment of the evidence' .107 On policy grounds, the award for damages 
must carry an important message so as not to condone or trivialise 
impairment of dignity108 but at the same time must not be excessive to be 
without any rational basis. Compensation for injured feelings thus guards 
against infringement on personality rights. 
103 Grabler v Naspers Bpk & Another [2004] 5 BLLR 455 (C). 
104 Ntsabo supra (n31). 
105 Christian v Colliers Properties [2005] 5 BLLR 479 (LC). 
106 Ntsabo supra (n31) and Christian v Colliers supra (n105). 
107 RF Gregory Unwelcome and Unlawful: Sexual Harassment in the American Workplace (2004) at 
218. 
108 Similarly, in McCarthy v Metropolitan (Perth) Passenger Transport Trust (Transperth) (1993) 
EOC 92-478 it was noted that it is important that awards aimed at compensating for injured 



















Constitutional protection of dignity109 
So now, when a woman is sexually harassed and she speaks of it, that is not simply a 
woman speaking in a different voice or narrating her subject experience of her 
situation. She is saying what happened to her. And what happened to her, when it 
happens, is now authoritatively recognized in law as inequality on the basis of sex, 
that is, as a violation of women's human rights.110 
The founding provision of the Constitution highlights human dignity as an 
important constitutional value in our democratic South Africa111 and 'nothing 
is more destructive of human dignity than being forced to perform sexual acts 
against one's will'.112 This section will demonstrate how sexual harassment is 
unacceptable in an open and democratic South Africa because it violates the 
constitutional right to dignity by treating women as sub-human, unequal and 
sub-citizens in total disregard of their emancipation, dignity, self-esteem, 
personal integrity, and ubuntu. 
It will be outlined that sexual harassment generates gender 
discrimination and inequality in the workplace and conveys the message that 
women are 'primarily perceived, not as workplace colleagues and valuable 
assets, but merely as sexual objects' .113 
5.3.1 The Constitutional Court protection of the right to human dignity 
An impairment of human dignity is a fundamental harm suffered by a victim 
of sexual harassment as it undermines the value and worth of a woman as an 
autonomous human being as acknowledged by Ehrenreich114 that: 
The most fundamental harm of sexual harassment is dignitary harm: by humiliating, 
intimidating, tormenting, pressuring, or mocking individuals in their places of work, 
sexual harassment is an insult to the dignity, autonomy and personhood of each 
victim ... 
109 S 10 Constitution. 
11° CA MacKinnon Are Women Human?: And Other International Dialogues (2006) at 47. 
111 S 1 Constitution. 
112 Nichols v Frank 42 F 3d 503 (9th Cir 1994) at 510. 
113 RF Gregory Unwelcome and Unlawful: Sexual Harassment in the American Workplace (2004) at 
10. 

















It is clear from the outline of judicial precedent, which follows, that the 
Constitutional Court has not hesitated to protect and uphold the right to 
human dignity: 
a) Human right to dignity is a building block upon which the 
Constitution is framed.115 
b) The Constitutional Court has held that 'the constitutional protection of 
dignity requires us to acknowledge the value and worth of all 
individuals as members of our society'. 116 
c) The Constitutional Court has reiterated that the right to human dignity 
is an irrevocable right, which cannot be compromised or waived even 
when the person is a public figure with a diminished right to 
privacy.117 
d) In S v Makwanyane and Another,118 the Constitutional Court agreed that 
the imposition of capital punishment constituted cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading punishment. Justices Langa, Mahomed, Mokgoro and 
O'Regan were of the view that capital punishment would not only 
have amounted to encroachment on the prisoner's right to dignity, but 
would have amounted to a complete destruction and unjustifiable 
infringement of the prisoner's right to human dignity. 
e) The Constitutional Court has also established that where the removal 
of a person to another country is effected by the state in circumstances 
that threaten the life or human dignity of such person, sections 10 and 
11 of the Bill of Rights are implicated.119 
115 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others [2004] 7 
BCLR 687 (CC) at para 73. 
116 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice [1998] 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) 
at para 28. 
117 Khumalo and others v Holomisa [2002] 8 BCLR 771 (CC). 
11s S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 










f) The Constitutional Court has outlawed the common-law of sodomy, 
upheld the right to dignity, and protected gay and lesbian groups.120 In 
so doing, the court emphasized that the vulnerability of the 
aforementioned groups makes discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation more likely to be unfair. 
g) In K v Minister of Safety and Security, one of the factors that the 
Constitutional Court took into account in finding the employer 
vicariously liable was that the rape, which was found to be in the scope 
of employment, infringed K's rights to dignity and security of 
person.121 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another v Minister of 
Justice and others, 122 the court stated that dignity contemplates a much wider 
range of situations, irrespective of membership to a protected class, and offers 
protection to persons in their multiple identities and capacities. The 
Constitutional Court gave examples of indignity thereby giving hope for 
sexual harassment victims that it will not hesitate to rule that sexual 
harassment is unconstitutional because the attendant indignity is even greater 
in sexual harassment than in examples listed by the court: 
This could be to individuals being disrespectfully treated, such as somebody being 
stopped at a roadblock. It also could be to members of groups subject to systemic 
disadvantage, such as farm workers in certain areas, or prisoners in certain prisons, 
such groups not being identified because of closely held characteristics, but because 
of the situation they find themselves in. These would be cases of indignity of 
treatment leading to inequality, rather than of inequality relating to closely held 
group characteristics producing indignity .123 
The right to dignity is therefore not only concerned with an 
individual's sense of self-worth, but constitutes an affirmation of the intrinsic 
worth of human beings in our democratic society.124 Dignity is a fundamental 
right, which cannot be waived or compromised. Ehrenreich correctly 
120 National Coalition supra (n116). 
121 Supra (n19) at para 57. 
122 Supra (n116) at para 124. 
123 Ibid. 







describes sexual harassment as conduct, .which 'violates each individual's 
right to be treated with the respect and concern that is due to her as a full and 
equally valuable human being' _125 It is submitted that the history of 
patriarchal domination, subservience, and vulnerability of women in South 
Africa is one of the factors that the court will take into account in protecting 
dignity. These factors weigh in women's favour of the court finding that 
gender discrimination flowing from sexual harassment is unfair and taking 
into account the aggravating fact that gender discrimination has led to the 
invasion of additional women's constitutional rights to dignity and equality. 
In Presiden t of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, 126 O'Regan 
J held that there are two factors relevant to the determination of unfairness -
that is to say, the vulnerability of the group and the impact of the 
discrimination on the interests of those concerned. The court further held that 
the more vulnerable the group adversely affected by the discrimination, the 
more likely the discrimination will be held to be unfair.127 Similarly, the court 
held, the more invasive the discrimination upon the interests of the 
individuals affected by the discrimination, the more likely it will be held to be 
unfair.128 
It is highlighted that the vulnerability of women in a male-dominated 
workplace leads to a presumption that gender discrimination suffered is 
automatically unfair. At the same time, the invasive nature of the wrong of 
sexual harassment, leads to a presumption that gender discrimination 
suffered is automatically unfair. It is observed therefore that the 
subordination and vulnerability of women makes them more prone to abuse 
and exploitation, and the resultant harm is greater. There is a correlation 
between disparity in power relations and potential abuse of that power 
leading to impairment of dignity of women in a weaker position than her 
125 Ehrenreich op cit (n35) 16. 









male supervisor counterpart because 'an invasion of dignity is more easily 
established when there is an inequality of power and status between the 
violator and the victim'.129 
Sexual harassment involves an unlawful encroachment on the 
women's right to dignity. Imprisonment involves a legal encroachment on the 
prisoner's rights and yet the Constitutional Court has protected the prisoner's 
right to dignity without hesitation. Similarly, a woman's right to be free from 
sexual harassment should be protected by the courts. This highlights the 
importance of dignity in a democratic South Africa and upholding a value, 
which is integral to the Constitution. 
In the United States Constitution, 'dignity' is not explicitly mentioned 
and equality is the most fundamental liberty to the people of America. Hence 
many of the tort cases in the United States have to fit the sexual harassment 
claims into the existing pigeon-holes of action for slander, false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional harm, intrusion of physical solitude, battery 
and invasion of privacy. MacKinnon explains a possible reason of the absence 
of' dignity' in the United States Constitution as follows: 
In comparison, when asked what right is violated by harassment, people in the 
United States tend to refer to equality. To many individuals, it indicates an unequal 
status that women are sexually harassed at work, and it seems to violate a right to 
equal opportunities in making one's living. This correlates to the understanding of 
harm established by the U.S. civil rights movement where equality was used in 
litigation for the right against violence, harassment, and unequal access to public 
facilities. In the United States, equality seems to provide the standard for violation of 
rights.130 
It is highlighted that dignity and equality are interrelated in that 
dignity is a founding value upon which all other human rights flow. The 
United States group based approach looks at sexual harassment as a violation 
129 National Coalition supra (n116) at para 125. 
130 S Baer 'Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German, 








of gender equality thereby protecting women as a class, and not as individual 
autonomous human beings. It is emphasized that: 
Violated human dignity, sexual autonomy, and integrity capture what happens to 
women when they feel that someone has overstepped a boundary or intruded into 
their emotional or physical space.131 
It is further argued that dignity is therefore primary in protecting 
individual autonomy before protecting women by virtue of their membership 
to a protected class. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women132 provides that gender 
discrimination is a violation of principles of equality and dignity of women. It 
reiterates the importance of the worth of women and an urgency to eliminate 
gender discrimination as an obstacle to gender equality in its pre-amble as 
follows: 
Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of 
rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on 
equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their 
countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes 
more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of 
their countries and of humanity ... 
This makes South Africa one of the more liberated jurisdictions in the 
world. It upholds the right to human dignity in the common-law actio 
iniuriarum and the universal fundamental constitutional standard for 
violation of human rights. In South Africa, the impairment of dignity because 
of sexual harassment is a viable remedy because section 39(2) of the 
Constitution enjoins the courts when developing common-law, to promote the 
spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights, thereby protecting the rights 
of women in the workplace. 
131 KS Zippe! The Politics of Sexual Harassment: A Comparative Study of the United States, the 
European Union, and Germany (2006) at 220. 
132 UN General Assembly 'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 




5.3.2 Section 36 of the Constitution - The limitation clause 
The rights guaranteed in chapter three of the Constitution are not absolute but 
are subject to the limitation clause as contained in section 36 of the 
Constitution. The limitation of the rights in terms of section 36133 must be 
justifiable and reasonable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality, and freedom. The meaning of what is 'justifiable and 
reasonable' is the same as in common-law in that the objective standard is 
applied taking into account 'the prevailing norms of society';134 the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.BS 
It is submitted that the objective test to dignity acknowledges that 
some infringements of dignity might be reasonable and justifiable. However, 
it is emphasized that it is inconceivable that an impairment of dignity in the 
context of sexual harassment can be justifiable and reasonable in an open and 
democratic South Africa mainly because dignity is featured in the 
Constitution as a right,136 as a founding value as reflected in the pre-amble 
and an underlying value in the limitation clause.137 If one looks at 
proportionality,138 a lot is at stake when trying to limit the right to dignity in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution especially taking into account other 
133 S 36 Constitution. 
134 De Lange supra (n37) at 862A-G. 
135 S 39(2) Constitution. 
136 S 10 Constitution. See also Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka and Another 
2004 (2) BCLR 120 (SCA) at paras 30-1, Nugent J cited with approval Ex Parte Chairperson of 
the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997(1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 20 and held that there were 
considerations which constitute reasonable and justifiable grounds for limiting the protection 
that section 10 of the Constitution accorded to dignity so as to exclude from its scope a right 
on the part of every applicant for asylum to undertake employment. 
137 S 36 Constitution. 
138 In S v Makwanyane supra (n118) at 104, Chaskalson P held that: 
There is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining 
reasonableness and necessity and that in the balancing process, the relevant 
considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance 
to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for 
which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the 
extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be 
necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other 
means less damaging to the right in question. In the process regard must be had to 




constitutional rights139 violated by an act of sexual harassment. It is argued 
that ubuntu, dignity and gender equality are of significant importance in this 
period of democratic transition. The limitation of such rights can never be 
justifiable in an open and democratic society since the society would cease to 
be open and democratic if such rights were restricted. 
It is suggested that women can never be equal when their ubuntu and 
dignity are violated. Therefore, the limitation clause in such circumstances 
would completely curtail the personhood, freedom, and liberty of women in 
an open and democratic society. Sexual harassment involves a complete 
negation of ubuntu of the individual and a complete disregard of dignity. It is 
submitted that since dignity is about respecting the human worth and 
freedom of individuals, limitation of dignity in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution would hinder the plaintiff from free and equal participation in 
the labour market in the face of indignity and gender discrimination. The 
limitation of dignity would be inimical to the spirit of ubuntu and legislative 
intent of achieving gender equality and eliminating unfair discrimination, 
which is endorsed in the EEA and the Constitution. 
It is inconceivable that the Constitutional Court can limit the right to 
dignity whilst maintaining its content - when it is also the founding value 
from which other rights are premised and a value to be taken into account 
when applying the limitation clause in section 36 of the Constitution, and still 
uphold the essence of the Constitution. 
5.3.3 Distinction between delictual and constitutional remedies 
A distinction must be drawn between delictual and constitutional remedies 
especially in the light of the fact that dignity is protected both under a 
delictual remedy of the actio iniuriarum and in terms of section 10 of the 
139 Ss 9, 10, 12 and 22 Constitution. 
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Constitution. A plaintiff must be cognizant of the fact that it may not be 
feasible for the courts to develop a constitutional delict in the context of 
sexual harassment in the workplace because 'to recognize all constitutional 
violations as infringements of dignity' would 'confuse the wider concept of 
dignity under the Constitution with a narrow concept of dignitas' .140 
The plaintiff must thus be aware of the ends to be achieved by the 
appropriate remedy: 
In delict, an award of damages is the primary remedy, its aim being to afford 
compensation in respect of the legal right or interest that has been infringed. The 
purpose of a constitutional remedy is to vindicate guaranteed rights and prevent or 
deter future infringements. In this context an award of damages is a secondary 
remedy to be made in appropriate cases.141 
In the light of the above extract, the plaintiff can therefore not (at least at the 
present time) allege a constitutional breach of right to dignity and equality 
and to that end seek delictual damages for the alleged violation. The plaintiff 
can pursue the actio iniuriarum for damages and only seek constitutional relief 
where the desired end is to vindicate the rights violated and to interdict any 
future infringement. 
Constitutional damages may be awarded 'in exceptional circumstances 
when other remedies would not be effective and if there is no other 
compensatory remedy available in law' .142 In President of the Republic of South 
Africa and others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd143 the court awarded 
constitutional damages and held that 'the only appropriate relief that, in the 
particular circumstances of the case, would appear to be justified is that of 
"constitutional" damages'. Therefore, it is observed that constitutional 
damages may be awarded to protect the constitutionally entrenched rights 
where it is necessary to uphold precepts of justice and an alternative 
appropriate relief is not feasible on the facts of the case. 
140 Dendy supra (n58) at para 23. 
141 Dendy supra (n58) at para 20. 
142 Ibid. 





In the context of sexual harassment in the workplace, constitutional 
damages may not be feasible where common-law or other alternative relief 
'would be a sufficiently appropriate remedy to vindicate a plaintiff's right'144 
and would 'be a powerful vindication of the constitutional rights in question 
requiring no further vindication by way of an additional award of 
constitutional damages' .145 Currently in South Africa, there are, in any event, 
adequate alternative remedies available to the victim of sexual harassment 
thereby militating against a likelihood of an exceptional award for 
constitutional damages. 
5.4 Common-law Tort Remedy in the United States 
This section deals with how and to what extent the United States courts have 
been willing to give redress to victims of sexual harassment under a tort-
based approach. It is observed that there is no explicit legal protection of 
dignity in the United States and as a result, personality rights violated have 
been protected using the existing tort remedies like slander, invasion of 
privacy, emotional distress, false imprisonment, intrusion of physical solitude 
and battery. The standards for proving these common-law torts 'are generally 
quite stringent, including that the offending conduct must be not merely 
offensive but outrageous, "exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent 
society" .'146 The advantage in South Africa is that there is a specific provision 
for protection of impairment of dignity both at common-law and in the 
Constitution. 
144 Fose v Minister of Safett; and Security 1997 (7) BCLR 851 at para 68. 
145 Fose supra (n144) at para 67. 
146 AB Cochran Sexual Harassment and the Law: The Mechelle Vinson Case (2004) at 162. 
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5.4.1 United States judicial precedent on tort remedies 
In Stockett v Tolinl47 the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor, Tolin subjected 
her to repeated sexually harassing behaviour, which included, grabbing her 
breasts and nipples, running his fingers up her shirt and grabbing her from 
behind. The court allowed a tort claim to succeed in favour of the plaintiff 
and held that Tolin's groping and kissing of Stockett constituted both an 
offensive and unwelcome touching (battery) and an invasion of her physical 
solitude (invasion of privacy).148 In addition, the act of pinning plaintiff 
against the wall and refusing to allow her to escape, even though only done 
for a short period, was held to constitute false imprisonment.149 The court 
characterized Tolin's conduct toward Stockett as being outrageous, wanton, 
wilful, and in total disregard of her rights.1so 
The cumulative behaviour of Tolin's conduct was held to constitute an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court thus viewed sexual 
harassment as a violation of personality rights, an intrusion into the plaintiff's 
physical solitude, an invasion of privacy and false imprisonment. It is 
emphasized that the court inferred intention from wrongfulness of Tolin's 
conduct in that his conduct was held to amount to an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
In Godfrey v Perkin-Elmer Corp151 the New Hampshire court held that 
allegations of sexually harassing behaviour that included frequent suggestive 
comments, demeaning language, insulting remarks made in front of co-
workers, staring, and 'sitting and standing inordinately close, often in a 
sexually suggestive manner' could, if proved, be viewed as constituting both 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and slander. The court noted that 
conduct must be outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
147 791 F Supp 1536 (SD Fla 1992). 
148 Supra (n147) at 1555-6. 
149 Supra (n147) at 1556. 
150 Ibid. 













beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.152 On the facts, the court held 
that the conduct complained of went 'beyond the mere indignities, 
annoyances, or petty oppressions that one may expect to encounter in one's 
daily life and that cannot be redressed by this tort' .153 
The court went on to note that the standard to be used to assess 
whether statements uttered were defamatory is based on the 'average 
person'.154 The court was satisfied that a remark such as 'your job isn't 
important and doesn't require brains' was easily susceptible of being verified 
as true or false and that an average person could thus understand the remark 
to be factual and could reasonably hear those words to defame the plaintiff.155 
The court further analysed the statements 'you have a bad attitude' and 'you 
have a lot of growing up to do' taking into account the circumstances of the 
case that the plaintiff had suffered through more than a year of sexually 
suggestive and demeaning comments and conduct. In the light of the 
prevailing circumstances the court held that the defendant's utterances to the 
supervisee could be construed as actionable opinion and could be understood 
to imply the existence of defamatory fact (for example, immaturity, perhaps, 
for not responding affirmatively to sexual advances).156 
It is submitted that the courts in the United States advocate the use of 
an objective test to common-law torts (which is consistent with the South 
African test on impairment of dignity in De Lange v Costa157) of whether 'an 
ordinary prudent person, viewing his cumulative behaviour, would be 
compelled to find this to be outrageous' .158 What is worth noting is that sexual 
harassment is an indignity, annoyance, or material oppression that an average 
152 Supra (n151) at 1189. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Supra (n151) at 1191. 
1ss Ibid. 
156 Supra (n151) at 1192. 
157 1989 (2) SA 857 (A). 







person may not be expected to encounter and endure in one's daily working 
life.159 
In Priest v Rotary160 a waitress was assigned to a coffee shop rather than 
a high-tip cocktail lounge and was eventually terminated because of her 
negative reaction to employer's request for sexual favours and employer's 
other conduct of sexual nature. The court held that the conduct inflicted on 
the complainant caused: 
highly unpleasant mental reactions, including fright, humiliation, shock, surprise, 
sickness, nervousness, apprehension, disgust, emotional pain, intimidation, 
embarrassment, anger, worry, substantial sleeplessness, nausea and anxiety.161 
The court held that the defendant's conduct consisted of more than 
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other 
trivialities in that the conduct of defendant was of an extreme and outrageous 
nature.162 The court was thus of the view that such conduct went beyond the 
acceptable bounds of decency, and no reasonable person could be expected to 
endure it.163 The court also found the defendant liable for subjecting the 
plaintiff to unlawful and repeated offensive touching constituting battery and 
false imprisonment without her consent and without a lawful privilege.164 
The court thus recognized sexual harassment as an indecent and 
unethical behaviour, which cannot be viewed as a normal way of relating in 
the workplace. The valuable principle developed in this case is that sexual 
harassment is an unlawful and offensive behaviour, which has detrimental 
effects on the mental tranquillity and welfare of the plaintiff and the courts 
will not hesitate to uphold its zero tolerance in the workplace. 
In Kanzler v Renner165 the court also used a tort remedy to give a victim 
of sexual harassment redress and held that inappropriate sexual conduct in 
159 Godfrey supra (n151). 
160 634 F Supp 571 (ND Cal 1986). 
161 Supra (n160) at 578. 
162 Supra (n160) at 583. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Supra (n160) at 583-4. 









workplace can, upon sufficient evidence, give rise to claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The court held that our society has ceased 
seeing sexual harassment in the workplace as a playful inevitability that 
should be taken in good spirits because it has a corrosive effect on those who 
engage in it, as well as those who are subjected to it.166 The court went on to 
note that such harassment has far more to do with the abusive exercise of one 
person's power over another than it does with sex.167 
The court noted the importance of the context of workplace within 
which sexual harassment occurs and found 'recurring factors that courts have 
used to assist in the determination of whether particular conduct in the 
workplace is sufficiently outrageous to survive a preliminary motion' which 
included the following: 
a) Abuse of power by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which 
gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his 
interests; 
b) Repeated pattern of harassment; 
c) Unwelcome touching/ offensive, non-negligible physical contact (off limits to any 
person other than a consensual intimate partner); and 
d) Retaliation for refusing or reporting sexually-motivated advances.168 
The court correctly highlighted the fact that sexual harassment has 
more to do with an expression and abuse of supervisory power than it does 
with sexual conduct. It is submitted that the reasoning in Kanzler169 (abuse of 
power) can be compared to K v Minister of Safety and Security17D where the rape 
of the victim was facilitated by the fact that she might have initially seen 
policemen as protectors and caretakers. Their role and power as policemen 
created an opportunity for them to take advantage of the victim and to abuse 
their position. The subsequent rape of the victim was thus more of an abusive 
exercise of the policemen's power over her than it had to do with self-
gratification of having sexual intercourse. 
166 Supra (n165) at 1342. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Supra (n165) at 1343. 
169 Ibid. 







Ehrenreich has correctly noted that the notion of 'abuse of power' in 
Kanzler171 suggests 'that dignitary harms inflicted in the workplace could be 
seen as inherently aggravated by the very fact that they occur in the 
workplace'.172 This is so because sexual harassment occurs 'in the workplace, 
a setting in which employees are clearly in a dependent relationship both vis-
a-vis their supervisors (most obviously) and vis-a-vis their co-workers (less 
obviously, but equally powerfully)' .173 It is emphasized that sexual 
harassment by a supervisor will always constitute abuse of power and trust as 
discussed in chapter seven. 
5.5 Breach of contract of employment 
This section outlines that where the relationship between the parties is that of 
employer and employee, the duty of care arises from an implied term of the 
contract of employment despite the absence of any legal obligation on the 
employer to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. This creates scope 
for finding the employer personally liable for breach of contract of 
employment. 
In Spring v Guardian Assurance plc174 Lord Woolf considered whether 
the primary basis of liability resulting from the breach of duty of care is 
contractual rather than tortious, and held as follows: 
Furthermore, in the employment field, there has always been a considerable overlap 
between claims based on an alleged breach of duty in contract and in tort, as stated in 
Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, 8th ed. (1990), p. 795, para 10-06: "The relationship 
itself of master and servant is necessarily based upon contract but it has been the 
subject of some controversy in the past whether the common-law duties, regarding the 
servant's safety, are contractual duties or lie in tort. Because of the closeness of the 
relationship between the master and servant, as well as its very nature, there really 
171 Supra (n165). 
172 R Ehrenreich 'Dignity and Discrimination: Towards a Pluralistic Understanding of 
Workplace Harassment' (1999) 88 Geo LJl at 45. 
173 Ibid. 




can be no doubt that a duty of care does arise under the law of tort, as expressed in 
Donoghue v Stevenson ([1932] AC 562, [1932] All ER Rep 1) ... "175 
The employer is thus under common-law duty arising out of the 
contractual relationship of employment, by virtue of the proximity of such a 
relationship, to safeguard the workplace against sexual harassment since it is 
detrimental to both the servant's safety and welfare in the workplace. There is 
also an implied term in the contract of employment that the employer 'shall 
render reasonable support to an employee to ensure that the employee can 
carry out the duties of his job without harassment and disruption by fellow 
workers' .176 The burden of proving that such support was given rests on the 
employer. It is a fundamental breach of the contract of employment if the 
employer fails to support the employee and to correct sexual harassment, 
which was intolerable to the employee and led to constructive dismissal.177 
It is submitted that the employer is under an obligation to ensure a 
safe, sound, and tranquil work environment, which encourages proper 
execution of duties without disruption, gender discrimination, or harassment. 
This duty of care is owed to 'newly appointed and long established 
employees' as they are 'equally vulnerable in situations of sexual harassment, 
and therefore equally deserving of protection' .178 It is worth highlighting that 
the duty of care is 'both contractual and delictual in character and that the 
plaintiff is at liberty to sue either for breach of contract or for negligence' .179 In 
Davie v New Merton Board Mills, Lord Simonds held: 
The same act or omission by an employer may support an action in tort or for breach 
of an implied term of the contract of employment but it can only lead to confusion, if, 
when the action is in tort, the court embarks on the controversial subject of implied 
contractual terms. 180 
175 Supra (n174) at 167. 
176 Wigan Borough Council v Davies [1979] ICR 411 (EAT) at 414. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Christian v Colliers supra (n105) at 483. 
179 Glass et al op cit (n8) at 1. 
1so [1959] 1 All ER 346 at 350. See also Matthews v Kuwait Bechtel Corporation [1959] 2 All ER 
345, where an employee suffered personal injuries in the course of employment and the court 
held that an action for damages was maintainable at the option of the employee either in tort, 









personality rights in delict.184 Mowatt argues that where an employer imposes 
gender discrimination to the 'detriment of the ability of the employee to 
perform her work properly' or 'to the extent that the employee's other 
abilities for the work are ignored, a breach of contract has occurred'.185 
Mowatt thus opines that in such an instance 'sexual harassment may 
constitute a sufficiently serious breach to allow the aggrieved employee to 
invoke the right to terminate the contract and claim relief' .186 
If sexual harassment interferes with the worker's ability to properly 
execute her duties or hinders her prospects for career advancement thereby 
amounting to career sabotage, then the plaintiff can pursue a remedy for 
breach of contract. However, the right to opt out and terminate the contract of 
employment should not be encouraged, as that will serve to preserve the 
workplace as an exclusive man's world. Instead, it is suggested that women 
must be encouraged to press on and fight for their rights until all barriers to 
gender equality, which threaten their livelihood and economic prosperity, are 
broken. 
5.6 Conclusion 
A central focus of the chapter was personal liability of the employer in delict 
and contract; and the protection of dignity in terms of the Constitution and 
under the common-law actio iniuriarum. Mowatt correctly asserts that the 
advantage of a delictual remedy of the actio iniuriarum is compensation for 
sentimental damages.187 The writer endorses the impairment of dignity as 
being 'flexible enough to include the obvious forms of sexual harassment'.188 
184 Edouard supra (n183) at 590A. 
185 JG Mowatt 'Sexual Harassment - Old Remedies for a New Wrong' (1987) 104 SALJ 439 at 
449. 
186 Ibid. 







The advantage of the actio iniuriarum is that compensation for 
emotional injuries which is often incurred in sexual harassment cases can be 
recovered, unlike in the context of a contractual remedy or the COIDA where 
the plaintiff cannot be compensated for sentimental loss or emotional pain 
and suffering. Furthermore, in South Africa the violation of dignity is 
compensable under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA as part of unfair 
discrimination suffered and claiming payment of damages which entails 
intangible loss often suffered as a result of sexual harassment. Damages 
which can be claimed in the actio iniuriarum and section 50(2)(b) of the EEA, 
are not capped but are discretionary to the court. 
Burchell correctly supports the delictual remedy of the actio iniuriarum 
as an effective way of protecting the individual's right to dignity in the light 
of the fact that rights and freedoms entrenched in the Bill of Rights 'coincide 
with certain of the rights protected by the law of delict' .189 A delictual claim 
under the actio iniuriarum for an impairment of dignity would serve a viable 
alternative remedy for victims of sexual harassment in that this personality 
right to dignity has been elevated to a status of being a guaranteed freedom in 
the Constitution which is the highest law of the land. This means that the 
courts will be more inclined to protect a woman's dignity in the workplace. 
It has been noted that there are potential limitations to the delictual 
action under the actio iniuriarum because of the objective and subjective test 
for an impairment of dignity. This means that the requirements are stricter if 
one pursues a delictual action for sexual harassment rather than the labour 
law route under the EEA where sexual harassment is subjectively assessed. 
The objective test to an impairment of dignity introduced in De Lange190 is a 
fundamental test used in the actio iniuriarum and means that the conduct 
complained of is objectively evaluated from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
189 J Burchell 'Beyond the Glass Bead game: Human Dignity in the Law of Delict' (1988) 1 
SAJHR6. 













person, which determines whether the wrongful conduct is of such 
magnitude as to reasonably offend a person of ordinary sensibilities. The 
objective criterion is instructive in that it helps curb a potential flood of trivial 
claims. 
The actio iniuriarum remedy for an impairment of dignity 'has been 
severely underutilized in the past' .191 The advantage of the remedy for an 
impairment of dignity in sexual harassment cases is that 'it focuses directly on 
the breach of natural justice and is not dependent upon proof that patrimonial 
loss has been caused.'192 Ehrenreich rightly opines that 'common-law is 
inherently conservative, but it does change over time; it has changed before, 
and it will change again.'193 Sexual harassment is an obstacle that prevents 
women from achieving their maximum potential and 'prevents women from 
making a contribution commensurate with their abilities' .194 
It is clear from the wealth of the constitutional law jurisprudence on 
the protection to human dignity, and more recently NK (CC),195 that the courts 
will not hesitate to uphold and protect the right to dignity of women where 
such right is threatened or encroached upon by an act of sexual harassment.196 
In this period of democratic transition, the courts will continue to do 
everything in their power to entrench the spirit of ubuntu in an effort to 
eradicate the injustices of the past and promote equality of women as rightful 
members of the civil society. This is strengthened by Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Securityl97 where the Constitutional Court held that: 
South Africa also has a duty under international law to prohibit all gender based 
discrimination that has the effect or purpose of impairing the enjoyment by women 
of fundamental rights and freedoms and to take reasonable and appropriate 
measures to prevent the violation of those rights. 
191 Burchell op cit (n41) 336. 
192 Burchell op cit (n41) 345. 
193 Ehrenreich op cit (n35) 56. 
194 'Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women' Beijing (4-15 September 1995). 
195 Supra (n15). 
196 Ss 8(3), 39(2) and 173 Constitution. 







The United Nations has applauded the Carmichele judgement for setting an 
important precedent 'on the applicability of international law to State and 
individual responsibility for violence against women'l98 and noted that 'the 
use of international legal standards on violence against women by domestic 
courts is a promising practice' .199 
It is concluded that it is inconceivable that the Constitutional Court will 
successfully apply the limitation clause as contained in section 36 of the 
Constitution in the context of sexual harassment, in a democratic society, 
which is committed to achieving gender equality in the workplace. It has been 
noted that the plaintiff is therefore at liberty to seek the common-law remedy of 
the actio iniuriarum against the employer for an impairment of dignity and 
claim for damages, which are discretionary to the High Court. The plaintiff 
must be cognizant of the fact that whilst the Constitution and the actio 
iniuriarum both protect the right to dignity, the purpose of these remedies is 
different. The plaintiff can pursue the actio iniuriarum for damages since it 
sufficiently gives relief to the victim of sexual harassment for an impairment 
of dignity, and only seek constitutional relief where primarily, the desired 
end is to vindicate the rights violated and to interdict any future 
infringement. 200 
It has been noted that the federal courts have not hesitated to use the 
tort remedy to protect the dignity of women in an effort to restore gender 
equality in the workplace, even though dignity is not specifically listed in the 
United States Constitution but is conceptualized and protected as an affront 
to equality or privacy. It is for this reason that many of the tort cases in the 
United States fit the sexual harassment claims into the existing pigeon-holes 
of action for slander, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional 
harm, intrusion of physical solitude, battery and invasion of privacy. It has 
198 United Nations General Assembly 'In-depth Study on All Forms of Violence against 
Women: Report of the Secretary-General' (6 July 2006) at 71-2. 
199 United Nations Report of the Secretary-General op cit (n197) 89. 








been highlighted that the protection of dignity is advanced and broader in 
South Africa compared to the United States, since dignity is a constitutional 
right,201 a founding value of the Constitution, a value to be taken into account 
when applying the limitation clause in section 36 of the Constitution, and is 
protected at common-law through the actio iniuriarum. Ehrenreich supports the 
use of' common-law tort' approach and opines that: 
Common-law torts applied creatively, might offer such a way to address most kinds 
of workplace harassment, and, because of the changed social meaning of work, the 
employment context should be considered an aggravating factor when courts assess 
workplace harms.202 
It has been established in this chapter that the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as a result of sexual harassment is even greater given the 
context of the workplace in that it occurs in a setting where 'it has the 
potential to prevent the achievement of one's professional fulfilment or self-
definition'. 203 It also occurs in a setting 'where women have been 
marginalized or relegated to distinct and limited roles and where they 
continue to face hostility and systematic obstacles to professional progress' .204 
It is emphasized that the employment context is an aggravating factor to the 
wrong suffered in that it is an environment where individuals spend their 
lifetime contributing to economic prosperity and making their livelihood. 
201 S 9 Constitution. 
202 Ehrenreich op cit (n35) 53. 













Chapter Six - Labour Law Remedies 
6.1 Outline 
The scope of protection for the victims of sexual harassment under the EEA 
and LRA applies to all employees in the place of employment.1 It would seem 
that a more generous, inclusive and less formal concept of who deserves 
legislative protection (' employee'),2 is appropriate in the context of labour law 
remedies for sexual harassment, in the light of the following: 
a) The changing nature of employment with the advent of 
'casualization, externalization and informalization' ;3 
b) The constitutional right to fair labour practices, which is available 
to 'everyone' .4 
c) South Africa's international obligations in terms of the ILO 
conventions and recommendations; and 
d) The mandate of the courts in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution to develop common-law and interpret legislation to 
accord full protection of the constitutionally entrenched rights. s 
However, precarious, informal, or other marginal workers might be 
excluded from the scope of legislative protection in terms of the LRA and 
EEA by virtue of the following provisions in section 200A(l) of the LRA, 
which requires that to be an employee: 
1 The 'employee' is broadly defined in section 1 of the EEA, LRA, Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 and Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 to mean: 
'any person, excluding an independent contractor who-
a) works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to 
receive, any remuneration; and 
b) in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer. .. ' 
2 See also para 7.2.1 on the discussion of 'Who is an employee?' 
3 J Theron 'Employment Is Not What It Used To Be' (2003) 24 ILJ 1247 at 1256-7. 
4 S 23(1) Constitution. 
5 See O'Regan J dicta in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 














d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours 
per month over the last three months; 
e) 
f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other 
person; or 
g) the person only works for or renders services to one person. 
This chapter will discuss the remedy of statutory vicarious liability in 
terms of section 60 of the EEA, which is a focal point of this research, and is 
distinct from common-law vicarious liability. The labour law remedy of 
statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA is a unique form 
of legal liability, which is neither a true reflection of common-law liability nor 
an equivalent to common-law vicarious liability discussed separately in chapter 
seven. It will be outlined that section 60 of the EEA creates a unique type of 
statutory vicarious liability and contains an element of deemed personal 
liability on the part of the employer for failure to take steps and ensure 
eradication of gender discrimination in the workplace. 
Statutory vicarious liability in section 60(3) balances opposing 
considerations 'that the employer is not responsible for policing all the 
nonwork behaviour of its employees, but that the employer owns and 
controls the workplace' .6 This chapter will highlight that in terms of section 60 
of the EEA; fault on the part of the employer is not derivative but is 
independent of the fault-finding on the part of the perpetrator of sexual 
harassment. The affirmative defence in section 60(4) of the EEA which is 
available to the employer to exonerate itself from statutory vicarious liability 
will be discussed to highlight that vicarious liability is not an open-ended 
form of a liability even though it is a no fault liability. 
The scope of the award of damages and compensation under section 50 
of the EEA is explored to the extent to which the plaintiff can recover 
compensation in delict and under the LRA. A case is made for regarding 
sexual harassment as a form of misconduct warranting dismissal of the 
perpetrator. Constructive dismissal is also discussed, since sexual harassment 









can be unbearable and lead to constructive dismissal if the employer fails to 
act after the plaintiff has complained about sexual harassment. 
This chapter will highlight that the labour law remedies enhance 
protection and respect for labour rights and calls for the observing of human 
rights, which are entrenched in the Constitution. Labour law at times overlaps 
with delict on the duty of care owed by the employer to its employees who 
cannot assume a duty to fend for themselves from all the risks on safety, 
health, and discrimination, which are inherent in the workplace. Such duty 
rests with the employer and flows from the employer-employee relationship. 
6.2 Statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Employment Equity Act 55 
of 1998 ('EEA') 
As a starting point, it is highlighted that the advantage with statutory 
vicarious liability is that it is not subject to the restrictive rules of scope of 
employment and is distinct from the delictual rules of vicarious liability. This 
form of statutory vicarious liability is different from and mutually exclusive to 
common-law vicarious liability discussed in chapter seven. It is emphasized 
that the employer cannot be cavalier but must act and comply with its 
statutory obligations in the EEA and ensure that gender discrimination is 
prevented and eliminated in the workplace. It is a statutory breach, which 
gives rise to vicarious liability on the part of the employer for its failure to 
take the necessary steps. 
6.2.1 Section 60 of the Employment Equity Act 
Sexual harassment is a statutory breach of section 6(1) of the EEA, which 
outlaws unfair discrimination on grounds of gender, sex, and/ or sexual 



















unfairly discriminated directly or indirectly because of gender, sex and/ or 
sexual orientation which is entrenched in section 9(4) of the Constitution. 
Relief for sexual harassment is available in terms of section 60 of the EEA, 
which deals with statutory vicarious liability of the employer. The relevant 
subsections of section 60 read as follows: -
(1) If it is alleged that an employee, while at work, contravened a provision 
of this Act, or engaged in any conduct that, if engaged in by that 
employee's employer, would constitute a contravention of a provision of 
this Act, the alleged conduct must immediately be brought to the 
attention of the employer. 
(2) The employer must consult all relevant parties and must take the 
necessary steps to eliminate the alleged conduct and comply with the 
provisions of this Act. 
(3) If the employer fails to take the necessary steps referred to in subsection 
2, and it is proved that the employee has contravened the relevant 
provision, the employer must be deemed also to have contravened that 
provision. 
(4) Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an 
employee if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was 
reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in 
contravention of this Act. 
Section 60 of the EEA evinces a legislative scheme and underlying 
policy, which includes deterring and outlawing sexual harassment in the 
workplace on grounds of gender discrimination. This is done through 
extending responsibility beyond the guilty employees, by making employers 
liable for sexual harassment, and then supplying them with the affirmative 
defence under section 60(4), which will: 
exonerate the conscientious employer who has used his best endeavours to prevent 
sexual harassment, and to encourage all employers who have not yet undertaken 
such endeavours to take the steps necessary to make the same defence available in 
their own workplace.7 
It is emphasized that section 60(1) of the EEA is aimed at encouraging 
employees to be pro-active and report instances of sexual harassment 
'immediately' - that is to say, 'as, soon as is reasonably possible in the 
circumstances and without undue delay, taking into account the nature of 














sexual harassment'.8 It is noted that the insistence that a woman should be 
expected to complain in order to trigger the process for statutory vicarious 
liability in terms the EEA, may be viewed as insufficiently dealing with the 
vulnerability of the victim and the ability of sexual harassment itself to silence 
or intimidate victims from coming forward. The 2005 Code addresses such 
potential difficulties where the perpetrator is a person of seniority, by stating 
that: 
Where a complainant has difficulty indicating to the perpetrator that the conduct is 
unwelcome, such complainant may seek the assistance and intervention of another 
person such as a co-worker, superior, counsellor, human resource official, family 
member or friend. 9 
It is argued that the plaintiff is expected to mitigate her loss by making 
use of the grievance procedure in place at work or request a colleague to 
lodge a complaint on her behalf. The effect of this measure will similarly help 
strengthen the plaintiff's case for constructive dismissal where she will be 
able to prove that she made use of the reasonable alternatives to no avail from 
the employer. 
Both the employers and employees will not only win in the courtroom 
or in parliament, but in the workplace through collaborative effort the fight 
against sexual harassment in the workplace. Therefore, 'pushing women to 
report instances of sexual harassment should also be encouraged from a 
feminist standpoint'10 because 'it is important for women to be pro-active 
against this problem and by speaking out against such behaviour, women 
send a message that such conduct is not and should not be accepted' .11 The 
employee must thus meet the employer half-way to fulfil the promise of the 
EEA to ensure gender equality in the workplace, by breaking the silence and 
s Item 8.1.2 2005 Code. 
9 Item 5.2.3 2005 Code. 
10 J Kreisberg 'Comment: Employers and Employees Beware: The Duties Imposed by the 
Recent Supreme Court Decisions and Their Impact on Sexual Harassment Law' (1999) 6 



















reporting sexual harassment so as to enable the employer to act and correct 
gender discrimination. 
Section 60(3) is a form of statutory vicarious liability as was confirmed 
in Ntsabo v Real Security CO2 that where the employer allows and condones, 
either directly or by inaction, conduct which is or leads to a violation of the 
EEA, then the employer is vicariously liable for any damages flowing from 
such conduct. This form of statutory vicarious liability differs from common-
law vicarious liability in that the 'scope of employment' is not part of the 
enquiry. In Ntsabo13 the court held that sexual harassment did not arise in the 
scope of employment because 'the conduct of which the applicant complained 
did not fall anywhere within the job description of Mr Dlomo or that of the 
applicant'. Le Roux is correctly critical of this reasoning (scope of 
employment) in Ntsabo14 and is of the opinion that it refutes: 
the complex nature of modern employment and would in any event negate most 
claims based on either COIDA or vicarious liability since many of these claims are 
premised on incidents that would not fall within any job description or duties of the 
employee.15 
It is suggested that in the light of the court's reasoning, if Ntsabo had 
brought a common-law claim for vicarious liability, then her action would have 
failed because the 'scope of employment' requirement would not have been 
established since the court would have been of the view it was not part of 
Dlomo's job description to sexual harass his subordinates. Ntsabol6 (the scope 
of employment reasoning) is consistent with English law in Trotman v North 
Yorkshire County Council17 where the court held that the sexual assault 
committed by a deputy headmaster on one of the pupils in his care, 'was far 
removed from an unauthorised mode of carrying out a teacher's duties on 
behalf of his employer'. The court was thus of the view that unless the 
12 [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) at 98. 
13 Supra (n12) at 97. 
14 Ibid. 
15 R le Roux 'Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Matter of More Questions than Answers 
or Do We Simply Know Less the More We Find Out?' 2006 (10) Law, Democracy and 
Development 49 at 61. 
16 Supra (n12). 





















business of the principal is to molest children, there will be denial of vicarious 
liability. This highlights the way courts have rigidly applied the 'scope of 
employment' to dismiss sexual harassment cases for what is perceived as 
personal, frolic of one's own or not within the harasser's job description to 
sexually harass, under the common-law principle of vicarious liability. 
The legislature did not intend to import the principles of delict into the 
EEA and as such it must be read in the context in which it is framed - that is to 
say, to eliminate gender discrimination in the workplace and not make it 
unlawful and at the same time demanding for the plaintiff to prove gender 
discrimination. It is emphasized that to apply the common-law principles of 
'course of employment' would serve to seriously undermine the statutory 
intention of section 60 of the EEA and would contravene the purpose which 
the EEA was passed to realize. Another distinguishing feature between a 
delictual remedy and section 60 of the EEA is that 'one of the elements of 
delict is dolus in the form of intention or negligence, but it is generally 
accepted that intent is not a relevant factor in determining liability for unfair 
discrimination'.18 Fault is not one of the elements of a section 60 enquiry but is 
deemed in terms of section 60(3) of the EEA. 
One asks whether it is open for the employer to argue in defence in 
terms of section 60(4) that it is not responsible for the wrongful conduct of its 
servant in that sexual harassment was not authorised by the employer or that 
sexual harassment was not an unauthorised mode of doing some act 
authorised by the employer. The answer to this question is that this defence is 
not available to the employer in the context of section 60 of the EEA and this 
feature distinguishes statutory vicarious liability from common-law vicarious 
liability discussed in chapter seven. Under common-law vicarious liability 
employers often raised a defence that sexual harassment was neither part of 
the job description nor an unauthorized mode of performing an authorized 
18 R le Roux 'Section 60 of the Employment Equity Act 1998: Will a Comparative Approach 





















act. This led the courts to dismiss sexual harassment cases for what was 
perceived as a frolic of one's own; personal; or not part of the job description 
of the perpetrator to sexually harass employees. 
The use of the term 'deemed' in section 60(3) can be interpreted to 
mean 'fault' is inferred to the employer. This creates a special form of statutory 
vicarious liability in section 60 in that the difference between common-law 
vicarious liability and the 'deemed' form of employer liability is that the latter 
appears to contain both elements of personal ( deemed fault) and vicarious 
liability on the part of the employer. It is emphasized that failure to act on the 
part of the employer in terms of section 60(3) of the EEA means that the 
employer is rubber-stamping sexual harassment and is undermining both the 
letter and spirit of the EEA in that: 
If targets complain or if these misdeeds pollute the workplace to the extent that the 
employer should have been aware of the problem and corrected it, the employer can 
properly be held financially liable to the victims of such an abusive work 
environment when the employer negligently fails to clean it up.19 
It has been correctly suggested by Le Roux that section 60(3) of the 
EEA creates 'a form of direct liability for failing to address equity in the 
workplace' .20 It is observed that focus in terms of section 60 is thus not only 
on the employee's wrongful conduct, but also on the employer's personal 
negligence which focuses on the extent to which the employer failed in its 
statutory duty to prevent and remedy gender discrimination. This means that 
the employer cannot be passive but is called upon not only to remedy but to 
'eliminate' gender discrimination in the workplace. The employer is thus 
under a legal obligation to 'treat every complaint as a legitimate one' 
19 Cochran op cit (n6) 140. 
20 Le Roux supra (n18) 6. See also the United States Court of Appeals judgment in Burlington 
Industries Inc v Ellerth 524 US 742 (1998) at 759, where the court held that direct liability on the 
part of the employer will ensue with respect to sexual harassment 'if it knew or should have 







including 'those that are obviously bogus, and to treat each with the same 
degree of seriousness and professionalism' as the 'most credible claims' .21 
MacKinnon correctly states that the basis for vicarious liability is that 
'individuals empowered by and within institutions are the institution' and 
'they get much of their power to discriminate, and to harm through 
discrimination, from the institution' and as such 'when they discriminate, the 
institution discriminates'.22 MacKinnon's view is consistent with section 60(3) 
of the EEA in that when the employer fails to act against gender 
discrimination, the employee's discriminatory act is deemed to be the 
employer's discriminatory act. 
The importance of the 2005 Code, albeit only relevant as a 'guide', 
cannot be understated in that it is a risk management tool, which assists the 
employer in ensuring compliance with the provisions of the EEA by taking 
reasonable steps to eliminate unlawful discrimination and promote gender 
equality in the workplace. Similarly, in the United Kingdom the Code of 
Practice on Sex Discrimination in Employment23, has been produced by the 
Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC)24 which recommends that 'particular 
care is taken to deal effectively with all complaints of discrimination, 
victimisation or harassment' and 'it should not be assumed that they are 
made by those who are over-sensitive'.25 
The employer owes its employees a non-delegable duty of care to 
ensure elimination of discriminatory conduct in employment. This shows an 
overlap between law of delict (duty of care) and labour law (EEA). The basis 
of vicarious liability in terms of the EEA is a 'breach of the obligation' by the 
21 D Orlov and MT Roumell What Every Manager Needs to Know about Sexual Harassment (1999) 
at 77. 
22 CA MacKinnon Women's Lives, Men's Laws (2005) at 183. 
23 Issued in 1985. 
24 In terms of section 58(A)(l) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
















employer to 'assist the victim by taking steps to prevent the harassment' .26 It 
is interesting to note that vicarious liability is a no-fault liability yet the 
employer under the EEA is allowed to raise an affirmative defence to prove 
that it was scrupulously diligent in preventing and correcting sexual 
harassment. 
It is suggested that statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of 
the EEA is therefore not entirely strict and 'is not intended to be absolute'27 
since the employer can escape liability by proving reasonable steps and 
'adequate pro-active measures should stand the employer in good stead' .2s 
This means that in terms of section 60(4) of the EEA, the employer has to 
guard against an alleged negligent breach of standard of care ( deemed fault). 
This shifts focus from the wrong committed by the employee to the conduct 
of the employer in enhancing or preventing harm caused by the wrongful 
conduct. Therefore, section 60 'provides for vicarious liability on the part of 
employers only where the employer fails to take necessary steps to eliminate 
the alleged sexual harassment' _29 
Relief in terms of section 60 of the EEA was sought in Ntsabo30 where 
the applicant, a security guard, resigned after being sexually harassed by her 
supervisor, Dlomo. The factors surrounding her resignation were that Dlomo 
suggested to her that they engage in an intimate relationship. She refused this 
upon which, she stated, her supervisor threatened to tender a 'negative work 
performance' report about her. He carried out his threat and complained 
about her bad work performance, that she was not wearing the prescribed 
26 J Grogan 'Workplace Harassment: The Highest Courts Speak' (2004) 20 Employment Law 3 at 
6. 
27 Le Roux op cit (n18) 7. 
28 Ibid. See also Y Slabbert Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (1994) Unpublished LLM 
Dissertation, University of Cape Town at 70, correctly supports the pro-active approach to 
sexual harassment 'to create public awareness of the incidence and impact of sexual 
harassment' and opines that the peril of sexual harassment in the workplace should be dealt 
with 'by addressing the root of the problem and not just the consequences thereof after it has 
occurred'. 
29 Christian v Colliers [2005] 11 BLLR 1066 (LC) at 1071. 














uniform and that she was making tea for the other guards. Dlomo also 
touched her breasts, thighs, buttocks, and genital area when they were in the 
guardroom and pulled her skirt. Dlomo also simulated sexual intercourse on 
her person during which he ejaculated on her dress. He had a firearm and 
threatened to shoot her if she told anyone about the incident. Dlomo was thus 
'enacting and thereby reinforcing and perpetuating gender norms that 
positioned him as a supervisor as a masculine sexual conqueror' and her 
subordinate, Ntsabo, as 'feminine sexual conquest'.31 
She was then reassigned to a night shift. She then complained that she 
would be unable to carry out shift duty, upon which the employer suggested 
that if that is the case, she must resign. She tendered her resignation citing her 
problem with Dlomo as a reason of her termination of employment. The 
employer tore up that letter and asked her to write another one citing her 
mother's illness as a reason of her termination of employment. The 
employer's approval of Ntsabo' s night shift in such circumstances was held to 
be in breach of section 60(2) and (3) and merely served to co-operate with the 
perpetrator, rather than oppose and protect Ntsabo from gender 
discrimination. The court correctly held that since sexual harassment was 
brought to the attention of the employer who did not attend to the issue as 
envisaged in subsection 60(2) of the EEA, the actions of the employer 
contravened the provisions of section 60(3) of the EEA.32 
It is suggested that Dlomo used his dominant position as a supervisor 
to victimize and discriminate against Ntsabo taking advantage of his 
organizational power. Furthermore, it is argued that Dlomo's capacity to 
harass Ntsabo was enhanced by the fact that as a supervisor, he was a 
representative of the employer, revered by his subordinates, and had power 
to inflict economic harm on Ntsabo. It is for this reason that the United States 
courts adopted a supervisory approach, as a fitting response to deal with 
31 KM Franke 'What is Wrong with Sexual Harassment' (1997) 49 Stan L Rev 691 at 766. 

















sexual harassment in the workplace, to truly capture the essence of the risk of 
abuse of power and trust inherent in the supervisor's delegated power.33 This 
means that in many instances, sexual harassment would not have occurred 
but for the supervisor's dominant authority and organizational power. It is 
submitted that it is far easier to stand up to a harassing co-worker than to 
stand up to a supervisor who is in a superior position in the organization and 
on whose hands one's livelihood, performance appraisal, and career direction 
and progress depends. 
The employer's failure to deal with Ntsabo' s sexual harassment 
contravened the provisions of section 6(1) and 6(3) of the EEA since the 
harassment experienced by the applicant was sexual harassment in terms of 
the EEA.34 The employer merely left Ntsabo at the perpetrator's mercy and 
failed in its duty of care towards Ntsabo and this meant that the employer 
was guilty of unfair discrimination in its personal capacity in failing to protect 
Ntsabo. It is for this reason that the court rightly held that the employer 'did 
or, at best, ought to have foreseen the development of hostile and intolerable 
working environment in the circumstances' and was directly liable in its 
failure to act on allegations of sexual harassment and for constructive 
dismissal. 35 
The court held further that for the purpose of the EEA, failure of the 
respondent to attend to the problem of sexual harassment brought the whole 
issue within the bounds of unfair discrimination on grounds of gender.36 The 
employer was thus held vicariously liable for supervisory harassment. It is 
argued that a court finding of both personal liability and vicarious liability on 
the part of the employer is not a contradiction and does not confuse the legal 
principles. It is part of the section 60(3) enquiry to establish deemed fault on 
33 See ch 7.4.3 on the discussion of supervisory approach to sexual harassment in the United 
States. 
34 Supra (n12) at 95. 
35 Supra (n12) at 93. 














the part of the employer by assessing the extent to which the employer failed 
to comply with its statutory obligations in terms of section 60(2). It is for this 
reason that statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA is a 
powerful remedy for victims of sexual harassment. 
6.2.2 The affirmative defence in terms of the Employment Equity Act 
It is emphasized that the employer will be immune from statutory vicarious 
liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA if it proves that it discharged its 
statutory duty and obligations by preventing, dealing, and eliminating sexual 
harassment. This means that the employer must 'design and enforce policies 
that are actually effective at preventing sexual harassment rather than simply 
bullet-proofing themselves for a potential claim down the road' .37 The 
employer is cautioned that proof of inadequate and inefficient steps taken fall 
short of meeting the standard of care expected of the employer in terms of 
section 60 of the EEA. On the contrary, the employer must prove that it did all 
that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in 
contravention of the EEA. 
6.2.2.1 Section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act 
In terms of section 60(4) an employer will be immune from liability if that 
employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to 
ensure that its employees would not act in contravention of section 6(1) of the 
EEA, which prohibits gender discrimination in the workplace. Section 60 of 
the EEA is distinguishable from the affirmative defence in English law 
whereby an employer will not be vicariously liable, whether or not it was 
done with its knowledge or approval, for the acts of its employees if the 
37 TM Beiner Gender M yths V Working Realities: Using Social Science to Reformulate Sexual 





















employer proves that he took such steps as are reasonably practicable to 
prevent sexual harassment from occurring in its employees' course and scope 
of employment.38 
It must be noted that English law statutory vicarious liability, unlike the 
EEA, has a disadvantage of being linked to common-law 'course of 
employment' .39 This distinguishes section 60 of the EEA from section 41 of the 
Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 ("SDA") in terms of which statutory vicarious 
liability includes the 'scope of employment' thereby creating a risk of English 
courts importing common-law rules of vicarious liability as guidance to the 
statutory remedy. Relief in terms of the SDA is thus more demanding in that 
the plaintiff has an extra hurdle to overcome by establishing course of 
employment, than a plaintiff seeking remedy under section 60 of the EEA. 
The uniqueness of statutory vicarious liability in section 60 of the EEA will 
enable the courts to give effect to the letter and spirit of the EEA 'with a mind 
unclouded by any parallels sought to be drawn from the law of vicarious 
liability' in delict.40 In the English case of Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd41, the 
enquiry before the court was whether the conduct complained of was done in 
the course of employment, for the purposes of section 32 of the Race Relations 
38 S 41 of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 reads: 
(1) Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated 
for the purposes of this Act as done by his employer as well as by him, 
whether or not it was done with the employer's knowledge or approval. 
(2) Anything done by a person as agent for another person with the authority 
(whether express or implied, and whether precedent or subsequent) of that 
other person shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as done by that 
other person as well as by him. 
(3) In proceedings brought under this Act against any person in respect of an act 
alleged to have been done by an employee of his it shall be a defence for that 
person to prove that he took such steps as were reasonably practicable to 
prevent the employee from doing that act, or from doing in the course of his 
employment acts of that description. 
39 See ch 7 on the discussion of the 'scope of employment' test under the principle of vicarious 
liability and how it was narrowly applied by the courts to deny protection for the victims of 
sexual harassment by regarding sexual harassment as a 'frolic of one's own', 'personal' and as 
being 'not part of the job description' or modus operandi to sexually harass. 




















Act 1976 and the corresponding provisions in section 41 of the Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975. Waite LJ applied a purposive approach and held 
that words in the 'course of employment' should be interpreted in the sense in 
which they are employed in everyday speech and not restrictively by 
reference to the principles laid down by case law for establishing an 
employer's vicarious liability for the torts committed by an employee. The 
court correctly held that to do so would seriously undermine the statutory 
scheme of the Discrimination Acts and flout the purposes, which they were 
passed to achieve. The employer is under a statutory obligation in terms of 
section 5 of the EEA to take steps to promote equal opportunity in the 
workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or 
practice. 
'To take steps'42 and 'comply with the provisions of this Act'43 means 
'something more' is expected from the employer than being reactive when an 
incident of sexual harassment occurs. The 2005 Code introduces further duties 
on the employer as follows: 
a) Employers should create and maintain a working environment in 
which the dignity of employees is upheld and respected;44 
b) Employers should take appropriate action to address and eliminate 
sexual harassment;45 
c) Employers should adopt a sexual harassment policy and communicate 
its contents to employees;46 and 
d) Employers should grant additional paid sick leave in cases of serious 
sexual harassment where the employee's sick leave entitlement has 
been exhausted.47 
42 S 5 EEA. 
43 S 60(2) EEA. 
44 Item 6 2005 Code. 
45 Items 6 and 8.2 2005 Code. 













The duties outlined above make it clear that the employer is called 
upon to uphold the letter and spirit of the EEA by being pro-active and taking 
reasonable steps to maintain a harmonious working environment, which is 
free from sexual harassment, protecting the welfare and rights of the 
employees, and preventing sexual harassment. The affirmative defence is thus 
more likely to succeed if the employer is pre-emptive by upholding a culture 
of ubuntu in its workplace, which promotes respect, integrity, and dignity of 
the employees, and a no-nonsense zero tolerance to sexual harassment in the 
workplace. This view is consistent with the pro-active approach adopted in 
Media 24 Limited, Gasant Samuels v Sonja Grobler4B where the court extended 
the basis of an employer's duty to prevent sexual harassment in the 
workplace and to compensate the victim for harm negligently caused, to the 
legal convictions of the community, which are not dependent on the contract 
of employment or statutory remedy. Le Roux similarly opines a pro-active 
approach to section 60(4) and that 'the emphasis ought to be on the employer 
conduct that preceded the act of discrimination'49 which will give the 
employer' an absolute defence if, nonetheless, the discrimination happens' .so 
The affirmative defence that would be sufficient under section 60(4) of 
the EEA is proof that the employer fostered a culture of zero tolerance to 
sexual harassment in the workplace as part of its corporate governance. 
Existence of a sexual harassment policy, which can be implemented 
effectively, and which not only exists in letter, but also vigorously enforced 
and communicated to all employees in the workplace is a step in the right 
direction for the employer to immunize itself from vicarious liability in terms 
of section 60(4) of the EEA.51 The employer should therefore establish that he 
'did something more than put pen to paper'.52 
47 Item 10 2005 Code. 
48 [2005] 7 BLLR 649 (SCA) at para 68. 
49 Le Roux op cit (n18) 26. 
so Le Roux op cit (n18) 31. 
51 Item 7.3 2005 Code. 






It is argued that emphasis is not only on the preventative measures 
(pro-active) but on remedial measures adopted as well. In order to escape 
liability in terms of section 60(4) of the EEA, the employer is not only called 
upon to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, but is also called upon to 
come to the employee's rescue once gender discrimination occurs and act 
promptly with a view to deal and remedy gender discrimination. It is 
suggested that the pro-active and reactive approaches are thus two sides of a 
coin, which are both of fundamental importance to the employer to 
successfully raise the affirmative defence in terms of section 60(4) of the EEA. 
Le Roux correctly opines that if a reactive approach is adopted, 
'employers will fail to see the need to take any pro-active steps and will rather 
deal with discrimination as and when it arises, an approach that would 
undermine the purpose of the EEA'.53 It is suggested that a reactive approach 
signifies lack of commitment to the elimination of gender discrimination and 
falls short of putting safeguards against gender discrimination and taking 
preventative steps, which would help, educate, and change the employees' 
attitudes to the harm of sexual harassment. It is submitted that the 
preventative steps are cost effective compared to damages which an employer 
could be called upon to pay, if he were to be found liable for failure to prevent 
and remedy sexual harassment. 
In Ntsabo54 the employer stood no chance of successfully raising the 
affirmative defence as it was neither pro-active nor reactive in its approach as 
it did nothing in its workplace to prevent sexual harassment and turned a 
blind eye to sexual harassment despite several complaints lodged by Ntsabo. 
Furthermore, the employer acted unreasonably in handling the matter in a 
manner that would insulate it from liability under section 60(4). 
53 Le Roux op cit (n18) 30. 
54 Supra (n12). See also Fall v Indiana University Bd of Trustees 12 F Supp 2d 870 (ND Ind 1998) 
where the federal court noted that the affirmative defence requires the employers to prove 
two necessities and is not framed in the alternative with the use of 'or' but has a conjunction 












Ntsaboss is distinguishable from a United States judicial precedent in 
Bernard v Calhoon MEBA Engineering Schoo[56 where the court gave judgment 
in employer's favour on grounds that he had acted promptly in response to a 
harassment charge despite the deficiency in its internal sexual harassment 
policy. Bernard complained to a supervisor that a co-worker made racially 
offensive remarks. The supervisor immediately relayed that complaint to the 
human resources manager, sought out the co-worker, and made him 
apologize. On the facts, the human resources manager came to the school the 
next day to address the complaint; met with the co-worker, secured his 
promise to stop his remarks; and was warned that he would be disciplined if 
he did not stop. The court found that these prompt actions worked because 
Bernard did not report any further offensive remarks by co-workers. 
It is suggested that the court will grant immunity from vicarious 
liability to the employer who displays commitment to eliminating gender 
discrimination in the workplace; takes reasonable and prompt steps to protect 
his employees; and treats each complaint with seriousness, merit, and 
attention it deserves. Reasonable steps, which are expected in terms of section 
60(4) of the EEA to insulate the employer from being held vicariously liable, 
include a minimum of the following guidelines contained in the 2005 Code: 
55 Ibid. 
a) A sexual harassment policy must be communicated to the staff 
members;57 
b) Sexual harassment must be outlined as a form of gender 
discrimination which infringes the rights of the employees and 
constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace;ss 
56 309 F Supp 2d 732 (D Md 2004). 
57 Item 7.2 2005 Code. 














c) A grievance procedure with clear lines of communication and 
reporting must exist, and must spell out that appropriate action 
must be taken by the employer;S9 and 
d) It must be stated that it is a disciplinary offence to victimise or 
retaliate against complainants.60 
The following additional reasonable steps are suggested as part of the 
employer's duties and obligations to prevent and deal with sexual harassment 
in the workplace and insulate itself from statutory vicarious liability in terms 
of section 60 of the EEA: 
a) The employer must adopt awareness training programmes which serve 
to sensitise the employees to the harm of sexual harassment;61 
b) The sexual harassment policy must clearly outline the nature of sexual 
harassment; examples of forbidden behaviour; what makes it 
intolerable in the workplace and sanctions for committing sexual 
harassment. 
c) The employer must undertake special training for the supervisors and 
managers on how they must treat their subordinates in a way that does 
not abuse their authority and power thereby poisoning the workplace; 
d) The employer must appoint a sexual harassment officer or a human 
resources officer responsible for monitoring compliance with the 
sexual harassment policy;62 
59 Jtems 7.4.3 and 7.5 2005 Code. 
60 Item 7.4.4 2005 Code. 
61 See also Shellhabour Golf Club v Wheeler (1999) New South Wales Supreme Court 224, the 
Tribunal found that the fact that the employer had a sexual harassment policy did not 
prevent it from being vicariously liable for the actions of the president, as the Tribunal found 
that the policy was merely displayed on a notice board, rather than being the subject of 
discussions or training with staff. 
62 See also Hopper v Mt Isa Mines Ltd & others (1997) EOC92-87 is an Australian precedent for 
the proposition that even where the employer has a relevant sexual harassment or anti-
discrimination policy, unless the employer takes reasonable and efficient steps to police and 
enforce that policy, then the employer is failing in its obligations to its employees and will be 















e) The employer must therefore foster a culture in which complaints will 
not be trivialised. 
Guidance on the 'affirmative defence' can also be sought from English 
law. In the United Kingdom, the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Caniffe v 
East Riding of Yorkshire Council held that the proper approach to considering 
whether there is a 'reasonable steps' defence is: 
a) to identify whether the respondent took any steps at all to prevent the employee, 
from doing the act or acts complained of in the course of his employment; 
b) having identified what steps, if any, they took to consider whether there were 
any further acts, that they could have taken, which were reasonably practicable. 63 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the employer will not be 
immune 'if it has not taken reasonable steps simply because if he had taken 
those reasonable steps they would not have led anywhere or achieved 
anything or in fact prevented anything from occurring'.64 This reasoning is of 
relevance in the context of section 60 of the EEA, in that the employer is 
statutorily obliged to take steps even though in its own assessment the taking 
of such steps will be a futile exercise. 
6.3 Empowering provisions in awarding a remedy for sexual harassment 
under the Employment Equity Act 
The plaintiff, who has framed her cause of action for sexual harassment on 
grounds of gender discrimination under the EEA, can claim compensation for 
pure economic loss and damages for intangible loss, which entails an 
impairment of dignity, contumelia, iniuria, sentimental loss, pain, and 
suffering, in terms of section 50 of the EEA. Section 50(2) of the EEA 
empowers the Labour Court to award: 





















(b) Damages and 
(c) Order directing employer to take preventative measures. 
Section 50 requires the court to make an appropriate order that is just 
and equitable in the circumstances. The factors to be taken into account were 
considered in Christian v Colliers Properties as enjoining the court to: 
... consider various interests, including the need to redress the wrong caused by the 
infringement, the deterrence of future violations, the dispensation of justice which is 
fair to all those who might be affected, and the necessity of ensuring that the order 
can be complied with. 65 
In Christian v Colliers Properties66 the court awarded the plaintiff a total of R58 
000 (R48 000 in terms of section 194(3) of the LRA and RlO 000 in terms of 
section 50 of the EEA). In reaching this quantum, the court took into account 
the following: 
a) The acts complained of occurred on the same day and within a short space of time; 
b) The only physical advance was the defendant's attempt to kiss the plaintiff on her 
neck;and 
c) There was no evidence of severe emotional and psychological trauma or 
consequences. 67 
It is emphasized that the plaintiff can claim under both the LRA and EEA. 
The plaintiff can plead unfair dismissal/ automatic unfair dismissal under the 
LRA and claim maximum compensation permissible in terms of section 194 of 
the LRA; and plead unfair discrimination and claim damages and 
compensation, which are not capped in terms of section 50 of the EEA. This is 
evident in Ntsabo6B where the court awarded the plaintiff a total of R82 000 
(R12, 000 in respect of unfair dismissal in terms of the LRA, R20 000 for future 
medical costs and R50 000 for general damages including contumelia, pain and 
suffering, emotional or psychological trauma and the loss of amenities of life 
in terms of the EEA). It is highlighted that the award of damages for 
contumelia (sentimental loss) is a matter to be heard by the Labour Court 
65 Supra (n29) at 483G-H. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Supra (n29) at 485E. 

















under the section 50 of the EEA and not under the LRA. In terms of section 
46(9)(c) of the Labour Relations Act69 ('old LRA') the plaintiff could claim 
sentimental loss as part of her case for unfair labour practice. 
In Intertech Systems (Pty) Ltd v Sowter70 the court awarded the plaintiff an 
amount equivalent to 12 months salary or R92, 088. This case was brought for 
an unfair labour practice ruling in terms of section 46(9)(c) of the old LRA but 
is important in highlighting the considerations that the court takes into 
account when determining an award regarding compensation for sexual 
harassment. In awarding compensation, the court found that the company's 
conduct towards the employee had been 'reprehensible and insupportable, 
and its conduct of its case in the industrial court had been lamentably 
disingenuous' .71 The court thus felt that the plaintiff had to be compensated 
for the egregious invasion of her employment security and affront to her 
dignity, which the company perpetrated because of sexual harassment.72 The 
court therefore took into account non-patrimonial loss occasioned by sexual 
harassment, when awarding compensation. 
The distinction between 'compensation' and 'damages' (including both 
patrimonial and sentimental loss) in section 50 of the EEA, must be noted. In 
Harmony Furnishers v Prinsloo73 Foxcroft J held that the word 'damages' is 
merely a synonym for 'compensation'. However, section 50 of the EEA 
differentiates between 'payment of compensation'74 and 'payment of 
damages' .75 It is also interesting to note that in Sibiya v Num76 the Industrial 
Court referred to the word 'damages' in the context of 'non-monetary 
damages'. It is suggested that this means that 'damages' in the context of the 
EEA signify intangible loss. 
69 28 of 1956. 
7o (1997) 18 ILJ 689 (LAC). 
71 Supra (n70) at 705G. 
n Supra (n70) at 706D. 
73 (1993) 14 ILJ 1466 (LAC) at 1469. 
74 S 50(2)(a) EEA. 
7s S 50(2)(b) EEA. 














'Compensation' in section 194 of the LRA is capped and restricted to no 
more than 12 months for unfair dismissal and a maximum of 24 months 
remuneration for automatically unfair dismissal. In the context of the LRA, it 
is emphasized that 'compensation' can be understood to mean pure economic 
loss and non-monetary loss, which is discretionary to the court since iniuria 
(often involved in sexual harassment), is not capable of mathematical 
precision. Similarly, in delict 'damages' encompass payment for patrimonial 
loss as well non-patrimonial loss, which would otherwise be separately dealt 
with under 'payment of compensation' and 'payment of damages' in section 
50 of the EEA. 
The concept of 'damages' means the 'diminution, as a result of a damage-
causing event, in the utility or quality of a patrimonial or personality interest 
in satisfying the legally recognized needs of the person involved'77 and 
implies a 'comprehensive concept with patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss 
as its two mutually exclusive components'.78 In delict, compensation is used 
to denote 'the process of reparation or restoration of any patrimonial or non-
patrimonial loss'.79 This means that in delict, 'damages' and 'compensation' 
are used interchangeably whereby damages encompass the monetary 
recompense for any tangible and intangible loss. Under the EEA, the plaintiff 
is paid either damages (intangible loss which encompasses impairment of 
dignity, contumelia, iniuria, sentimental loss, pain and suffering) or 
compensation (pure economic loss) - or awarded both under separate 
headings. 
It is underscored that a claim for sentimental loss under section 50(2)(b) of 
the EEA is not subject to the delictual rules governing the actio iniuriarum as 
defined in De Lange v Costa80 - that is to say, an unlawful, impairment of 
77 PJ Visser and JM Potgieter Visser and Potgieter' s Law of Damages 2ed (2003) at 24. 
78 WA Joubert The Law of South Africa 1995(7) at para 10. See also J Neethling and PJ Visser 
Law of Delict 5ed (2006) at 197. 
79 Joubert op cit (n78) para 16. 

















dignity inflicted with animus iniuriandi. Factors affecting a delictual assessment 
of damages for sentimental loss come into play to the extent to which they will 
enable the court to make an appropriate order which is just and equitable as 
prescribed by section 50(2)(b) of the EEA. It is stressed that the requirements 
for claiming damages under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA are less demanding to 
establish than in the actio iniuriarum in that sentimental loss is assessed from 
the cumulative effect of the circumstances surrounding sexual harassment 
and the adverse effects of the sexual harassment experience on the plaintiff. 
For instance in Ntsabo,81 the indignity suffered by the applicant was inferred 
from the following: 
a) The fact that Dlomo simulated sexual intercourse on the 
applicant; the embarrassment she experienced in having to 
attend psychiatric clinics; 
b) The employer's failure to act when sexual harassment was 
reported by the applicant; 
c) The emotional and psychological trauma she suffered; and 
d) An unacceptable invasion of the applicant's privacy and her 
constitutional rights. 
However, section 50(2)(b) of the EEA is compatible with the objective 
test to impairment of dignity in De LangeB2 in that a finding of contumelia 
under section 50(2)(b) involves an objective factual enquiry. 
6.4 Dismissal 
It has been highlighted that sexual harassment is a specific form of gender 
discrimination which amounts to unfair discrimination; unfair labour 
81 Supra (n12). 




















practice; affront to right to dignity; violation of the right to equality; and 
inimical to the values underlying the Constitution. It is proposed that as part 
of the employer's corporate responsibility in the spirit of corporate 
governance, sexual harassment should constitute misconduct warranting 
dismissal of the perpetrator. A claim for constructive dismissal will also be 
discussed highlighting reasons why it is not a viable remedy for automatically 
unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(£) of the LRA read with section 
186(1)(e). 
6.4.1 Unfair dismissal 
Section 185 of the LRA prohibits unfair labour practice and reiterates that: 
1) Every employee has a right not to be unfairly dismissed. 
Automatically unfair dismissal provides for a more stringent and punitive 
award of not more than the equivalent of 24 months remuneration which is in 
excess of the normal 12 months remuneration compensation for other kinds of 
dismissals.83 The court held in NtsaboB4 that the applicant's dismissal could 
not be described as being based on discrimination from a LRA point of view, 
since her dismissal was not linked to discrimination. Instead, the court held 
that the employer's failure to deal with the matter therefore constituted 
discrimination within the meaning of that term in the EEA. 
On the other side of the coin lies a perpetrator who alleges unfair 
dismissal because of committing sexual harassment. The court in Reddy v 
University of Natazss treated sexual harassment as a form of misconduct 
justifying dismissal and found dismissal as a justifiable remedy in the 
circumstances. Conduct of sexual harassment may be considered serious 
83 S 194(1) LRA caps compensation at not more than an equivalent of 12 months remuneration 
for unfair dismissal. S 194(3) LRA provides for compensation, which is not more than the 
equivalent of 24 months' remuneration for automatically unfair dismissal. 
84 Supra (n12). 















enough to warrant dismissal where such acts are likely to bring the employer 
and business into disrepute, and undoubtedly have dire repercussions in the 
workplace.86 
The 2005 Code states that 'the employer's sexual harassment policy 
should specify disciplinary sanctions that may be imposed on a perpetrator' .87 
The 2005 Code is consistent with Rubenstein' s recommendation that 
'violations of the organization's policy should be treated as a disciplinary 
offence and the disciplinary rules should make it clear what is regarded as 
inappropriate behaviour at work' .88 This means that the employer has: 
an affirmative duty to investigate complaints of sexual harassment and deal 
appropriately with the offending personnel. .. the failure to investigate gives tacit 
support to the discrimination because the absence of sanctions encourages abusive 
behaviour.89 
It is suggested that dismissal of the perpetrator will thus be a fitting response 
to misconduct because sexual harassment renders the employment 
relationship 'intolerable' and is the test of fairness in dismissal for misconduct 
(such as sexual harassment). 
It is essential that the employer must take disciplinary action against 
the perpetrator, and not condone or tacitly approve sexual harassment, in 
order to discharge its personal obligations in terms of section 60(2) of the 
EEA, which enjoins it to 'take the necessary steps to eliminate the alleged 
conduct and comply with the provisions' of the EEA. 
6.4.2 Constructive dismissal 
Constructive dismissal is a form that dismissal may take, which may or may 
not be unfair (though it usually is) and may give rise to a claim of unfair 
dismissal. In the present context, it offers a statutory basis on which a victim 
86 NEHA WU obo Barnes v Department of Foreign Affairs [2001] 6 BALR 539 (P) at 542. 
87 Item 8.8 2005 Code. 
88 M Rubenstein 'Sexual Harassment: European Commission Recommendation and Code of 
Practice' (1992) 12 ILJ 70 at 73. 















of sexual harassment who has been driven from her job may seek a remedy 
for automatically /unfair dismissal.90 The purpose of exploring this remedy is 
to ensure that the plaintiff is not without recourse when she has suffered 
sexual harassment to a point where she has been left with no option but to 
resign. Furthermore, constructive dismissal is in breach of the employee's 
right not to be unfairly dismissed and subjected to unfair labour practice, 
which is entrenched in section 185 of the LRA. 
The remedy for automatically unfair dismissal on grounds of 
constructive dismissal may be sought in terms of section 187(1)(£) of the LRA 
(read with section 186(1)(e) of the LRA) which states that dismissal is 
automatically unfair if: 
' the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on 
any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political 
opinion, culture, language, marital status or family responsibility'. 
Section 186(1 )( e) of the LRA endorses the principle of constructive dismissal 
under a meaning of 'dismissal' and is defined as follows: 
(e) an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice because 
the employer made continued employment intolerable for the employee. 
Section 186(l)(e) of the LRA bears resemblance to the English law on 
constructive dismissal as contained in 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 
1996 which provides: 
An employee is dismissed by his employer if -
the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or 
without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it 
without notice by reason of the employer's conduct. 
It is clear from the definition above that constructive dismissal is coerced by 
the conduct of the employer, as compared to an employee's unilateral and 
voluntary resignation. Grogan91 states that the test for constructive dismissal 
rests on the employee to establish the following: 
(a) Whether the employee brought the contract to an end; 
90 S 187(1)(f) of the LRA read withs 186(1)(e). 
















(b) Whether the reason for the employee's action was that the employer had 
rendered the prospect of continued employment 'intolerable'; 
(c) Whether the employee had no reasonable alternative other than terminating 
the contract. 
In Ntsabo92 the plaintiff endured a hostile environment as a result of 
sexual harassment by her supervisor, which the employer did nothing to 
rectify. The court held that to ground constructive dismissal, employer 
conduct becomes intolerable only when the employee has exhausted the 
means she might reasonably be expected to employ to put a stop to it. The 
court concluded that on the facts, Ntsabo's case fell within the situation 
envisaged by section 186(1)(e) of the LRA in that: 
a) The inaction of the employer after Ntsabo had complained about her 
supervisor sexual harassment poisoned the working environment and 
it became intolerable for her to continue employment;93 
b) She was then compelled to terminate her contract of employment and 
her consequent resignation was coerced in that the respondent did or 
are at best ought to have foreseen the development of a hostile and 
intolerable working environment in the circumstances;94 and 
c) The employer did nothing to safeguard against the creation of a hostile 
and abusive working environment.95 
In order to establish constructive dismissal, the employee's resignation 
must be causally linked to the employer's conduct. If the employee would in 
any event have resigned, she cannot claim constructive dismissal. It is 
submitted that the conduct contemplated in terms of section 186(1)(e) of the 
LRA does not refer exclusively to pro-active conduct by the employer but 
includes reactive conduct which entails omission by the employer to deal 
with an unbearable and intolerable situation once it has come to its attention. 
92 Supra (n12). 
93 Ibid. 














6.4.2.1 Employer repudiation of an employment contract 
It is highlighted that to ground constructive dismissal, the employer's 
conduct must breach the essence of the employment contract so as to 
reasonably conclude that he no longer intends to be bound by the contract of 
employment but has instead opted to repudiate the contract of employment. 
Lord Denning summarised the English law on constructive dismissal in a 
leading case of Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp96 as follows: 
If an employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of 
the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to 
be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, the employee is 
entitled to treat himself as being discharged from further performance. If he does so, 
then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer's conduct and he is 
constructively dismissed. 
It is emphasized that the employer must thus conduct himself so as to 
repudiate the employment contract and evince intention to be absolved from 
the contract. 
6.4.2.2 Breach of trust 
Sexual harassment also constitutes a breach of the trust, which lies at the heart 
of an employment relationship and makes a continued relationship between 
the perpetrator, the victim, and other female colleagues intolerable.97 Sexual 
harassment is hazardous to a harmonious working environment and can lead 
to constructive dismissal if left unattended by the employer. 
In Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots9B Nicholson JA 
stated that to ground constructive dismissal, the enquiry is whether the 
appellant, without reasonable and proper cause, conducted itself in a manner 
calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between employer and employee. The court held that it 
96 [1978] QB 761 at 769. 
97 Gerbber v Algorax (Pty) Ltd [2000] 1 BALR 41 (CCMA) at 52-3. 













is not necessary to show that the employer intended repudiation of the 
contract; the court's function is to look at the employer's conduct as a whole 
and determine whether its effect, judged reasonably and sensibly, is such that 
the employee cannot be expected to put up with it.99 Intention on the part of 
the employer is thus not part of the constructive dismissal enquiry but the 
employer's conduct is assessed objectively on the facts. 
The requirements for a successful claim of constructive dismissal were 
further set out by the court that an employee is required to prove that: 
a) Her situation had become so intolerable that she was unable to work; 
b) She would have continued working indefinitely had the employer not created the 
unbearable situation; 
c) She resigned because she did not believe that the employer would reform or 
abandon the pattern of creating an unbearable work environment.100 
Conduct becomes intolerable only when the employee has exhausted 
all the means and avenues she might reasonably be expected to employ to put 
a stop to sexual harassment. The conduct of the employer must reach such 
degree and proportions to destroy the trust and confidence between the 
employer and employee. Therefore, facts must lead the court to conclude that 
resignation was a natural progression of the events that ensued in that the 
employee had no choice but to resign. It is for this reason that constructive 
dismissal is a remedy available to victims of sexual harassment. 
6.4.2.3 The employee must leave at once 
The employee must leave at once in that her resignation must follow 
immediately after the conduct of the employer in failing to deal with sexual 
harassment after it was brought to its attention. This means that constructive 
dismissal is end-result behaviour of employer's conduct. If the employee does 
not resign pursuant to employer's failure to prevent or remedy sexual 
99 Ibid. 










harassment, then she will lose her right to claim constructive dismissal and 
will be taken to have affirmed the contract despite the breach thereof by the 
employer. 
The court in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp101 held that the 
employee must respond at once and resign immediately after the employer 
has displayed its intention to no longer be bound by the contract, as follows: 
The employee is entitled in those circumstances to leave at the instant without giving 
any notice at all or ... he may give notice and say that he is leaving at the end of the 
notice. But the conduct must in either case be sufficiently serious to entitle him to 
leave at once. Moreover, he must make up his mind soon after the conduct of which 
he complains. For, if he continues for any length of time without leaving, he will 
loose his right to treat himself as discharged. He will be regarded as having elected to 
affirm the contract. 
An instructive principle, which has been established in this English 
case as a guide to the South African context, is that time is of essence in 
constructive dismissal in that the employee must act and report instantly the 
employer conduct complained of and not condone his conduct. Therefore, the 
plaintiff cannot resign at a later stage for other reasons unrelated to sexual 
harassment and claim constructive dismissal as a reason for sexual 
harassment, which occurred in the past. 'Leaving at once' is thus of relevance 
to the plaintiff when establishing that the employer conduct rendered 
continued employment 'intolerable' in terms of section 186(1)(e) of the LRA. 
In Ntsabo102 by citing Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots, 
CEPPWAWU and Another v Glass Aluminium cc, and Kruger v CCMA and 
Another103, the court reasoned that the conduct of the employer must be so 
unbecoming and intolerable that the employee cannot fulfil what is the 
employees most important function, namely to work. It follows that in order 
to ground a successful claim of constructive dismissal, the plaintiff must 
101 Supra (n96) at 769. 
102 Ntsabo supra (n12) at 92. 
103 Loots supra (n98); CEPPWAWU and Another v Glass Aluminium cc [2002] 5 BLLR 399 (LAC); 

















prove that on the facts, there was 'unfair and wrongful conduct by the 
employer that drives the employee to resign'.104 
6.4.2.4 Supervisor harassment 
Abuse of supervisory authority can lead to constructive dismissal. In Ntsabo105 
the supervisor had abused his organizational power and dominant position 
by harassing his subordinate. Ntsabo was a victim of her supervisor's abuse 
of power, which is an aggravating circumstance because Ntsabo was at her 
supervisor's mercy and he was in a position to discriminate and alter her 
terms of employment in the event of her refusing to co-operate or lodging a 
complaint. The court thus correctly held that she was compelled under the 
circumstances to terminate her contract of employment with the respondent 
and that the respondent, did or at best, ought to have foreseen the 
development of a hostile and intolerable working environment in the 
circumstances. 
The position of supervisors as the alter ego of the employer and their 
dominant and influential position enhance the risk of sexual harassment 
because they 'generally have greater access to people still higher in the 
employment hierarchy' .106 The subordinate is thus placed: 
in a lose-lose situation if harassed by a supervisor: she can either accept the harassing 
behaviour which renders the workplace unpleasant (at the least), or she can protest 
and risk making the workplace even more unpleasant, if she does not lose her job.107 
Sexual harassment by the supervisor can lead to constructive dismissal 
in that the supervisor improperly exercises and abuses his dominant authority 
in implementing a tangible employment detriment and bullying his 
104 D Du Toit, D Bosch, D Woolfrey, S Godfrey, C Cooper, GS Giles, C Bosch and J Rossouw 
Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide Sed (2006) at 386. 
10s Supra (n12). 
106 R Ehrenreich 'Dignity and Discrimination: Towards a Pluralistic Understanding of 
















subordinates thereby threatening their continued employment. It is argued 
that the organizational power of the supervisor makes him the representative 
of the master who is often revered and thereby puts the subordinate under 
duress when subjected to sexual harassment, leaving the victim of sexual 
harassment with no option but to resign. 
6.4.2.5 Employer's omission to remedy sexual harassment 
The employer must fail to deal with sexual harassment once it is brought to its 
attention. It is established that what leads to employee's resignation is not 
sexual harassment per se but it is the employer's failure to protect the 
harassed employee and remedy sexual harassment once a sexual harassment 
complaint has been lodged. In some sexual harassment cases, constructive 
dismissal is responses to retaliatory mechanisms adopted by the employer 
when it treats a complaint with neglect and thereafter colludes with the 
perpetrator in aggravating a discriminatory environment. This scenario will 
make it unlikely for the affirmative defence in section 60(4) of the EEA to be 
successfully raised by the employer. 
In Intertech Systems (Pty) Ltd v S0wter10s the plaintiff reported sexual 
harassment and the employer failed to deal with it adequately. The harasser 
was not relocated or discharged from the employment and as such continued 
to harass the plaintiff. The court found the plaintiff's constructive dismissal to 
be an unfair labour practice and held that the plaintiff must be compensated 
for the 'egregious invasion of her employment security and her dignity which 
the company perpetrated' and reasoned as follows: 
The unfair labour practice was both outrageous and egregious. It involved an attack 
upon Sowter's dignity as an employee; it involved a gross invasion of her stability 
and security in employment; and it involved a denigration of her employment 
prospects ... The company initially treated her complaint with neglect. Later it 
colluded with the perpetrator and became accessory to her victimisation. The 


















company showed a singular lack of candour and evasiveness in dealing with 
Sowter's complaints .. . In short, the company's conduct towards Sowter was 
reprehensible and insupportable, and its conduct of its case was lamentably 
disingenuous.109 
The court thus ordered the employer to pay R92, 088, which was an 
equivalent of 12 months' salary at the time of her dismissal. It is worth noting 
that the court highlighted the employer's failure to deal with sexual 
harassment after it came to its attention, as an aggravating circumstance of its 
neglect of its responsibility to deal with sexual harassment. The employer's 
omission to deal with sexual harassment thus impaired the plaintiff's 
employment security, stability, and dignity. Implied in the court's conclusion 
is an employer's duty to ensure a safe and discriminatory-free working 
environment with zero tolerance to sexual harassment. If the employer fails to 
remedy sexual harassment once it has come to its attention, then it will be 
deemed to have committed gender discrimination in terms of section 60(3) of 
the EEA - because through its omission, it thereby endorsed sexual 
harassment. 
In Ntsabo11D the court noted that by the time Ntsabo resigned, matters 
had worsened due to omission on the part of the employer. The employer did 
nothing to rectify the situation in order to ensure that the risk of sexual 
harassment to the plaintiff was neutralized.111 The court reasoned that all that 
Ntsabo wanted was to get on with her work without being subjected to sexual 
harassment and she did all that could reasonably be expected of her in an 
attempt to hold onto her employment and to avoid being sexually harassed.112 
It is emphasized that the employer's display of callousness and neglect in 
handling sexual harassment in the workplace is a recipe for constructive 
dismissal. 
109 Supra (n108) at 705E-H. 
no Supra (n12). 





















6.4.2.6 The affirmative defence in the United States 
In the United States, for constructive dismissal to succeed, resignation must 
be a fitting response pursuant to a creation of a hostile environment. The 
evidentiary burden is placed on the plaintiff to prove constructive dismissal. 
The evidentiary burden shifts to the employer once the plaintiff has 
discharged the onus, to establish a corrective or remedial response to an 
intolerable situation, which led to constructive dismissal. 
Guidance can be obtained from a federal case of Pennsylvania State 
Police, Petitioner v Nancy Drew Suders on the standard test to be applied in 
constructive dismissal cases where Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of 
the Court as follows: 
Beyond that, we hold, to establish 'constructive discharge,' the plaintiff must make a 
further showing: She must show that the abusive working environment became so 
intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response. An employer may 
defend against such a claim by showing both (1) that it had installed a readily 
accessible and effective policy for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual 
harassment, and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of that 
employer-provided preventive or remedial apparatus. 113 
It is observed that the United States thus takes constructive dismissal a 
step further and creates an affirmative defence for an employer to be able to 
prove that it took preventative and remedial actions to safeguard and deal 
with sexual harassment. The plaintiff must unreasonably have failed to take 
advantage of the avenues available to her to eliminate or mitigate the 
occurrence of sexual harassment. That is, the employer can prove that her 
resignation was unwarranted and did not qualify as an appropriate and 
fitting response to sexual harassment. In any event, since constructive 
dismissal hinges on employer conduct, where an employer has conducted 
itself to protect the plaintiff and remedy a discriminatory environment, then 
there would be no question of constructive dismissal since employer's 
preventive response would cure an intolerable situation. 



















In the United States, the affirmative defence is only available in hostile 
environment harassment and not in quid pro quo harassment resulting in a 
tangible employment detriment.114 This distinguishes South Africa from the 
United States in that in South Africa there is no differentiation between the 
scope of protection and legal redress for forms of sexual harassment. Instead, 
in South Africa there is equal protection before the law for all irrespective of 
the form of sexual harassment suffered. Similarly, it is argued that in South 
Africa, just like in the United States, there is an affirmative defence to 
constructive dismissal, which is available to the employer. Thompson and 
Benjamin correctly state that 'in order to show that a situation has become 
intolerable', the onus is on the employee to 'show that termination of the 
employment relationship was the only reasonable option in the 
circumstances' .115 Furthermore, Grogan correctly states that 'where a 
complaint is such that the employer could, and probably would, have dealt 
with the cause of the employee's unhappiness', then 'the employee should file 
a complaint before resigning' .116 
Grogan cautions therefore that 'where the employees have failed to file 
grievances or formally to complain of the treatment which induced them to 
resign, they are unlikely to persuade arbitrators that they were constructively 
dismissed'.117 Commissioner Marcus in Smith v Magnum SecurityllB held that 
the employee must show that 'the conduct of the employer left him/her with 
no reasonable alternative option other than resignation in the circumstances'. 
It is for this reason that the plaintiff's claim of constructive dismissal was not 
upheld in Coetzer and The Citizen Newspaper119 where Commissioner Harris 
found that 'the applicant's resignation was not justified and was premature' 
since she 'did not exhaust all remedies available to her prior to resigning' .120 It 
114 Ibid. 
115 C Thompson and P Benjamin South African Labour Law (2006) 1 at AAl-408. 
116 J Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practice (2005) at 163. 
117 Ibid. 
11s [1997] 3 BLLR 336 (CCMA) at para 341D. 

















is concluded that 'the employee will also have to show that the resignation 
was action of last resort'.121 It follows therefore that 'if the employee's 
concerns are not well founded or if there are other reasonable remedies, the 
onus is not discharged' .122 
6.4.3 Compensation for constructive dismissal under the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 ('LRA') 
The victim of sexual harassment may seek relief in terms of section 193 of the 
LRA for reinstatement, re-employment in the same job or alternative job 
reasonably suitable to the plaintiff, or compensation. The remedy of 
reinstatement is not a viable option because it is prejudicial to the victim in 
that she would have left her job in the first place because the continued 
employment was intolerable. Furthermore, reinstatement is also not a 
practical option where: 
• the plaintiff has to bear the brunt of yet facing her harasser on a 
perpetual basis; and 
• the relationship between the plaintiff and the perpetrator is strained 
beyond repair. 
An efficient remedy for constructive dismissal as an unfair dismissal is in 
terms of section 194(1) of the LRA, which caps compensation and 'may not be 
more than the equivalent of 12 months' remuneration calculated at the 
employee's rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal'. Compensation is 
capped at no more than 24 months remuneration for an automatically unfair 
121 AC Basson, MA Christianson, C Garbers, PAK le Roux, C Mischke and EML Strydom 
Essential Labour Law 4ed (2005) at 93. 
122 D Du Tait, D Bosch, D Woolfrey, S Godfrey, C Cooper, GS Giles, C Bosch and J Rossouw 
Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) at 387. See also Kuipers and Durattract 
Plastics (Phj) Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 758 (BCA) at 7671 where Albertyn A held that the employee had 
reasonable alternatives other than resigning as she resigned while her grievance hearing and 






















dismissal.123 It is submitted that in the case of constructive dismissal as a 
result of sexual harassment, something more than just monetary loss is 
involved. Sexual harassment often involves iniuria, which can clearly not be 
recovered under the LRA but can be claimed under the EEA. 
It is worth noting that section 46(9)(c) of the now repealed LRA124 ("the 
old LRA") read wider than the current LRA 125 in that it empowered the court 
to make an order 'including but not limited to' compensation. An award for 
compensation was also not capped in the old LRA as is the case in the current 
LRA. In Harmony Furnishers v Prinsloo126 the Labour Appeal Court awarded 
compensation for iniuria and interpreted section 46(9)(c) of the old LRA to be 
wide enough to include compensation for intangible loss and held as follows: 
It is clear on the facts put before the Industrial Court that the conduct of the appellant 
in conducting an extremely lengthy interrogation, in searching the respondent's 
home and motor car, and in causing him to be arrested and detained by the police for 
an entire night, not only constitutes an unfair labour practice since all of this occurred 
while respondent was employed by appellant, but also was a clear injuria.127 
Similarly, the Industrial Court in Sibiya v Num12s read section 46(9)(c) of the 
old LRA to include non-monetary damages and gave an award: 
in the form of a solatium for the infringement of the employee's personality rights in 
the form of an injury to his dignity resulting from the employer's failure to afford 
him an opportunity to be heard. 
The Industrial Court went to acknowledge the distinction between 
section 46(9)(c) of the now repealed LRA and section 194(1) of the LRA and 
held that 'it would be inappropriate to attempt to apply a similar formulae 
when assessing compensation' in terms of 'section 46(9) of Act 28 of 1956, as is 
applied by section 194(1) of the new Act'.129 This means that the plaintiff can 
also ground her action in terms of the EEA and seek payment for intangible 
loss flowing from iniuria, which is otherwise not recoverable in terms of the 
123 Ss 187(1)(£) and 194(3) LRA. 
124 28 of 1956. 
12S 66 of 1995. 
126 Supra (n73). 
127 Supra (n73) at 1473-4. 
128 Supra (n76) at 804. 
129 Supra (n76) at 804-5. 
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LRA; and for payment of compensation,130 which is not capped in the EEA as 
in the LRA. It is highlighted that section 194 of the LRA is not restricted to 
compensation for patrimonial loss but is merely 'one of the factors that need 
to be taken into account by the court when determining compensation,'131 
which is just and equitable in the circumstances. This means that in deciding 
the maximum compensation payable in terms of section 194(3) of the LRA, the 
court will also take into account, in addition to patrimonial loss suffered, 'the 
calculating manner'132 in which dismissal was effected; and the employer's 
'attitude'133 and conduct in dealing with sexual harassment. It is argued that 
the labour law remedies are not mutually exclusive and the plaintiff is at 
liberty to claim of constructive dismissal under the LRA, and claim damages 
and compensation for unfair discrimination under the EEA. 
In all likelihood, the victim of sexual harassment will be able to receive 
compensation once she has proved constructive dismissal. Since constructive 
dismissal involves loss of employment, it signifies loss of income and thus the 
purpose of the compensation is to fill a hole in the victim's earnings. 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has established that section 60(3) of the EEA is a distinctive type 
of vicarious liability, which is neither a true reflection of common-law liability 
nor equivalent to common-law vicarious liability. The advantage with the EEA 
is that the burden lighter for the plaintiff when pleading unfair 
130 S 50(2) of the EEA enjoins the court to make any appropriate order, which is just and 
equitable in the circumstances thereby enabling the court to take into account any 
aggravating factors, which might have a bearing on the granting of the award. 
131 G Giles and D Du Toit 'Compensation for Unfair Dismissal: How Will the New 
Section 194 Work?' (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 124 at 138. 
132 Christian v Colliers supra (n29). 




















discrimination, because sexual harassment is outlawed as a form of unfair 
discrimination, which is prohibited on grounds of gender.134 
It is concluded that the 2005 Code is consistent with the European 
Union Directive that states that sexual harassment 'shall be deemed to be 
discrimination on the grounds of sex and therefore prohibited' .135 The 2005 
Code has also added a human rights criterion in the definition of sexual 
harassment by stating that it violates the rights of an employee and the impact 
of the conduct should constitute an impairment of dignity.136 The European 
Union Directive also endorses the human rights approach by defining sexual 
harassment as: 
where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in 
particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment.137 
It is emphasized that the violation of rights will be a factor taken by the 
courts when determining the payment of damages138 in terms of section 
50(2)(b) of the EEA thereby alleviating the need for the plaintiff to prove that 
her rights have been violated as a result of sexual harassment. The 2005 Code 
thus links protection for the victim of sexual harassment to the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution thereby making the promise and protection of 
the constitutional rights a reality in the workplace. The rights violated in the 
context of sexual harassment are the right to equality;139 right to dignity; 140 
right to freedom and security of the person;141 right to bodily and 
psychological integrity;142 right not to be unfairly discriminated against based 
134 S 6(1) EEA. 
l35 Article 2 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2002) 
amending Council Directive 76/207 /EEC 'Implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, 
and working conditions'. 
136 Items 4 and 5.4 2005 Code. 
137 Article 2 above (n121). 
138 S 50(2)(b) EEA. 
139 S 9 Constitution. 
140 S 10 Constitution. 





















on sex, gender and/ or sexual orientation;143 and right to choose trade, 
occupation or profession freely .144 
It is worth noting that the recourse in terms of section 60 of the EEA is 
limited to sexual harassment in the workplace. Section 60 of the EEA is a 
preferred remedy compared to delictual liability because fault is based on 
negligence rather than on intention, and the common-law vicarious liability 
'scope of employment' is not part of the test for statutory vicarious liability. 
This makes the burden on the plaintiff lighter. Damages under the actio 
iniuriarum would cover a wider field, which includes sentimental loss and is 
not limited to 12 month's remuneration. Furthermore, circumstances 
surrounding unfair discrimination and constructive dismissal such as 
supervisory abuse of power/ authority could form part of unlawfulness 
inquiry in a delictual action. Similarly, the scope of compensation under the 
EEA is not narrower than in delict in that the EEA, unlike the LRA, does not 
cap compensation and is 'not exhaustive'145 but is discretionary to the court.146 
It has been highlighted that the plaintiff can claim compensation for 
any tangible and intangible losses (like contumelia and sentimental loss) 
suffered as a result of sexual harassment under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA 
without a need to pursue a delictual remedy of the actio iniuriarum to claim 
non-monetary damages. The effect of the award will thus be to deter any 
future transgression of the anti-discrimination practices in the workplace and 
to restore workplace equity. In giving such an award, the court must give 
cognisance 'to the qualities and purposes which underlie the anti-
discriminatory measures in the EEA' .147 The EEA is therefore efficient in that 
143 S 9(3)-(4) Constitution. 
144 S 22 Constitution. 
145 Ntsabo supra (n12) at 98. 
146 S 50 EEA. 























'it can give people back the humanity that the violation took away' and 'gives 
law the power to change'.148 
The advantage with a delictual remedy of the actio iniuriarum is that it 
applies beyond the workplace and is not dependent on a finding of an 
employer-employee relationship. This means that in K v Minister of Safety and 
Securityl49 the actio iniuriarum would have been available to NK as opposed to 
the EEA remedy, to vindicate impairment of dignity where rape was found to 
have occurred in the perpetrator's course of employment but in the absence of 
an employer-employee relationship between NK and the employer. 
For common-law delictual liability, simply an impairment of dignity is 
required which would seem to include unfair discrimination but ranges more 
broadly as well. However, section 60 of the EEA is still an important and 
powerful remedy for victims of sexual harassment in that it contains a form of 
deemed personal liability (and statutory vicarious liability). This is 
strengthened by the adoption of the 2005 Code under the EEA, which 
imposes duties on the employer to take active steps in combating sexual 
harassment in the workplace. Section 60 of the EEA is preferred to common-
law vicarious liability because of the stringent rules of agency, which were 
apparently interpreted by the courts to exclude sexual harassment within the 
scope of employment. However, NK (CC)lSO has established that rape is 
within the course of employment and has opened up some possibilities for 
common-law vicarious liability in the context of sexual harassment. 
It is concluded that whether or not the employer took reasonable steps 
in terms of the affirmative defence in section 60(4) of the EEA, is a factual 
enquiry, which centres on what was an appropriate and reasonable response 
148 MacKinnon op cit (n22) 108. 





















in the circumstances.151 An employer is merely expected to discharge its 
statutory obligations in terms of the EEA by taking reasonable steps and 'by 
ensuring an organisational culture and management style that fosters 
openness, trust, and support' .152 The affirmative defence also does not apply 
to common-law vicarious liability. The fact that the employer had proper 
policies in place might however, be relevant to employer's lack of knowledge 
of unlawfulness of its or its employee's conduct. 
The disadvantage with the constructive dismissal is that 'from a policy 
standpoint, however, it is suggested that to require a woman to resign in 
order to acquire an effective remedy against harassment may be regarded as 
unduly onerous'. 153 It is emphasized that in the light of a common fact that 
female unemployment rate154 is higher at 36% for black African females and at 
5.8% for white females than male unemployment rate at 27.5% for black 
African males and at 5.1 % for white males in South Africa, constructive 
dismissal is not a viable remedy. 
Mowatt also opines that the shortcoming in the use of a constructive 
dismissal remedy is that 'it requires the female employee to be dismissed or to 
have her employment terminated for her to acquire an effective remedy 
against sexual harassment' .155 Mowatt correctly asserts further that a delictual 
remedy is a better alternative, which does not suffer this shortcoming and 'is 
wider than the contractual action' .156 The fight against sexual harassment will 
not be won if women are driven out of the workplace through constructive 
dismissal. The aim is to transform the workplace to uphold and reflect the 
values of dignity, equality, and ubuntu for all. 
151 See Croft v Royal Mail Group plc [2003] ICR 1425 (CA), where the court held that steps 
which require time, trouble and expense, and which may be counterproductive given an 
agreed low-key approach and are disproportionate to the result, may not be reasonable steps 
if, on an assessment, they are likely to achieve little or nothing. 
152 T Stephens and J Hallas Bullying and Sexual Harassment: A practical handbook (2006) at 5. 
153 Rubenstein op cit (n88) 8. 
154 Statistics South Africa 'Statistics release P0210 - Labour Force Survey' (September 2004). 
























Chapter Seven - The Remedy of Common-Law Vicarious Liability 
7.1 Outline 
Considerable strides have been made in the courts of some countries, notably Canada 
and South Africa, beyond the formal equality approach of sameness with a dominant 
(male) standard and towards substantive equality, measuring laws and policies 
against realities of subordination and gender hierarchy.1 
This chapter examines the use of vicarious liability as a remedy to find the 
employer liable and be made to pay for the wrongful act committed by its 
employee. The principle of vicarious liability in the context of the employer-
employee relationship is thus an 'exception' to a general rule that 'a person is 
not liable for the unlawful actions of others' .2 In Gifford v The Table Bay Dock 
and Breakwater Management Commission, De Villiers CJ stated the principle of 
vicarious liability as enunciated by Story and Pothier, which he quoted: 
The principal is liable to third persons for the torts, negligences, and other 
malfeasances or misfeasances and omissions of his servant or agent in the course of 
his employment, although the principal did not authorize or justify or participate in, 
or indeed know of such misconduct, or even if he forbade the acts or disproved of 
them. "In all such cases," he adds, "the rule applies respondeat superior; and it is 
founded upon public policy and convenience" ... 3 
It will be shown in the light of the above extract how courts have 
inconsistently applied the principle of vicarious liability in vacuum and in 
total disregard of its mischief and underlying policy considerations. A 
comparison will be made between South Africa and the common-law 
jurisdictions of Canada, United States, United Kingdom on how the 
authorities have narrowly and rigidly applied the principle of vicarious 
liability to deny protection for victims of sexual harassment by regarding it as 
1 CA MacKinnon Are Women Human?: And Other International Dialogues (2006) at 7. 
2 JPA Swanepoel Introduction to Labour Law 3ed (1993) at 25. 
3 Gifford v The Table Bay Dock and Breakwater Management Commission (1874) 4 Buch 96 
(Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope) at 114 citing Story on Agency§§ 308, 452-456 and 




















'a frolic of one's own', 'personal' and 'not within the job description to 
sexually harass'. These common-law jurisdictions are comparable to the South 
African jurisdiction because they were a catalyst in the development of sexual 
harassment law in South Africa. A comparative study is thus important to 
ensure full protection of the human rights entrenched in the Constitution. 
Therefore, the use of a comparative method as prescribed in terms of section 
39 of the Constitution is instrumental to the South African courts in learning 
how other foreign jurisdictions have addressed the common problem of 
sexual harassment in the workplace in a way that effectively promotes gender 
equality and respect for dignity/ ubuntu of workers. 
This chapter will highlight that the basis for vicarious liability is based on 
public policy, convenience, and agency principles. Similarities will be 
extracted on how South Africa has developed law on sexual harassment in 
compliance with the Constitutional mandate to be in line with the common-law 
jurisdictions.4 It will be examined how South Africa, Canada, United States, 
and United Kingdom have heeded to the rationale for invoking vicarious 
liability as an alternative remedy, in developing law on sexual harassment, 
which is: 
a) 'to make sure that institutional power is not abused to discriminate on 
the basis of sex' ;5 
b) to furnish 'an innocent tort victim with recourse against a financially 
responsible defendant' ;6 
c) ' the desirability of affording claimants efficacious remedies for harm 
suffered'; 7 and 
d) 'to incite employers to take active steps to prevent their employees 
from harming members of the broader community' .s 
4 Ss 39(2) and 173 Constitution. 
5 CA MacKinnon Women's Lives, Men's Laws (2005) at 182. 
6 Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534 at para 26. 





















The basis for vicarious liability is to spread the loss and offer 
compensation to the plaintiff since employers have deeper pockets than the 
perpetrator (employee) who is often a man of straw. This chapter will 
examine how the courts in South Africa developed the common-law remedy of 
vicarious liability to be in harmony with the Canadian and English authorities 
in order to cope with sexual harassment in the workplace. It will be shown 
that the developments in Canada, United Kingdom and the United States 
were instrumental and persuasive on the common-law evolution of sexual 
harassment law in South Africa. This was done by broadening the 'scope of 
employment' test to include approaches compatible with an abuse of power 
and trust; 'frolic of one's own'; enterprise risk; mismanagement of duties; and 
abuse of supervisory authority. 
Vicarious liability thus involves spreading the risk to the employer who 
runs an enterprise, which has inherent risks of sexual harassment and thus 
carries an instructive objective of encouraging the employers to be pro-active 
and prevent sexual harassment. 
7.2 General principles of vicarious liability in South Africa 
In South Africa, the enquiry in order to establish vicarious liability on the part 
of the employer for sexual harassment by its employees is a two-leg test: 
(i) Who is an employee? and 
(ii) What is meant by the course and scope of employment? 
One of the essentials for finding the employer vicariously liable is the 
existence of an employer - employee relationship. In this respect, it is 
paramount to distinguish between the employee and the independent 

















direction of his employer. An independent contractor is the person engaged 
to do certain work, but exercises his own discretion as to the mode and time 
of doing it. One of the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether 
there is an employer-employee relationship is a test of right of control and 
supervision over the employee. 
7.2.1 Who is an employee? 
In South African law, a leading case, which is authority on the right of control 
and supervision test, is Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society v Macdonald. 9 The 
court stressed that the master - servant relationship cannot exist where there 
is a total absence of the right of supervising and controlling the worker under 
the contract. The court went on to add that a master must have a right to 
prescribe to the worker not only what has to be done, but also the manner in 
which that work has to be done. It is emphasized that the court will thus look 
at the totality of factors that bear upon the existence of the contract of 
employment which include the power to hire and fire, remuneration 
arrangements, the nature of work and modus operandi thereof, the degree and 
extent of discretion and the freedom of action accorded to the servant. 
Joubert JA modified the traditional test of right of control and 
supervision advanced in the case of Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society,10 in 
the case of Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner where he developed 
the 'dominant impression' test as follows: 
It is in the marginal cases where the so-called dominant impression test merits 
consideration ... the presence of a right of supervision and control. . .is not the sole 
determinative factor since regard must also be had to other important indicia in the 
light of the provisions of the particular contract as a whole. 11 
91931 AD 412 at 435. 
10 Ibid. 



















In the light of the above extract, it is underscored that the existence of the 
right of supervision and control is one of the many factors, which indicate an 
existence of an employment contract. The right of control test is therefore no 
longer a conclusive test in establishing a contract of employment and 'if this 
had been insisted upon in an age of increasing professionalism and technical 
skill, the result would have been greatly to diminish the scope of vicarious 
liability' .12 
In Stein v Rising Tide Productions C03 the court reiterated the principle 
developed in Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner14 that the correct 
test to be applied in determining an existence of an employment contract is 
not the 'control' test but the 'dominant impression' test. The court went on to 
list a 'number of indicae, the combination of which may be decisive'15 in 
assessing 'whether or not the dominant impression of the relationship is that 
of a contract of employment' .16 This view is consistent with English law 
where the 'control test' is no longer the conclusive test but ' the practice of the 
courts is to examine a variety of indicia and to consider the totality of the 
relationship between the parties' .17 Ultimately, the question of whether or not 
a person is an employee or an independent contractor, hinges upon the 
dominant impression created on the facts. 
The court endorsed Langley v Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v De 
Valence1B and held that there is no vicarious liability for the negligence or 
wrongdoing of an independent contractor 'except in situations where the 
employer has been personally at fault' .19 This means that the employer is 
liable where either 'the employer failed to take reasonable care in selecting or 
12 RA Buckley The Law of Negligence 4ed (2005) at 386. 
13 [2002] 2 All SA 22 (C). 
14 Supra (n11). 
1s Supra (n13) at 28. 
16 Supra (n13) at 27. 
17 RP Balkin and JLR Davis Law of Torts 3ed (2004) at 783. 
1s 1991 (1) SA 1 (A). 


















instructing the independent contractor; or the employer is under a "personal" 
or "non-delegable" duty' .20 
NEDLAC has issued a 'Code of Good Practice'21 published in terms of 
section 200A(4), read with section 203, of the LRA which sets out guidelines 
on who is an 'employee' and clarifies the interpretation of the presumption as 
to who the employee is in terms of section 200A of the LRA. Section 200A 
creates presumption on who is the employee and reads as follows: 
1) Until the contrary is proved, a person who works for, or renders services to, any 
other person is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an 
employee, if any one or more of the following factors are present: 
a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction 
of another person; 
b) the person's hours of work are subject to the control or direction of 
another person; 
c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms 
part of that organisation; 
d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 
hours per month over the last three months; 
e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or 
she works or renders services; 
f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other 
person; or 
g) the person only works for or renders services to one person. 
The paramount importance of distinguishing between an 'employee' 
and an 'independent contractor' has become less evident in an epoch of 
increasingly 'atypical' employment. Employment is not what it used to be 
with the advent of 'casualization, externalization and informalization',22 and 
also in the context of the constitutional right to fair labour practices which is 
available to 'everyone' .23 
O'Regan J in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 
and Another24 held that in the light of section 39 of the Constitution which 
mandates that the courts 'must consider international law' when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, the court held that the meaning and scope of 
20 Balkin and Davis op cit (n17) 795. 
21 GG Notice 1774 of 2006. 
22 J Theron 'Employment Is Not What It Used To Be' (2003) 24 ILJ 1247 at 1256-7. 
23 S 23(1) Constitution. 














the term 'worker' must be construed having regard to the conventions and 
recommendations of the International Labour Organisation ('ILO'). The 
Constitutional Court further held that the meaning of the 'worker' must be 
given a 'generous interpretation' and not be restricted primarily to those who 
have entered into a contract of employment to provide services for an 
employer.25 Article 5 of the ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation26 
which has been 'adopted'27 in the sense of integration into the labour 
legislation and attached as an annexure in the Nedlac Code on 'who is the 
employee', states that: 
Members should take particular account in national policy to ensure effective 
protection to workers especially affected by the uncertainty as to the existence of an 
employment relation, including women workers, as well as the most vulnerable 
workers, young workers, older workers, workers in the informal economy, migrant 
workers and workers with disabilities. 
It would seem that a more generous, inclusive and less formal concept 
of who deserves legislative protection, is appropriate also in the context of 
remedies for sexual harassment, in the light of the following: 
a) The changing nature of employment; 
b) South Africa's international obligations in terms of the ILO 
conventionsandrecommendations;and 
c) The mandate of the courts in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution 
to develop common-law and interpret legislation to accord full 
protection of the constitutionally entrenched rights. 
The most difficult part, which usually serves to negate a finding of 
vicarious liability, is the test of course and scope of employment. If it is 
proved that the person was not the employer's employee at the time of the 
commission of delict, then the enquiry ends there and there is no need to 
enquire whether the delict was committed within the scope of employment. 
25 South African National Defence Union supra (n24) at paras 27-8. 
26 Adopted 15 June 2006. 
27 The attachment of the ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006, to the Nedlac 
Code of Practice on who is an employee may be an indication of acceptance of principles as 


















In the thesis, the use of the term 'employer' refers to any natural person or 
juristic person, whether an institution, corporation or governmental entity 
'who receives services from an employee or is assisted in the conduct of its 
business by an employee'.28 
7.2.2 What is meant by the course and scope of employment? 
Once it has been proved that the perpetrator was the employee at the time of 
committing sexual harassment, it must be proved further that the employee, 
at the time of commission of sexual harassment was acting within the 'scope 
of employment' to ground vicarious liability on the part of the employer. The 
employee is considered to act 'within the scope of his employment if he acts 
in the execution or fulfilment of his duties in terms of the employment 
contract' .29 It follows therefore that an agent who acts beyond of scope of his 
employment becomes a stranger to his master and is on a frolic of his own. 
Judicial precedents will be examined on how the courts have battled to 
interpret the 'scope of employment' to include intentional wrongdoing. It is 
stressed that the strict interpretation of the 'scope of employment' is 
problematic in the context of sexual harassment in the workplace since sexual 
harassment is a workplace event albeit a frolic of one's own and often 
involves the mismanagement of duties. 
In Mkize v Martens30 the employer engaged two youths to assist him in 
his transportation business and undertook to supply them with food on their 
journeys. The employer was held liable for the damage caused by a fire, 
which the boys had lit while on their journey for cooking their midday meal 
and had negligently allowed to spread. The act of making a fire, was held to 
28 D Du Toit, D Bosch, D Woolfrey, S Godfrey, C Cooper, GS Giles, C Bosch and J Rossouw 
Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) at 80. 
29 J Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser Law of Delict 5ed (2006) at 341. 


















be a reasonable essential for executing the employer' s instructions and 
therefore within the course of employment. It was thus established that the 
employer is vicariously liable for wrongful acts committed by its agents 
whilst acting in furtherance of the employer's aims. 
An employer will not be vicariously liable for the wrongful act 
committed by an employee in doing something, which he is permitted to do, 
but which does not constitute a discharge of his duties to the employer at the 
time and place when the wrongful act occurred.31 This principle is 
problematic in the context of sexual harassment because it does not serve the 
master and is clearly a deviation from the authorised yet the deviation can 
provide a sufficiently close link to ground vicarious liability on the part of the 
employer.32 
It is worth comparing Mkize v Martens33 with an English case of Crook v 
Derbyshire Stone Ltd.34 In the latter case, the first defendants, his employers, 
permitted the second defendant, a lorry driver, to stop during journeys to 
obtain refreshments. One morning, having parked his lorry on the side of the 
road, he proceeded to walk across the road to a cafe. While crossing the road 
he collided with the plaintiff, who was riding a motorcycle. The collision was 
due partly to the negligence of the plaintiff. 
Pilcher J held that at the time when the accident occurred, the second 
defendant was a 'stranger to his master'. He further reasoned that the 
employer was not liable to the plaintiff for the consequences of the second 
defendant's negligence because although the second defendant was employed 
at the time of the accident and was permitted to obtain refreshments, the 
obtaining of the refreshments was not something that he was employed to do. 
31 Crook v Derbyshire Stone Ltd [1956] 2 All ER 447. 
32 See NK (CC) supra (n7). 
33 Supra (n30). 















Therefore, he was not discharging his duty to his employer when the accident 
occurred. 
Pilcher J went on to confirm the controversy surrounding the 
application of the scope of employment test and considered two scenarios on 
the same facts, which might lead the court to reach a different conclusion: 
It is interesting to inquire (and the question might be difficult to resolve) what the 
position would be if a lorry driver in the second defendant's position crossed the 
road to ask the way or to get a tin of petrol to put into his lorry; or indeed, what the 
position might have been if, returning from the cafe, the second defendant had seen 
someone getting into his lorry and about to drive it off, had hurried across the road to 
stop him, and had been involved in a collision. Those are all matters which may fall 
on one side of the line or the other.35 
An authorised meal break is incidental to employment yet it was 
considered to be outside the scope of employment in Crook v Derbyshire Stone 
Ltd.36 This highlights that there is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes 
'scope of employment'. What the South African court in Mkize v Martens37 
found to be within the scope of employment whilst carrying out instructions 
of the employer, was found to be a digression from the scope of employment 
by the English Court in Crook v Derbyshire Stone Ltd.38 It is suggested that the 
problem with the application of the vicarious liability is that courts are neither 
always consistent nor certain at what point a chain of employment can be 
considered to be broken in order to regard the wrongful act committed by the 
employee as being beyond the scope of employment. 
The liability of the employer is not confined to acts done by the 
employee within the employer's authority. The employer's liability extends to 
all acts falling within the general scope of employment, which do not deprive 
the employer of the power to order the employee to act within or beyond that 
scope of authority.39 In Estate van der Byl v Swanepoe[,40 a taxi driver was 
authorised to drive through a certain area but was expressly forbidden to ply 
35 Supra (n31) at 450F-H. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Supra (n30). 
38 Supra (n31). 
















for hire within the same area. He disobeyed his orders and, while carrying a 
passenger, ran into the plaintiff and injured him. The master was correctly 
held liable for the servant's delict because by the terms of the contract the 
master had the right to order the servant to drive within the stated area where 
the accident occurred and to control him while driving there. 
Burchell correctly states that the employer is liable if its agent 'acts 
contrary to his instructions' but in so doing, still acts within the sphere of 
employment in 'carrying out that assignment and none other' .41 This principle 
was applied in Francis Freres and Mason (Pty) Ltd v Public Utility Transport 
Corporation Ltd42 where the court found the employer vicariously liable for the 
negligent collision with plaintiff's two stationary vehicles by a mechanic (L). 
Although L acted contrary to the master's instructions in delegating 
the driving of the bus to Walter, he did so in the course and scope of his 
employment. It was his function to see to it that the bus reached the workshop 
and he adopted an improper method or mode of doing what he was 
authorised to do. That is, the delict was committed within the scope of his job 
description and was thus not far removed from the servant's execution of his 
duties. Compare this case with Roos v De Loor's Ltd43 where a person 
employed as a confectioner took his master's car, without its knowledge and 
consent, for delivering confectionery. On his route, he collided with a 
motorcycle and the driver of the motorcycle died because of the accident. 
The court held that the employer was not vicariously liable for the 
negligent collision caused by its agent. The court noted that a master is liable 
for the wrongs of its servant committed in the exercise of the tasks to which 
he is appointed. Vicarious liability can thus not be extended to cases where a 
servant is appointed to perform tasks of an entirely different class also 
requiring special qualifications. 
41 J Burchell Principles of Delict (1993) at 218-9. 
42 1964 (3) SA 23 (D). 















In Viljoen v Smith44 the court held that whether or not an employee had 
abandoned his employment or he had not acted in the course and scope of 
employment during his excursion, was a factual enquiry and one of the 
factors to be taken into account was a degree of digression. The court further 
highlighted that not every act of an employee committed during time of 
employment in advancement of personal interests of achievement of own 
goals, necessarily falls outside the course and scope of his employment. 
It is submitted that it is not sufficient that the work affords the 
employee a mere opportunity to commit a wrongful conduct. It is suggested 
that for vicarious liability to ensue, there must be an abuse or misuse by the 
servant of the authority vested in him and the act must be so connected to the 
employer's work that it may be regarded as a modus operandi, albeit an 
improper one of doing work. In Hirsch Appliance Specialists v Shield Security 
Natal (Pty) Ltd45 the goods belonging to the plaintiff, an exhibitor at a house 
and garden show, were stolen by guards supplied by the defendant to protect 
the property of the exhibitors against theft. 
Booysen J held that there were two grounds for holding the employer 
vicariously liable: 
Firstly, the breach by defendant's employees of its non-delegable duty to guard the 
premises and the goods therein; and, secondly, the abandonment of the defendant's 
work by said employees, which amounted not only to misconduct for their own 
benefit, but constituted mismanagement in the performance of their work, and was in 
itself the cause of harm to the plaintiff. 46 
It is emphasized that this reasoning is relevant to sexual harassment in the 
workplace. The fact that the court found the employer vicariously liable for 
the employee's mismanagement of his duties means that the duties have both 
a positive and negative aspect. The positive aspect is the proper execution of 
duties for which the employee is employed. The negative aspect of the 
employee duties is to refrain from negligently executing his duties in a way 
441997 (1) SA 309 (A). 
451992 (3) SA 643 (D). 




that deviates from his job description and poses a danger to other employees. 
It is highlighted that the employer will thus be liable for sexual harassment 
where it occurred whilst the perpetrator was simultaneously acting in the 
scope of employment and engaged in the business activities of the master. 
The omission to perform the duties may amount to the breach of duty that the 
employee owes to the victim of sexual harassment. 
It is underscored that the harasser has not abandoned his employment 
when he mismanages his duties but is still in the scope of employment in that 
at the time and place of sexual harassment, he is serving the master. In the 
context of sexual harassment, the mismanagement of duties is relevant and 
closely intertwined to the scope of employment in that a supervisor may 
abuse his power or authority by taking advantage of his seniority and 
organizational power. The supervisor carries enormous institutional 
responsibilities, which entail staff management, staff recruitment and 
retention, performance appraisal, implementing salary and bonus-pay 
increments, and granting promotions. 
Similarly, a caretaker may abuse his duties to care and protect the 
vulnerable people subordinate to him. A caretaker is trusted by those in his 
care and may exploit that trust by mismanaging his duties. It is submitted that 
the organizational power creates an opportunity for the supervisor/ caretaker 
to misuse his powers to further his own personal ends whilst simultaneously 
executing his functions. There is an overlap between execution of duties and 
mismanagement of those duties in that mismanagement involves an omission 
or failure to carry out duties. Mismanagement of authorised tasks does not 
make sexual harassment an independent act, which is a mere frolic of one's 
own. 
In Feldman v Mall47 the driver of a vehicle had to deliver goods and 
thereafter immediately return to the business of the employer. Instead, the 















driver deviated from the route and drove to a township where he spent 
several hours on his own affairs and consumed enough alcohol to make him 
incapable of driving the van with safety. On his return trip, he negligently ran 
over a person and caused his death. Tindall JA held that the test to be applied 
is whether the servant's digression was so great in respect of space and time 
that it could not be reasonably held that he was still exercising the functions 
to which he was appointed.48 If this was the case, the master is not liable. The 
court concluded that in each particular case a matter of degree would 
determine 'whether the servant can be said to have ceased to exercise the 
functions to which he was appointed' .49 The court thus held that the employer 
was vicariously liable because the employee at that stage had resumed his 
duties. 
It is submitted that even if the accident had occurred when the driver 
was on his way to the township, the employer would have been still liable 
since the chain of causation would not have been severed. At that time, the 
driver would not have acted beyond the scope of control, and thus beyond 
the scope of employment. An observation is made that in any event, the 
causing of an accident was a mismanagement of his duties since being a 
motor-van driver included driving the vehicle cautiously as not to cause 
injury to third parties. Watermeyer CJ rightly concluded that 'his departure 
from the path of duty did not take him so completely away from the functions 
entrusted to him as a servant as to exonerate his master from legal 
responsibility for his negligence' .so 
One of the considerations that the courts take into account in deciding 
whether an act was performed in the course of employment is a two-leg test 
comprising of subjective and objective element. The subjective element 
enquires into the state of mind of the employee at the time of the commission 
of the offence as to whether he was executing instructions of the employer 
48 Supra (n47) at 756. 
49 Supra (n47) at 756-7. 














and had not abandoned his employment. The objective element enquires 
whether on the facts there is a sufficiently close link between the servant's acts 
for his own personal interests and the business of the employer. This principle 
was established in Minister Police v Rabie: 
It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes, 
although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course or scope of his 
employment, and that in deciding whether an act by the servant does so fall, some 
reference is to be made to the servant's intention ... The test is in this regard 
subjective. On the other hand, if there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link between 
the servant's acts for his own interests and purposes and the business of his master, 
the master may yet be liable. This is an objective test. SI 
The above paragraph was approved in NK (CC)52 where the 
Constitutional Court held that the approach to vicarious liability raises a 
subjective and objective enquiry. The subjective element enquires into the 
state of mind of the employee and asks whether the wrongful act was an 
independent act done solely for the purposes of the employee. The 
Constitutional Court held that the objective element is a mixed question of 
fact and law, which enquires into whether there is a sufficiently close nexus 
between the wrongful act and the business of employer. 
The court is under a constitutional mandate to give effect to the 'spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights' when answering whether there is a 
sufficiently close nexus between the wrongful conduct and the business of the 
master.53 It is argued that giving effect to the 'spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights' means that the courts, when interpreting any legislation or 
developing common-law, must endeavour to vindicate the constitutional rights 
of the plaintiff and deliver the promise of protection of rights entrenched in 
the Constitution. This means that the application of the test of vicarious 
51 1986(1) SA 117 (A) at 134C-E. 
52 Supra (n7) at para 32. 
53 Ibid. In NK (CC) supra (n7) at para 17, O'Regan J held that the overall purpose of section 
39(2) is: 
[T]o ensure that our common-law is infused with the values of the Constitution. The 
obligation imposed upon courts by section 39(2) of the Constitution is thus extensive, 
requiring courts to be alert to the normative framework of the Constitution not only 
when some startling new development of the common-law is in issue, but in all cases 















liability 'should not offend the Bill of Rights or be at odds with our 
constitutional order' .54 
It is emphasized that the objective element thus serves to bring 
intentional wrongdoing within the ambit of vicarious liability where the act 
was subjectively done solely for self-gratification not with intent to serve the 
master. In addition, where on examining the facts and law, there is a close 
nexus between the employee's independent act and the business of the 
master; it is immaterial that the employee subjectively intended to advance 
his own personal ends. 
In Bezuidenhout NO v Eskomss the court established that whether or not 
conduct is within the scope of employment is a question of fact and degree. 
The court also explored the subjective and objective enquiry enunciated in 
Rabie, 56 which looks at the subjective state of mind of the employee, and the 
objective test of a sufficiently close link between the servant's acts and the 
business of the master. The court held that the 'close connection' was 
demonstrably absent because Oelofse did not intend to further Eskom' s 
affairs. The court concluded that the conduct of the driver fell beyond the 
scope of his employment because subjectively the driver knew that he was 
prohibited from giving lifts to the public. 
The finding in Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom57 shows that it may be arduous 
for victims of sexual harassment who seek to rely on the principle of vicarious 
liability. This is so because subjectively, the employee is furthering his own 
sexual self-gratification or assertion of power when he sexually harasses and 
an act of sexual harassment is apparently not part of his job description or 
modus operandi of his employment. It is suggested that this is a strict analysis 
of the unauthorised mode of doing authorised work because objectively, 
54 NK (CC) supra (n7) at para 44. 
55 2003 (3) SA 83 (SCA). 
56 Supra (n51). 













sexual harassment may be closely connected to the business of the master and 
it seems irrational to exclude vicarious liability in such an instance, based on 
the harasser's subjective state of mind (frolic of one's own). 
Furthermore, according to Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom5B it would seem 
that the employee must intend to further the employer's instructions. It is 
submitted that this finding is contrary to the approach in NK (CC)59 where the 
state was held vicariously liable for rape committed by on-duty policemen 
even though they were "furthering their own ends". Similarly, in Lister and 
others v Hesley Hall Limited60 the House of Lords held that the motive of the 
employee and the fact that he is doing something which serves only his own 
ends does not negate vicarious liability for its breach of the delegated duty. 
There are instances where a frolic of one's own (for example, supervisory 
harassment, police brutality, and parental authority abuse) may be closely 
connected to the employment to reasonably conclude that the wrongful 
conduct was within the scope of employment. 
In Ntsabo v Real Security CC61 the court noted that the conduct of sexual 
harassment was not within the scope of employment in that it 'did not fall 
anywhere within the job description of Dlomo or that of the applicant'. An 
observation is made that if such a strict interpretation were to be applied to 
the 'scope of employment', vicarious liability will arise if the employer is 
involved in the business of harassing employees. This means that an 
employer who has a sexual harassment policy in place would be able to 
escape vicarious liability by showing that he expressly excluded any 
possibility of sexual harassment being part of its course of employment. The 
employer would thus argue that in prohibiting sexual harassment in its 
policy, sexual harassment is thus a prohibited sphere of its employment. It is 
thus established that the challenge for the plaintiff is to demonstrate a strong 
58 Ibid. 
59 Supra (n7). 
60 [2001] UKHL 22 at para 55. 
















link between the wrongful conduct and the business operations of the 
employer. 
7.3 The basis of the principle of vicarious liability 
One theory advanced as the basis of vicarious liability is the risk inherent in 
the enterprise approach. In Rabie62 Jansen JA held: 
By approaching the problem whether Van der Westhuizen's acts were done within 
the 'course of employment' from the angle of the creation of risk, the emphasis is 
shifted from the precise nature of the link between his acts and police work, to the 
dominant question whether those acts fall within the risk created by the State. 
This judgment is instructive in the context of sexual harassment in 
considering 'risk' as part of vicarious liability. In Rabie63 the court correctly 
held that the state was vicariously liable where it has created a risk of 
unlawful harm to others through misuse of power for own purpose, 
especially with regard to assault, unfounded prosecution and unlawful arrest. 
The court further held that his appointment, as a member of the force and 
clothing him with all the powers involved were conducive to the wrongs he 
committed. Similarly, it is argued that where the employer has delegated 
powers to supervisors, police officers, and caretakers, there is risk of sexual 
harassment through misuse of authority to the advantage of the perpetrator. 
The risk theory adopted in Rabie64 was rejected in Ess Kay Electronics 
Pty Ltd and another v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd where the court 
held: 
What seems to require continual emphasis, therefore, is that the rule and the reason 
for its existence must not be confused. The risk referred to, and considerations of 
public policy, have to do with the reason for the rule. They are not elements of the 
rule and they do not inform its content. It follows that unless the requirements of the 
rule are met, it cannot matter that it is the employee's appointment and work 
circumstances that place the employee in a position to commit the wrong ... The 
question is always: were the acts in the case under consideration in fact authorised; 
were they in fact performed in the course of the employee's employment? 65 
62 Supra (n51) at 1341. 
63 Supra (n51) at 134I-135A. 
64 Supra (n51). 












The court thus correctly cautioned that the elements for vicarious 
liability should not be confused with its rationale. The court correctly felt that 
Rabie66 elevated the reason for vicarious liability, to the rule of vicarious 
liability. That is, the elements of risk created by the employer are not part of 
the test but rather the two-leg test of whether an employee committed the 
wrongful act and whether the acts were committed within the scope of 
employment still applies. 
In Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo the court also rejected the risk 
theory advanced in Rabie67 and Kumleben JA reasoned as follows: 
.. . what is regarded as an underlying reason - perhaps the main one - for attaching 
vicarious liability to the employer, namely, the creation of risk (also known as 'risk 
liability'), has hitherto never been regarded in our law as the consideration which 
determines whether such liability is proved ... However, in so far as Rabie's case may 
be said to have replaced the standard test with one based on creation of risk, I am for 
the reasons stated of the view that it was wrongly decided. Moreover, whatever 
direct liability may in certain circumstances attach to an employer as a result of a risk 
created by him, this consideration in my opinion is not a relevant one to be taken into 
account when the standard test is to be applied in order to decide whether the master 
is vicariously liable. 68 
The Appellate Division in Ngobo69 correctly rejected any attempt to 
replace the standard test of vicarious liability with a risk theory as advanced 
in Rabie.70 The court saw no need to complicate the standard test in order to 
accommodate the 'creation of risk' theory. In Eskom71 the court felt that the 
risk theory seeks to find and impute fault on the part of the employer based 
on the fact that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable which goes against 
the principle of no-fault liability upon which vicarious liability is premised. 
The court correctly held that the risk approach to vicarious liability blurs the 
distinction between personal liability of the employer and vicarious liability 
based on the wrongful act committed by the employee as follows: 
The author suggests that the meaningful answer to the "vagueness and 
inconsistency" of the rules relating to the unauthorised conveyance of passengers is 
to place the emphasis on whether the presence of the passenger in the vehicle is 
reasonably foreseeable (presumably, by the employer). It follows, he suggests, that 
66 Supra (n51). 
67 Ibid. 
681992 (4) SA 822 (A) at 831-3. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Supra (n51). 




















the nature of the employee's work (the driving of a vehicle) increases the potential for 
committing the delict (negligent driving) and renders the course of events, causally, 
reasonably foreseeable. The difficulty I have with this line of reasoning is that the 
delict is that of the employee not the employer. Whether the foresight of the 
employer is relevant must be doubted.72 
The Constitutional Court in NK.73 referred to Ngobo and Eskom74 cases 
where the court held that the common-law principles of vicarious liability are 
not to be confused with the reasons for them. O'Regan J went on to restate 
policy reasons which underlie the principle of vicarious liability and held that 
it is incorrect in the light of the section 39(2) of the Constitution to characterise 
it as a factual enquiry untrammelled by any considerations of law or 
normative principles.75 
The enterprise risk theory was adopted in Rabie76 and Bazley v Curry77 
in an effort to impute vicarious liability to the employer - the court in Rabie 
went beyond merely citing risk as a rationale for vicarious liability but stated 
risk as the test in establishing the scope of employment. In Bazley7B McLachlin 
J endorsed the 'enterprise risk' approach as a basis for upholding vicarious 
liability on the part of the employer and explained that the employer places 
an enterprise in the community, which has inherent risks in its operations and 
on grounds of fairness, the employer must bear the loss. 
7.4 Vicarious liability in the United States 
In the United States, two forms of sexual harassment are recognized: quid pro 
quo and hostile environment harassment. The historical development of the 
law on sexual harassment in the United States will be discussed to highlight 
how the courts rejected the traditional approach of vicarious liability based on 
72 Supra (n55) at 92. 
73 Supra (n7). 
74 Ngobo supra (n68) and Eskom supra (n55). 
75 Supra (n7) at para 22. 
76 Supra (n51). 
77 Supra (n6). 



















the scope of employment, which served to dismiss all cases of sexual 
harassment, since the authorities did not accommodate sexual harassment 
within the scope of employment. 79 
It will be emphasized that the pitfalls of the strict application of vicarious 
liability in the United States like in South Africa, Canada, and United 
Kingdom served to exclude sexual harassment from the scope of the 
employment as it was considered personal and isolated. The feminist theory 
instigated by Catherine MacKinnon in her book 'Sexual Harassment of 
Working Women' - (1979) on regarding sexual harassment as a case for 
gender discrimination was instrumental in transforming the law on sexual 
harassment in the United States to the advantage of sexual harassment 
victims. It is will be outlined how the United States courts developed the 
supervisor-approach as a fitting response to sexual harassment in the 
workplace to truly capture the essence of the risk of abuse inherent in the 
supervisor's delegated power. 
7.4.1 Recognized forms of sexual harassment in the United States 
Hostile environment harassment constitutes grounds for an action only when 
the conduct is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment'.so In short, 
therefore, hostile environment harassment 'arises in situations in which an 
employee must endure verbal and physical abuse as part of her 
employment' .s1 
79 Corne and DeVane v Bausch & Lomb Inc 390 F Supp 161 (D Ariz 1975); Tomkins v Public 
Seroice Electric & Gas Co 422 F Supp 553 (D NJ 1976); Miller v Bank of America 418 F Supp 233 
(ND Cal 1976); and Rabon v Guardsmark Inc 571 F 2d 1277 (4th Cir 1978). 
80 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson 477 US 57 (1986) at 67 quoting Henson v City of Dundee 
682 F 2d 897 (1982) at 904. 


















Quid pro quo harassment has the effect of a tangible employment 
action, which includes, but not limited to, demotion, firing, or unfavourable 
changes in work assignment.82 The EEOC has reaffirmed that the employer is 
always liable, without recourse to the affirmative defence, for harassment by a 
supervisor that culminates in a tangible employment action. EEOC defined 
tangible employment action as follows: 
1. A tangible employment action is the means by which the supervisor brings the 
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates, as demonstrated by the 
following: 
• it requires an official act of the enterprise; 
• it usually is documented in official company records; 
• it may be subject to review by higher level supervisors; and 
• it often requires the formal approval of the enterprise and use of its 
internal processes. 
2. A tangible employment action usually inflicts direct economic harm. 
3. A tangible employment action, in most instances, can only be caused by a 
supervisor or other person acting with the authority of the company.83 
Supervisory harassment encompasses quid pro quo because 'sexual 
compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment 
opportunity' .84 In quid pro quo harassment there is an element of reciprocity 
involved and thus 'if a supervisor continually pinches or grabs an employee 
but never hinges on a tangible employment action, a quid pro quo claim would 
not succeed' but alternatively would 'have a hostile environment claim' .ss It 
follows therefore that an example of quid pro quo harassment is a supervisor's 
demand of' sleep with me or I'll fire you' .s6 
Could an element of reciprocity be implied from the relationship 
between the parties for example, a playboy magazine editor pressuring a 
model, who is auditioning for a part in his editorial, to have sex with him? 
82 Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth 524 US 742 (1998) at 753-4 and Faragher v City of Boca Raton 
524 US 775 (1998) at 791. 
83 EEOC Enforcement Guidance at Ch IV (B). 
84 CA MacKinnon Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sexual Discrimination (1979) 
at 32. 
85 Juliano op cit (n81) 565. 





















This question must be answered in the affirmative. It is suggested that an 
element of reciprocity can be both express and implied because the essence of 
quid pro quo harassment is the granting or denial of a benefit or privilege in 
exchange for sexual considerations. Reciprocity can be implied where the 
harasser uses submission to or rejection of his sexual advances as the basis for 
decisions such as employment, short-listing for final selection of a role or task, 
performance appraisal, or the basis for favourable evaluation or 
recommendations. 87 
The distinction between a quid pro quo and hostile environment 
harassment has different repercussions for employers in the United States. 
The employer is subject to strict vicarious liability, without recourse to the 
affirmative defence, in quid pro quo harassment. 
7.4.2 Scope of employment 
The best-simplified analysis of the basis of vicarious liability is an illustration 
of a coffee spill, which is worth quoting at length, as follows: 
Assume that a patron is having breakfast at a coffee shop and the server has spilled 
hot coffee on her hand ... Some courts explain that the employer is liable because the 
wrongful act is incidental to the employee's legitimate work activities. Others 
explain that the employer is liable because the injury was foreseeable ... Some treat 
the injuries as an inherent risk of having employees. Still others hold the employer 
responsible because it is in the best position to insure against injuries ... Here again, 
the employer's liability is not premised on fault; it is vicariously liable ... Finally, what 
if instead of spilling coffee, the employee attacked a customer or co-employee with a 
frying pan? Even if the job did not include cooking (let alone attacking people with 
frying pans), the mere fact that the attack occurred on the job would often be 
sufficient to impose vicarious liability on the employer.ss 
What is worth noting in the extract above is that MacKinnon concedes 
that what grounds vicarious liability within the scope of employment is the 
wrongful act, which occurred on the premises of the employer, whilst on the 
87 See US EEOC Guidelines, which define quid pro quo to include instances where submission 
to such sexual advances is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
individual's employment. 
88 DB Oppenheimer 'Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors' in Directions 






















job and whilst executing the instructions of the employer. It is submitted that 
this is exactly the case with sexual harassment because it occurs on the job, on 
the premises of the employer (the location is irrelevant where the employee is 
not desk bound) and whilst executing the instructions of the employer. 
It is also interesting to observe that MacKinnon did not make a 
hypothetical example of 'what if the waiter had sexually harassed a patron at 
the restaurant'. Instead, she makes an example of 'assault' - it is suggested 
that the nature of assault should not be important. What if the server had 
sexually assaulted the patron? There are other factors other than that sexual 
harassment occurred on the job, which are relevant in determining the scope 
of employment and the strength of connection between the wrongful conduct 
and the employment. 
Based on the judicial precedent on the occurrence of sexual harassment 
on the job applying the scope of employment test, it can only be assumed that 
MacKinnon was avoiding an inevitable conclusion that the court would have 
found that the server had disassociated himself from his employment when 
he sexually harassed a patron. This is so because the United States 
jurisprudence on sexual harassment had not developed the scope of 
employment to cover sexual harassment on the job. 
In the United States, the courts applied the traditional scope of 
employment test to establish vicarious liability on the part of the employer. 
This test was applied restrictively and evidenced problems with the 
application of the 'scope of employment' test in sexual harassment cases. The 
development of law on sexual harassment in the United States only saw the 
light of the day when the scope of employment test was later abandoned for a 
gender discrimination and supervisory harassment approach to sexual 
harassment. 
Sexual harassment was viewed as too personal in nature and too 






















and DeVane v Bausch & Lomb IncB9 the court dismissed a sexual harassment 
claim in that it did not fall within the scope of employment. The court held 
that the employee's conduct of sexual harassment was nothing more than a 
'personal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism'. 90 
Judge Frey went on to say that nothing in the complaint alleges nor can 
it be construed that the conduct complained of was company directed policy, 
which deprived women of employment opportunities. In dismissing a claim 
of sexual harassment, the court concluded that an outgrowth of holding such 
activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit 
every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances 
toward another.91 The court felt that the only way an employer could avoid 
charges of sexual harassment would be to have employees who are asexual.92 
MacKinnon correctly asserts that the inference drawn in Corne93 is that 
a practice that is not related to the nature of the employment is 'not employer 
policy', hence cannot ground a discrimination claim, is simply wrong.94 It is 
highlighted that there is a definite flaw with the strict application of the 
traditional scope of employment, which excludes sexual harassment as a 
workplace practice, but instead regards it as a private matter. The implication 
of the view that sexual harassment is 'personal' is that there is nothing wrong 
with sexual harassment to justify legal interference. The reality is that sexual 
harassment is an unacceptable norm characteristic of ordinary professional 
relations in the workplace. It is argued that sexual harassment can no longer 
be regarded as a natural and personal phenomenon, which women must live 
with and not bring to the courts for legal protection and legal redress for the 
resultant harm suffered. 
89 Supra (n79). 
90 Supra (n79) at 163. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Supra (n79) at 164. 
93 Ibid. 






















In Tomkins v Public Service Electric & Gas Co95 a female clerk had gone 
out to lunch with her supervisor with the expectation of discussing her 
promotion. Instead, her supervisor became intoxicated and made sexual 
advances on her and threatened retaliation when she attempted to leave the 
restaurant. He then proceeded to talk of having sex with her and then kissed 
her. In dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the court held that: 
Natural sexual attraction can be subtle. If the plaintiff's view were to prevail, no 
superior could, prudently, attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of 
either sex. An invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a 
once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time. And if an inebriated 
approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could form 
the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion or a raise is later 
denied to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 
400.96 
Franke97 opines that the view adopted by the court in Tomkins98 is that 
'sexual content or coercion in the workplace relationships is merely the 
inevitable result of a sexually heterogeneous workplace' and 'it is a price 
women pay for participating equally in the public sphere'. It is suggested that 
this view instigated the fight to protect women and to liberate them from the 
bondage of inequality, patriarchy, and discrimination, which served to 
deprive women of their hard-earned equality, freedom, and integrity. 
In Miller v Bank of America99 the court framed the issue of employer 
liability for the employee's wrongful acts as 'whether Title VII was intended 
to hold an employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and 
unauthorised sex misconduct of the employee to another'. The court was of 
the view that 'the attraction of males to females and females to males is a 
natural sex phenomenon' _100 The court concluded that because the sexual 
harassment incidents were 'isolated' and 'personal' non-employment related 
events for which the employer could not be held vicariously liable. 
95 Supra (n79). 
96 Supra (n79) at 557. 
97 KM Franke 'What is Wrong with Sexual Harassment' (1997) 49 Stan L Rev 691 at 700. 
9s Supra (n79). 
99 Supra (n79) at 234. 




















Statistics101 however, refute this finding. Sexual harassment is not personal to 
the victim so as not to warrant employer and legal intervention. The reality is 
that sexual harassment is a violation of human rights and a violation of a 
woman's right to work in an equal opportunities work environment free from 
unwanted sexual advances. 
MacKinnon strongly condemns the omission of the employment nexus 
in the use of the term 'personal' in sexual harassment and observes that: 
One function of the uses of the term is to individuate, devalue, pathologize and 
isolate women's reactions to an experience which is common and shared, practically 
without variation, by countless women. 102 
It is suggested that the use of the term 'personal' is often used to justify sexual 
harassment as a natural phenomenon and serves to trivialise it by removing it 
from the spotlight and public arena, justifying lack of legal intervention to the 
problem of sexual harassment. It is argued that it serves to perpetuate male 
dominance and maintains the status quo of gender discrimination in the 
workplace. It also amounts to failure to acknowledge that there is fire even 
when there is a clear cloud of smoke up in the air. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates failure to protect women even when they are crying for help 
and serves to discourage women in their efforts of breaking the silence by 
being considered as having suffered a rare, unheard of, and isolated incident. 
It is emphasized that to consider sexual harassment a natural 
phenomenon between males and female species is to imply that it is static and 
as natural as God-made. Any attempt to characterise sexual harassment as 
'trivial' serves to treat sexual harassment as a de minim is incident meaning the 
'law does not concern itself with trifles'103 yet ironically, it is an astronomical 
problem. It is thus suggested that the only scope for a de minimis rule is in the 
case of a hypersensitive plaintiff where objectively, the conduct complained of 
would not have offended a person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of 
the plaintiff. 
101 See footnote 1 in chapter one. 
102 MacKinnon op cit (n84) 87. 






















The court's lack of finding a link between sexual harassment and the 
scope of employment is also evident in the case of Rabon v Guardsmark Inc104 
where the security guard on duty raped the plaintiff he was employed to 
guard, and was the last person to leave the building she worked in at night. 
The court held: 
The assault was to effect Roberts' independent purpose, and it was not within the 
scope of his employment. The mere fact that the tort was committed at a time that 
Roberts should have been about Guardsmark' s business and that it occurred at the 
place where the guard was directed to perform Guardsmark' s business does not alter 
these conclusions.1os 
The court dismissed this case because it was of the view that the plaintiff's 
sexual assault was not in the scope of employment nor was it committed in 
furtherance of the employer's business. Instead, the sexual assault was found 
to be in furtherance of the employee's independent purpose and actuated by 
employee's personal desires. 
In Childers v Shasta Livestock Auction Yard Inc106 the court found in 
favour of the plaintiff and held the employer vicariously liable for injuries 
sustained by an employee whilst off site. In this case, the employer routinely 
furnished alcohol on the premises to customers and employees to encourage 
good customer relations. The court emphasized the fact that Childer' s injuries 
occurred away from the work site, did not bar the employer's vicarious 
liability for the employee's drunken driving because it was a regular practice 
for the employer to furnish alcoholic beverages on the premises. The court 
thus held that when an employee undertakes after-work drinking that causes 
the employee to: 
... become an instrumentality of danger to others, even where the danger manifests 
itself at times and locations remote from the ordinary workplace, the employee is still 
acting within the scope of his employment.107 
104 Supra (n79). 
105 Supra (n79) at 1279. Compare to NK (CC) supra (n7) where the Constitutional Court held 
that the policemen were not on the frolic of their own so as to render their conduct to be 
outside the scope of employment because when committing the rape, they were 
simultaneously omitting to perform properly their constitutional and statutory duties as 
policemen which they owed to K. 
106190 Cal App 3d 792, 235 Cal Rptr 641 (Cal Ct App 1987). 




















It is observed that the Childers judgment108 is a typical example of flaws 
of applying the scope of employment test and is evidence of how reluctant 
and resistant the United States courts were in upholding values of equality 
and protection of dignity of women in the workplace. If the court in Childers1D9 
could find an occurrence resulting from a voluntary drinking spree of the 
plaintiff as being within the scope of employment, then by the same token, the 
perpetrator of sexual harassment could become an 'instrumentality of danger' 
to women. This is so because sexual harassment bolsters a hostile, abusive, 
menacing, and discriminatory environment. 
In Ira S Bushey & Sons, Inc v United States110 the court read the scope of 
employment more widely to allow a claim of vicarious liability against an 
employer for intentional torts that were in no sense actuated by any purpose 
to serve the employer. The court held that the employer was vicariously liable 
for damages to a day dock caused by a drunken sailor who was returning to a 
ship from a night's liberty.111 Judge Henry Friendly described the basis of the 
principle respondeat superior as the 'deeply rooted sentiment that a business 
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may be 
fairly said to be characteristic of its activities' _112 
Similarly, abuse of authority by policemen which occurred in NK 
(CC)113 is a risk which may be fairly regarded as 'typical of or broadly 
incidental to the enterprise undertaken by the employer' .114 Furthermore, 
abuse of authority is an inherent risk of running a police enterprise in that 
police are in a powerful position to protect and serve the community, and 
1os Supra (n106). 
109 Ibid. 
110 398 F 2d 167 (2d Cir 1968). 
111 The sailor was on a frolic of his own when he went on a drinking spree and as much as the 
sailor had become drunk while on liberty and far off base, the court noted that drinking on 
leave was so common a part of naval life that the sailor's drunken return to ship could fairly 
be deemed to be characteristic of the military enterprise. 
112 Supra (n110) at 171. 
113 Supra (n7). 
114 Rodger v Kemper Construction Company 50 Cal App 3d 608 at 619, 124 Cal Rptr 143 (4th Dist 






















may thus exploit the vulnerability of the people in need of their assistance 
similar to supervisors who are likely to abuse or misuse their authority over 
their subordinates. 
In Taber v Maine115 the court specifically premised the principle of 
vicarious liability on the view 'that the employer should be liable for those 
faults that may fairly be regarded as risks of his business, whether they are 
committed in furthering it or not'. It is argued that the cumulative effect of the 
wider interpretation of the scope of employment would thus support treating 
all cases of sexual harassment as potentially within the scope of employment 
because such behaviour is distinctive of workplace activities and a risk 
inherent in human relations in the workplace. 
In Faragher v City of Boca Raton the court examined case law on 
vicarious liability and noted that courts have read the scope of employment 
widely: 
... to hold employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts, including 
sexual assaults, that were not done to serve the employer, but were deemed to be 
characteristic of its activities or a foreseeable consequence of its business. 116 
The court acknowledged that 'it is well recognized that hostile environment 
sexual harassment by supervisors (and, for that co-employees) is a persistent 
problem in the workplace' and an employer can, in a general sense, 
'reasonably anticipate the possibility of such conduct occurring in its 
workplace'.117 It is submitted that this means that the employer assumes 
sexual harassment as one of the risks and costs of running a business 
enterprise. MacKinnon therefore correctly states that the term 'personal' 
serves to 'defeat the contention that the incident is employment related' and 
that 'even though the incident occurred on the job,' somehow it has 'nothing 
to do with work'.118 
m 67 F 3d 1029 (2d Cir 1995) at 1037. 
116 Supra (n82) at 776. 
117 Supra (n82) at 798. 



















7.4.3 Supervisory harassment 
It is emphasized that abuse of trust; authority and power are really the 
essence of workplace sexual harassment and include both the authority to act 
in compliance with or contrary to terms of employment. This implies the risk 
of acting outside the employer's instructions.119 MacKinnon has correctly 
stated that supervisory harassment 'located institutional responsibility 
proximate to institutional reality: institutional hierarchy facilitates sexual use 
of subordinates by superiors in violation of the employer' s duty not to 
discriminate' .120 It is suggested that the supervisor is put on the pedestal in 
the workplace since he is entrusted with organizational power; care and 
welfare of the employees; authority; and influence over employment 
decisions. The supervisor's organizational position presents a strong risk of 
sexually harassing women, which is likely to lead to abuse of power and 
effect a tangible employment action. 
Abuse of delegated authority by a supervisor is a ground for finding 
the employer vicariously liable because: 
[T]he scope of supervisory employment may be treated separately because 
supervisors have special authority enhancing their capacity to harass and the 
employer can guard against their misbehaviour more easily.121 
The employer can guard against supervisory misconduct 'more easily because 
their numbers are fewer than the numbers of regular employees'.122 It is 
submitted that an employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors, and 
should be encouraged to prevent supervisory harassment. It is the powerful 
authority of the supervisor and his ability to misuse his power to the 
detriment of his subordinates, which is the essence of sexual harassment in 
the workplace. 
119 See also NK (CC) supra (n7). 
120 CA MacKinnon Women's Lives, Men's Laws (2005) at 180. 
121 Faragher supra (n82) at 776-7. 






















The supervisor's ability to intimidate, discriminate, and create a hostile 
environment was also discussed in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson123 
where the court held: 
A supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with the power to hire, fire, and 
discipline employees, or with the power to recommend such actions. Rather, a 
supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work environment and 
with ensuring a safe, productive workplace. There is no reason why abuse of the 
latter authority should have different consequences than abuse of the former. In both 
cases it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him to 
commit the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed 
with the employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on 
subordinates. 
The court held that a supervisor, whether or not he possesses the 
authority to hire, fire, or promote, is necessarily an 'agent' of his employer for 
all Title VII purposes, since even the appearance of such authority may enable 
him to impose himself on his subordinates.124 It is observed that the 
supervisor is thus an agent, a mouthpiece and an alter-ego of the employer. 
The subordinates are duty-bound to obey the instructions of the supervisor as 
being the instructions of the employer. It is suggested that it is the subservient 
position of the subordinate, which creates a risk and an opportunity for abuse 
of supervisory power. It is thus fair in terms of section 60(3) of the EEA for 
supervisory harassment to be inferred to the employer, and for gender 
discrimination perpetrated by the supervisor to be deemed to be perpetrated 
by the employer. 
In Vinson v Taylor125 the district court held the employer vicariously 
liable for acts of sexual harassment committed by its supervisor even though 
such sexual harassment may have been outside the scope of employment. The 
court noted that: 
Confining liability, as the common-law would, to situations in which a supervisor 
acted within the scope of his authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result 
123 Supra (n80) at 76-7. 
124 Supra (n80) at 70. 



















that employers would become accountable only if they explicitly require or 
consciously allow their supervisors to molest women employees.126 
The court thus correctly acknowledged the narrow approach of the 'scope of 
employment' and refused to rely on the principle of respondeat superior as a 
basis for employer liability for unlawful acts of its agents. It would be 
contrary to the spirit of anti-discrimination legislation (which includes both 
the Constitution and the EEA) if sexual harassment was considered to be 
within the scope of employment only if it was the supervisor's designated 
duty to molest women. 
The Supreme Court in Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth examined 
vicarious liability for an intentional tort committed by a supervisor and 
explained further why a tangible employment action justifies holding an 
employer vicariously liable for a supervisor's intentional tort of sexual 
harassment: 
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the 
injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation. A tangible 
employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm. As a general 
proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority of the 
company, can cause this sort of injury ... But one co-worker (absent some elaborate 
scheme) cannot dock another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote another. Tangible 
employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor. The supervisor 
has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to make economic 
decisions affecting other employees under his or her controI.127 
It is emphasized that it is the position of unequal power between the 
supervisor and his subordinates, which enhance the supervisor's ability of, 
harass because 'the victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing 
the whistle on a superior'.12s This is so because when the supervisor: 
discriminates in the terms and conditions of subordinates' employment, his actions 
necessarily draw upon his superior position over the people who report to him, or 
those under them, whereas an employee generally cannot check a supervisor's 
abusive conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a co-worker.129 
126 Supra (n125) at 151. 
127 Supra (n82) at 761-2. 

















It is for these reasons that in the United States the employer is vicariously 
liable, without recourse to the affirmative defence, for supervisory 
harassment, which results in a tangible employment action or tangible 
employment benefit.130 
The Court of Appeals in Jin v Metropolitan Life Insurance131 held that in 
requiring Jin to show an 'adverse employment action' was contrary to the 
plain language of Ellerth and Faragher cases,132 both of which cited positive 
employment actions such as 'hiring' and 'promotions' as kinds of tangible 
employment actions that would make the affirmative defence unavailable. 
The court went on to explain that the employer should automatically be liable 
where 'the employee rejects the demands and is subjected to an adverse 
tangible employment action or submits to the demands and consequently 
obtains a tangible job benefit' .133 It is argued that in such instances the 
supervisor has misused the power bestowed upon him by the agency 
relationship with the employer. 
For quid pro quo harassment, it is not necessary that the plaintiff must 
refuse to submit to sexual demands and suffer a tangible employment action. 
It is submitted that quid pro quo harassment also covers instances where a 
plaintiff for fear of suffering a tangible employment action, submits to sexual 
demands and thereby gains a tangible employment benefit.134 The reciprocity 
element is present in that the retention of her job was conditioned on 
compliance with the sexual demands because the supervisor is aided by his 
organizational power to effect economic decisions. 
In the United States, the critical issue in supervisory harassment, 
therefore, is whether the victim has suffered a tangible employment action. If 
130 Ellerth supra (n82) at 745. 
131310 F 3d 84 (2d Cir 2002) at 93. 
132 Supra (n82). 
133 Supra (n131) at 95. 
134 See the 2005 Code - which differentiates between victimization that is an equivalent of an 















so, the Ellerth and Faragher135 affirmative defence would be unavailable to the 
employer, and the employer would automatically be vicariously liable for the 
supervisor's sexual harassment. The employer is vicariously liable for 
supervisory harassment because: 
[T]he employer has a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by 
supervisors than by common workers; employers have greater opportunity and 
incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor their performance.136 
It is suggested that the supervisor is always significantly aided, in 
committing sexual harassment, by organization power; the agency 
relationship with his employer; and his human resources responsibilities, 
which involve intimate contact with the subordinates. Furthermore, the 
supervisory position creates a close link between the employment and the 
wrongful conduct since the dominant position of the supervisor helps him 
bring sexual harassment into fruition. The 'causal link' highlighted in Bazley137 
is present in supervisory harassment in that the nature of the supervisor's 
fiduciary position materially increases the risk of the supervisor misusing the 
employment to commit sexual harassment. It is for this reason that the courts 
in Faragher and Ellerth13B established an efficient solution by way of 
employer's vicarious liability for supervisor's wrongful conduct. 
7.4.4 Hostile environment harassment and the affirmative defence 
The affirmative defence is only available in hostile environment sexual 
harassment. Hostile environment harassment exists where gender 
discrimination exists in the workplace and a work environment is thereby 
poisoned. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson139 the court stated that for 
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 
13s Supra (n82). 
136 Faragher supra (n82) at 803. 
137 Supra (n6). 
138 Supra (n82). 















to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive 
working environment. In quid pro quo harassment, liability is strict and the 
affirmative defence is not available to the employer to shield itself from 
vicarious liability. In hostile environment sexual harassment, the employer 
will be found vicariously liable unless he can prove and satisfy the two-prong 
defence test. 
To establish the affirmative defence to counter the risk of automatic 
liability or limit damages, the employer must prove, by adducing evidence 
that, firstly, he 'exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
harassing behaviour' .140 Secondly, the employer must prove that the plaintiff 
'unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise'.141 It is 
argued that the second prong of the affirmative defence is consistent with 
section 60(1) of the EEA, which enjoins the plaintiff to report sexual 
harassment 'immediately' thereby giving the employer an opportunity to 
come to her rescue and remedy gender discrimination. This means that the 
employee must attempt to cut her losses and mitigate any harm occasioned by 
sexual harassment. 
The second prong shifts focus to the employee's conduct in her 
unreasonable failure to mitigate her losses in response to sexual harassment 
by taking advantage of the preventative and corrective opportunities put in 
place by the employer. The second prong of the United States affirmative 
defence and section 60(1) of the EEA seek to keep vicarious liability of the 
employer within reasonable bounds since common-law vicarious liability is 
strict liability and thus has a risk of imposing open-ended liability on the 
employer. The court in Faragher established that: 
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with 
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need 











for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be 
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.142 
This view is consistent with the 2005 Code, which states that the adoption of a 
sexual harassment policy and dissemination of the contents of the policy to 
employees is relevant when establishing the affirmative defence in section 
60(4) of the EEA when considering whether the employer has discharged its 
obligations in terms of section 60(2).143 
It is submitted that the first prong of the affirmative defence implies 
that vicarious liability is an extension of personal liability in that an employer 
is held vicariously liable not so much for the wrongful conduct of its 
employees but for its own failure to take meaningful steps to safeguard the 
workplace against sexual harassment. In other words, in the light of the 
affirmative defence, the employer will be immune if it can prove that it 
adopted a pro-active and reactive approach; and played its part to prevent 
sexual harassment and if sexual harassment occurred, took effective steps to 
remedy it. This means that the employer must do all that a diligent employer 
could reasonably do to guard against the risk of sexual harassment and deal 
with it promptly when it occurs. 
An observation is made that the United States law on the affirmative 
defence could assist a court in determining whether an employer is personally 
at fault (negligent) in a civil claim for damages under the 'aquilian action'. 
The affirmative defence would not be a defence as such in a civil suit but an 
aspect of negligence on the part of the employer that would have to be proved 
by the plaintiff. It is argued that in order to successfully invoke the affirmative 
defence the employer must demonstrate that: 
a) It complied with its duty of care to protect and safeguard the dignity 
and integrity of women against the harm of sexual harassment; and 
142 Ibid. 
143 See item 7.3 2005 Code. See ch 6.2 on the discussion of statutory vicarious liability in terms 


















b) It did all within its powers to eliminate the discriminatory practices, 
conditions, and terms in employment in an effort to root out sexual 
harassment in the workplace. 
The United States court cases have provided constructive guidelines on 
what amounts to reasonable and practicable steps sufficient in the court's 
view to successfully invoke the affirmative defence and exonerate the 
employer from vicarious liability, as follows: 
a) The affirmative defence requires the employers to prove two 
necessities and is not framed in the alternative with the use of 'or' but 
has a conjunction (to prevent) 'and' (correct promptly).144 It is 
submitted that in order to escape vicarious liability, the employer must 
therefore demonstrate that it undertook reasonable efforts to prevent 
and correct the alleged sexual harassment. 
b) Judgment in the employer's favour was proper where the employer 
had exercised reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting 
sexual harassment and the plaintiff likewise had fulfilled her duty to 
complain promptly about the alleged harassment. 145 
c) The employer, who instituted an investigation into sexual harassment 
complaint one day after plaintiff's report, took disciplinary action 
against harasser, notified plaintiff in writing of actions taken and 
revised workplace policy because of incident could not be held liable 
for sexual harassment. 146 
d) The affirmative defence will fail due the employer's inaction in the face 
of the plaintiff's complaints of harassment, and failure to implement 
any sexual harassment or grievance policy for the protection of its 
employees.147 
144 Fall v Indiana University Bd of Trustees 12 F Supp 2d 870 (ND Ind 1998). 
145 Indest v Freeman Decorating Inc 164 F 3d 258 (5th Cir 1999). 
146 McGhee v Treasure Chest Casion, LLC 1998 WL 187699 (ED La 1998). 









e) The affirmative defence will succeed where the employer has an anti-
harassment policy and its response to complaints of sexual harassment 
was prompt and reasonable. 148 
f) The employer must take steps to put an end to sexual harassment once 
its occurrence has come to its knowledge and will thus not be liable 
where it promptly reprimanded the harasser, investigated the incident, 
suspended, and reassigned the harasser.149 
g) An affirmative defence will fail where the employer maintained a 
comprehensive sexual harassment policy that was vigorously enforced 
but had failed to communicate, disseminate it and make known its 
grievance procedure to all employees. 1so 
It is worth noting Bernard v Calhoon MEBA Engineering Schoo[l51 where the 
court gave judgment in employer's favour on grounds that he had acted 
promptly despite the deficiency in its internal sexual harassment policy. The 
court was indifferent by the anti-harassment policy of the Calhoon MEBA 
Engineering School and held that it was constrained to address, at the outset, 
a 'stark deficiency' in Calhoon's anti-harassment policy.1s2 The school's 
harassment policy directed that workplace harassment complaints be 
reported 'to one of only two people: the Human Resources Manager or the 
Director of the School'.153 The reporting line was so restrictive that Judge 
Davis was 'not prepared to find that the harassment policy was reasonable as 
a matter of law' _154 
The court noted that the 'stark deficiency' in the school's policy was the 
limitation to two individuals and the failure to expand those options to 
include, at a minimum, all school supervisors and managers who were 
148 Scrivner v Socorro Independent School District 169 F 3d 969 (5th Cir 1999). 
149 Mikels v City of Durham 183 F 3d 323 ( 4th Cir 1999). 
150 Nuri v PRC, Inc 13 F Supp 2d 1296 (MD Ala 1998). 
151309 F Supp 2d 732 (D Md 2004). 













readily accessible to workers in the workplace. Despite having a flawed anti-
harassment policy, the school was still granted summary judgment. Bernard 
complained to a supervisor that a co-worker made racially offensive remarks. 
The supervisor immediately relayed that complaint to the human resources 
manager, sought out the co-worker, and made him apologize. On the facts, 
the human resources manager came to the school the next day to address the 
complaint; met with the co-worker, secured his promise to stop his remarks; 
and was warned that he would be disciplined if he did not stop. The court 
found that these prompt actions worked because Bernard did not report any 
further offensive remarks by co-workers. 
It is argued that this proves that substance over matter is material in 
giving effect to the spirit of the sexual harassment policy. It is established that 
anti-harassment policies are key documents in fighting sexual harassment in 
the workplace because they are the essence of the employer's compliance with 
its duty to eliminate gender discrimination; to uphold and promote gender 
equality; and to ensure zero tolerance to sexual harassment in the workplace. 
The employer's written commitment to zero tolerance to sexual harassment 
must be evidenced in the spirit of the harassment policy and employer-
culture in the workplace. Employees should be encouraged by the language 
of the sexual harassment policy to complain to any company supervisor or 
manager possibly even those at other company locations. In Bernard,155 the 
employer was vindicated by the fact that, even though its sexual harassment 
policy was flawed, it had taken immediate steps to correct sexual harassment 
once it was brought to its attention. 
It is argued that Bernard156 is distinguishable from Media 24 Limited, Gasant 
Samuels v Sonja Grobler157 where the employer was not exonerated by the fact 
that he had a sexual harassment policy in place because it failed to act once 
1ss Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 


















sexual harassment had come to its attention. Therefore, the employer's failure 
to act aggravated damages incurred by the plaintiff because sexual 
harassment persisted. It is submitted that an effective and well-communicated 
sexual harassment policy and grievance procedures are key to an employer's 
ability to raise the affirmative defence with success. 
7.5 Canada's approach to vicarious liability 
The development of the principle of vicarious liability in Canada has been of 
fundamental importance in influencing the development of law on sexual 
harassment in South Africa, United States, and United Kingdom to expand 
the scope of vicarious liability to include intentional wrongdoing; frolic of 
one's own; negation of duties; and abuse of trust and organizational power. 
The Canadian courts apply an enterprise risk test of vicarious liability (the 
enterprise and employment must substantially contribute to the risk). This is 
similar to the enterprise risk principle adopted in Minister Police v Rabie where 
Jansen JA held that in assessing whether acts fell within the scope of 
employment from the: 
... angle of creation of risk, the emphasis is shifted from the precise nature of the link 
between the acts of the employee and police work, to the dominant question whether 
those acts fall within the risk created by the State. 158 
Viewed this way, Jansen JA seems to downplay the causal element, 
which is important in establishing the extent to which employment causally 
contributed and enabled the commission of the wrongful conduct. It is 
suggested that the causal element is essential in controlling a floodgate of 
litigation where a mere coincidence between the employment and the wrong, 
with nothing more, will be considered sufficient to ground vicarious liability. 
The causal element is also important in keeping common-law vicarious liability 
within reasonable limits since it is a no-fault liability and therefore should be 
applied with caution. Vicarious liability would in all probability not be 


















imposed on the employer given the absence of a close nexus between the 
employee's duties and his wrongful acts. 
7.5.1 The 'enterprise risk' test 
In Jacobi v Griffiths159 the employer was insulated from vicarious liability for 
the sexual abuse performed by its employee on the children placed under its 
care in that such acts constituted independent initiatives on the part of the 
employee for his personal gratification. There was essentially a single incident 
of sexual assault by G involving the male appellant and one incident of sexual 
intercourse involving the female appellant at G's home outside working 
hours following several lesser incidents, including one incident of sexual 
touching in the club van. 
The court applied the strong connection test of vicarious liability and 
held that there must be a material increase in the risk of harm in the sense that 
the employment significantly enhanced the occurrence of harm.160 The court 
of appeal, in dismissing a claim for vicarious liability reasoned that while the 
vulnerability of children provides the appropriate context in which the 
respondent's enterprise is to be evaluated, vulnerability does not itself 
provide the 'strong link' between the enterprise and the sexual assault that 
imposition of no-fault liability would require.161 
The court went on to hold that other than the van incident, G's assaults 
all took place off site, at his home and after hours. The court relied heavily on 
these factors and weighed them against holding the club liable for the G's 
torts, reinforcing that G's conduct was perverse personal frolic, wholly 
unrelated to the scope of his employment.162 The court noted that where the 
1s9 [1999] 2 SCR 570. 
160 Supra (n159) at para 79. 
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chain of events constituted independent initiatives undertaken for the 
employee's own personal gratification, the ultimate sexual abuse was too 
remote from the employer's enterprise to justify strict liability.163 
On the facts, the court noted that there was neither a job created 
intimacy nor a job created parental authority, which established a strong 
connection between the employment and the sexual assault, to warrant a 
finding of a no-fault liability.164 The court thus felt justified in not imposing 
vicarious liability on the employer since G had deviated from the scope of 
employment and was on a frolic of his own when he sexually assaulted his 
victims. It is argued that the court rigidly applied the scope of employment 
test and did not take into account all relevant factors in determining whether 
there was a sufficiently close nexus between the employment and the sexual 
assault, which enhanced the risk of harm. The court concentrated on the 
factors, which severed the link of connection between the employment and 
the wrongful conduct - instead of similarly weighing up the factors, which 
strengthened the connection between the employment and the wrongful 
conduct. 
Jacobi165 is distinguishable from Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security166 where the South African Constitutional Court highlighted the 
relevance of the vulnerable status of women in the society, which makes them 
prone to exploitation and sexual attack. The Constitutional Court emphasized 
that: 
Sexual violence and the threat of sexual violence goes to the core of women's 
subordination in society. It is the single greatest threat to the self-determination of 
South African women.167 
It is argued that freedom from sexual harassment is essential in the 
emancipation of women in a democratic society because it is an affront to 
163 Supra (n159) at para 81. 
164 Supra (n159) at para 84. 
l65 Supra (n159). 
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women's liberty, dignity, equality, and security of the person. The vulnerable 
status of women provides a strong link in sexual harassment in the 
workplace, between the employment and the wrongful conduct. 
In a landmark Canadian judgment of Bazley v Curry168 the court 
revived the principle of vicarious liability on the part of the employer and 
found the employer liable for the delict committed by its employee. This case 
is a leading authority in Canada on the issue of vicarious liability for 
intentional torts. In this case, the children's foundation hired Curry, a 
paedophile, to work in one of its homes for the treatment of emotionally 
troubled children and his duties ranged from general supervision to intimate 
duties like bathing and tucking in at bedtime. 
The court held that the correct approach involved a two-step process 
for determining when an unauthorized act of an employee is sufficiently 
connected to the employer's enterprise that vicarious liability should be 
imposed. The court held that firstly, it should determine whether there are 
any precedents, which unambiguously determine on which side of the line 
between vicarious liability and no liability the case falls.169 Secondly, if prior 
judicial precedents do not clearly suggest a solution, the court held that the 
next step is to openly confront the critical issue of whether vicarious liability 
should be imposed in light of the broader policy considerations behind strict 
liability.170 The court recognized that vicarious liability must be viewed from 
a policy-driven perspective, which lies at the heart of strict liability and not as 
a deduction from legal principles.171 
McLachlin J adopted a new test, in the absence of conclusive judicial 
precedents, in assessing whether the employer is vicariously liable for an 
employee's unauthorised, intentional wrong as follows: 
168 Supra (n6). 
169 Supra (n6) at para 15. 
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The fundamental question is whether the wrongful act is sufficiently related to 
conduct authorized by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. 
Vicarious liability is generally appropriate where there is a significant connection 
between the creation or enhancement of a risk and the wrong that accrues therefrom, 
even if unrelated to the employer's desires.172 
The court cautioned that the enterprise risk test should not be applied 
mechanically, but with a sensitive view to the policy rationales that underlie 
the imposition of vicarious liability - that is to say, fair and efficient 
compensation for the wrong and deterrence.173 The court noted that it lies at 
the heart of tort law that a person who introduces a risk incurs a duty to those 
who may be injured should the risk materialise into harm.174 It is argued that 
this signifies the court's movement closer to personal liability of employer 
because a link is established between the employer's role in enhancing or 
creating the risk, which in essence creates a duty on the part of the employer 
to take steps, having identified such risk, to eliminate it. It is further argued 
that the wrong actuated by the alleged wrongdoer is linked to such 
enterprise-created risk, which gives rise to vicarious liability on the part of the 
employer. 
McLachlin J went on to identify five factors (not a closed list) which are 
relevant in assessing whether an employer created or materially enhanced the 
risk of an employee committing an intentional tort and was thus vicariously 
liable, as follows: 
a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her 
power; 
b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer's aims 
(and hence be more likely to have been committed by the employee); 
c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or 
intimacy inherent in the employer's enterprise; 
d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim; and 
e) the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the employee's 
power.175 
The court therefore adopted an enterprise risk test which looks at the 
extent to which the risk created by the enterprise substantially enabled the 
172 Supra (n6) at para 41. 
173 Supra (n6) at para 46. 
174 Supra (n6) at para 30. 

















employee to commit a wrong. The Canadian test of vicarious liability is 
informative because it looks at policy considerations, totality of circumstances 
and relevant factors, which establish a strong link between the authorised acts 
(employer's creation and enhancement of the risk) and the wrongful conduct, 
which accrues from it. It is submitted that the enterprise risk test adopted by 
the Canadian Courts has a causation element in that the employment must 
materially enhance the risk, in the sense of substantially contributing to it, 
before it is fair to impose vicarious liability. 
McLachlin J correctly noted that any employment that can be seen to 
provide the causation of an employee's tort and thus a 'mere opportunity' to 
commit a tort does not suffice.176 The court thus summed up its judgment and 
held that the opportunity for intimate private control, parental relationship, 
and power required by the terms of employment created a special 
environment that nurtured and brought to fruition Curry's sexual abuse.177 
The court further held that the employer's enterprise created and fostered the 
risk that led to the ultimate harm. The abuse was thus held not to be a mere 
coincidence in time and place, but a product of the special relationship of 
intimacy and respect the employer fostered, as well as the special 
opportunities created for exploitation of that relationship.178 
It is submitted that the court will thus not concentrate on factors like 
time and place which merely coincide with the commission of the wrong. 
Instead, the court will look at the framework of the enterprise to establish key 
factors, which helped, assist the employee in committing the wrong. It 
appears therefore that 'mere opportunity' to commit a wrong is not sufficient 
to establish a close nexus between the employment and the wrong, but the 
causation element is sufficient in that the employment must materially aid the 
perpetrator to commit sexual harassment. The 'causation element' will help 
176 Supra (n6) at para 40. 















curb potential floodgate of litigation where an employee relies on a 'mere 
opportunity' provided by the employment, which did not materially enhance 
the risk of harm. 
7.6 English law on vicarious liability 
A universally applied test in English law on whether liability rests with an 
employer for an employee's delict is known as the 'Salmond test'. This test 
lays down what constitutes 'scope of employment' as follows: 
A master is not responsible for a wilful act done by the servant unless it is done in the 
course of employment. It is deemed to be so done if it is either (a) a wrongful act 
authorised by the employer; or (b) a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some 
act authorised by the employer ... But a master, as opposed to the employer of an 
independent contractor, is liable even for acts which he has not authorised, provided 
they are so connected with acts which he has authorised that they may rightly be 
regarded as modes - although improper modes - of doing them. 179 
The first part of the Salmond test is straight-forward and presents no 
difficulty in its application and interpretation. Problems arise with the 
application of the second leg - that is to say, 'the unauthorised mode of doing 
some act authorised by the employer'. Sexual harassment falls within a class 
of acts, which forms part of the latter part of the Salmond test, which looks at 
the close nexus between the wrongful conduct and the acts authorised by the 
master. It is argued that the problem with the application of the Salmond test 
is mainly with intentional wrongdoing such as sexual harassment, which is 
done for personal gratification and does not serve the master. The reality is 
that sexual harassment can never be factually an unauthorised mode of doing 
authorised tasks but that does not mean that sexual harassment must be 
excluded from the scope of employment. 
It is suggested that the employer will be answerable not only where the 
employee correctly does that which he is authorised to do but will be liable 
where the employee negligently does that which he is authorised to do. An 














employer will even be liable for acts by an employee which are not authorised 
if these acts are so connected with the authorised acts such as to be regarded 
as modes, albeit improper modes, of doing them. 
7.6.1 Trotman v North Yorkshire County Councif1BO 
In the case of Trotman1B1 the employer was insulated from vicarious liability 
and was allowed to argue that the more the employee has deviated from his 
authorised mode, the less likely the employer is to be held liable. This case 
introduced the so-called 'negation' test - that is to say, if an employee 
performs a wrongful act that negates the employer's duty to the plaintiff; the 
employer is unlikely to be vicariously liable.182 In this case, the plaintiff was 
mentally handicapped and suffered from epilepsy. The plaintiff suffered from 
fits and required nocturnal supervision, thus it was arranged that he would 
share a room with the deputy headmaster. On several nights during the 
school trip, the deputy headmaster sexually assaulted him. 
The court held that: 
It is useful to stand back and ask: applying general principles, in which category in 
the Salmond test would one expect these facts to fall? A deputy headmaster of a 
special school, charged with the responsibility of caring for a handicapped teenager 
on a foreign holiday, sexually assaults him. Is that in principle an improper mode of 
carrying out an authorised act on behalf of his employers, the council, or an 
independent act outside the course of his employment?183 
The court went on to tackle the position of care-taking for the plaintiff: 
His position of caring for the plaintiff by sharing a bedroom with him gave him the 
opportunity to carry out the sexual assaults. But availing himself of that opportunity 
seems to me to be far removed from an unauthorised mode of carrying out a teacher's 
duties on behalf of his employer. Rather it is a negation of the duty of the council to 
look after children for whom it was responsible ... But in the field of serious sexual 
misconduct, I find it difficult to visualise circumstances in which an act of the teacher 
1so [1999] LGR 584 (CA). 
181 Supra (n180). 
182 The Constitutional Court in NK supra (n7) applied an analogy of this negation test where 
the court held that breach of the employer mandate is not in itself to be viewed in isolation. In 
finding the employer vicariously liable, the Constitutional Court considered that rape was a 
simultaneous commission of a wrongful conduct and an omission of policemen's statutory 
and constitutional duties to protect NK. 


















can be an unauthorised mode of carrying out an authorised act, although I would not 
wish to close the door on the possibility.184 
The court thus concluded that the employer was not vicariously liable 
and reasoned that the commission by him of acts of indecent assault on a 
pupil in his charge cannot be regarded as an improper and unauthorised 
mode of doing a job but that it was an independent act of self-indulgence or 
self-gratification.1ss The court relied on the questions of agency principle of 
whether the perpetrator was engaged in his master's business at the time of 
the commission of the tort or whether he was acting as a stranger to his 
master. The court was thus of the view that unless the business of the 
principal is to molest children, there will be denial of vicarious liability. The 
court also held that the sexual assault was an independent act done on an 
opportunity seized by the employee. 
It is suggested that the court finding that sexual assault was a negation 
of duty is tantamount to acknowledging a link between the wrong and the 
nature of employment. This means that when the deputy headmaster sexually 
assaulted the plaintiff, he was executing his duties within the scope of 
employment in an improper way. The position of care in relation to the 
disabled plaintiff enhanced the risk of abuse of parental authority by the 
deputy headmaster. The deputy headmaster was thus not a stranger to his 
master at the time of commission of sexual assault, but was still acting in his 
capacity as a caretaker and confidant of the plaintiff. It is thus submitted that 
the court should have found the employer vicariously liable based on the 
negation of duty, which amounted to mismanagement of his duties - that is to 
say, failure to take care of the disabled plaintiff. 
It is emphasized that the link is even stronger between the sexual 
assault and the scope of employment because the pupil in question was 
handicapped thereby making him more vulnerable and dependent on the 
184 Ibid. 



















caretaker. The position of responsibility over the health, care and safety 
created a greater risk of exploitation of caretaker's authority and power over 
the pupil. The negation test which was adopted in Trotman1B6 relies on the 
principle 'the greater the fault of the servant, the less the liability of the 
master'187 which serves to exclude those acts done by the employee in 
dereliction of the duties owed to the employer. It is argued that this test 
disregards the fact that the dereliction and negation of such duties could be 
done within the scope of employment. It is suggested that the connection 
between the nature of employment and the wrongful conduct can be 
established by the dereliction of the duties in that the deviation can be a 
transgression of that which the employee is authorised to do.188 





It overlooked that an employee does not cease to act within the 
scope of employment when he deviates from his authorised tasks 
and disobeys his master; 
Vicarious liability is not necessarily ruled out merely because the 
employee acted for his own benefit and self-indulgence; 
It overlooked an important part of the Salmond test which enjoins 
the courts to look at a sufficiently close nexus between the wrong 
and employment; 
It created a bad precedent in holding that vicarious liability cannot 
arise for an intentional wrongful act committed during an 
opportunity seized by the employee; and 
186 Supra (n180). 
187 Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716 at 733. 
188 See Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 733 where the court was of the view that the employer could 
be liable on application of the 'negation' test and held that a servant may omit to do his 
master's work or act in disobedience of his mater's instructions, and if such omission 
constitutes a negligent or improper performance of his master's work and causes damage, the 
master will be liable for such damage. 


















( e) It overlooked the enhancement of risk, which created a sufficient 
connection because of the deputy headmaster's special position of 
care and trust in relation to the vulnerable and emotionally 
dependent plaintiff. 
7.6.2 Lister and Others v Hesley Hall Limitedl90 
In Listerl91 the House of Lords took an opportunity to revisit the 'Salmond 
test' and overruled Trotman.192 In this landmark judgment, the court widened 
the scope of vicarious liability to include acts of physical and sexual abuse 
committed during the course of employment. Lord Steyn reasoned as follows: 
In my view the approach of the Court of Appeal in Trotman v North Yorkshire County 
Council [1999] LGR 584 was wrong. It resulted in the case being treated as one of the 
employment furnishing a mere opportunity to commit the sexual abuse. The reality 
was that the county council were responsible for the care of the vulnerable children 
and employed the deputy headmaster to carry out that duty on its behalf. And the 
sexual abuse took place while the employee was engaged in duties at the very time 
and place demanded by his employment. The connection between the employment 
and the torts was very close. I would overrule Trotman v North Yorkshire County 
Council. 193 
This case involved a special school for boys with emotional and 
behavioural difficulties, which were managed by Hesley Hall, who employed 
Gas warden and housekeeper to take care of the boys. Unbeknown to them, 
the warden systematically sexually abused the boys in his care. This 
illuminating judgment is instructive to the development of vicarious liability 
for sexual harassment in the workplace. The court rejected as a somewhat 
artificial argument the proposition that the employer should be liable for the 
warden's failure in its duty to report his wrongful intentions and conduct to 
the employer when the employer is not responsible for the wrongful act 
itself.194 
190 Supra (n60). 
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The court endorsed the landmark decisions of the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Bazley v Curry195 and Jacobi v Griffiths196 which relied on the principle 
of 'close connection' when approaching vicarious liability in sexual assault 
cases. The court thus advocated a new test for vicarious liability and held that 
the correct approach is 'whether the warden's torts were so closely connected 
with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employers 
vicariously liable'.197 The court held that the sufficiency of the connection 
might be determined by asking whether the wrongful acts can be seen as 
ways of carrying out the work, which the employer had authorised.198 The 
court held that on the facts, the question must be answered in the affirmative. 
After all, the court reasoned, the sexual abuse was 'inextricably interwoven' 
with the carrying out by the warden of his duties in Axeholme House.199 
The court considered the second leg of the Salmond test of whether the 
conduct was an 'unauthorised way of carrying out the employee's duties 
authorised by the employer'. The court concluded that this was a narrow 
application to sexual assault cases and held that the correct approach is for the 
courts to consider if there was a connection between the act in question and 
the employment. If a connection exists, then the closeness of that connection 
has to be considered in determining whether the wrongful act was committed 
in the scope of employment. It is submitted that this means that vicarious 
liability for intentional wrongdoing can arise if sexual harassment arose 
directly out of circumstances closely connected to the scope of employment. 
The court noted that the Salmond test does not cope ideally with intentional 
wrongdoing. 200 
The court rejected the narrow approach of simply holding that sexual 
assault is not part of the perpetrator's job description. It is submitted that the 
195 Supra (n6). 
196 Supra (n159). 
197 Supra (n60) at para 28. 
19s Supra (n60) at para 37. 
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same applies with sexual harassment in that it is absurd to dissect the 
employee's duties into what was ordered and forbidden within the scope of 
employment. The court held that the correct approach is to look at the nature 
of employment on the basis that the employer undertook to care for the 
plaintiff through the services of the warden. The court found that there was a 
sufficiently close nexus between the torts of the warden and his employment 
because the torts were committed in the time and on the premises of the 
employers whilst the warden was busy executing his duties of caring for the 
plaintiff.201 It is suggested that the strong connection was that the tort 
coincided with the carrying out of a supervisory role as a warden at a time 
and place he was in charge of the plaintiff and responsible for his welfare. 
The court further held that the close connection formulation for 
vicarious liability: 
... would have the advantage of dispensing with the awkward reference to the 
'improper modes' of carrying out the employee's duties; and by focusing attention on 
the connection between the employee's duties and his wrongdoing it would accord 
with the underlying rationale of the doctrine and be applicable without straining the 
language to accommodate cases of intentional wrongdoing.202 
The court dispensed of the rigid application of vicarious liability and held that 
the Salmond test is not a 'statutory definition of the circumstances which give 
rise to liability, but a guide to the principled application of the law to diverse 
factual situations' . 203 The court thus stressed an important policy dimension 
in its application of the principle of vicarious liability. 
The warden discharged that duty in an improper way, which was an 
abuse of his position, and the court held that ' an abnegation of his duty does 
not sever the connection with his employment'.204 This feature is a 
development of Trotman2os where the court held that sexual assault was a 
201 Supra (n60) at para 20. 
202 Supra (n60) at para 69. 
203 Supra (n60) at para 70. This view is consistent with Bazll!lj supra (n6), where the court held 
that the principle of vicarious liability is based on policy grounds and is not a ' deduction 
from legalistic premises.' 
204 Supra (n60) at para 50. 



















negation of duty of care but did not use that fact to ground a connection 
between the tort and the employment. It is submitted that mismanagement of 
duties does not break the nexus between the employment and the wrongful 
• conduct. It is suggested that the dominant and influential position of the 
harasser in the organization and his position of seniority and trust vis-a-vis 
the plaintiff, actually aids him in mismanaging his duties to commit sexual 
harassment. 
The court further developed the frolic of one's own reasoning which 
was used in Trotman2D6 to exclude employer liability and held: 
... the motive of the employee and the fact that he is doing something expressly 
forbidden and is serving only his own ends does not negative the vicarious liability 
for his breach of the 'delegated' duty.207 
It is argued that this means that in English law the subjective element that 
enquires into the state of mind of the perpetrator, is irrelevant to a test of 
vicarious liability. This reasoning is more compatible with the essence of 
vicarious liability since it is a no-fault liability. This is contrary to Bezuidenhout 
NO v Eskom2D8 where the subjective element was a central issue, which led the 
court to conclude that the conduct of the driver, fell beyond the scope of his 
employment because subjectively the driver knew that he was prohibited 
from giving lifts to the public. 
7.7 Critique of the South African law on vicarious liability in the 
workplace: sexual harassment cases in the light of foreign precedent 
206 Ibid. 
It was as if women ... saw a solid wall when they looked for a way out of the sexual 
harassment dilemma. The feminist ferment of the 1970s suggested that there ought to 
be something that could be done about sexual harassment. Kitty's work identified 
where women might look for a handle. We looked, we found it, we pushed and 
kicked at it, and a door opened. As soon as it did, everyone looked at it and thought, 
201 Supra (n60) at para 55. 





















"Oh, that's a door, not a wall", and began walking through it - as they have 
continued to do ever since. 209 
The above extract is true in the South African context because law on sexual 
harassment has recently seen the light of the day through the courts' initiative 
in developing common-law to accord with the Constitution thereby giving 
hope and protection to the victims of sexual harassment.210 The remedies for 
sexual harassment are an important feature of this thesis in that victims have 
not reached a dead-end when faced with sexual harassment. This chapter will 
discuss how the remedies for sexual harassment broadened by the courts to 
respond to sexual harassment in the workplace. These remedies provide a 
door to freedom and equal participation in the economy for women. The 
analysis of judicial precedents in South African will highlight that the silence 
on sexual harassment can be broken through legal intervention and redress. 
7.7.1 Grobler v Naspers Bpk en 'n ander211 
The problem with the traditional test of vicarious liability is that the courts 
have battled to develop consistent rules on what amounts to scope of 
employment. This was exacerbated by the perception that sexual harassment 
is not within the scope of employment but an independent act, which does 
not serve the master even though it occurs in the course of employment. 
Bazley v Curry has established that 'the doctrine of vicarious liability rests on 
policy considerations and not on legalistic principles' . 212 
Bazley213 reiterated that a court should determine whether there are 
precedents, which unambiguously determine on which side of the line 
between vicarious liability and no liability the case falls. If prior cases are 
209 AE Simon ' Alexander v Yale University: An Informal History' in MacKinnon and Siegel op 
cit (n88) 56. 
210 5ee ss 173 and 39(2) Constitution. 
211 [2004] 2 All SA 160 (C). 
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inconclusive and do not clearly suggest a solution, the court held that the next 
step is to determine whether vicarious liability should be imposed in light of 
the broader policy rationales behind strict liability.214 It is submitted that this 
Canadian precedent laid foundation for the development of vicarious liability 
of employers for sexual harassment, on constitutional and policy grounds, in 
the High Court case of Grobler.21s 
Judge Nel sought guidance from the Constitution and held that it 
enjoined the court to embark on judicial creativity and develop common-law to 
give effect to the Bill of Rights.216 On the facts of this case, the first defendant 
had employed the second defendant as a trainee manager, thus placing him in 
a position of authority over the plaintiff. This created a risk inherent in the 
enterprise and made it possible for him to abuse his position to intimidate the 
plaintiff and other employees in an attempt to gain sexual favours. This 
conclusion satisfies the causal (as well as the risk) element in Bazley.217 The 
special relationship between Samuels and Grobler materially aided him to 
commit sexual harassment thereby creating a sufficiently close link between 
the employment and the wrongful conduct. It is therefore clear that it is on 
the principle of conferring the supervisor with power to oversee the 
employees that creates an opportunity for the supervisor to abuse his power. 
Judge Nel used the Constitution to protect and uphold the dignity 
women and their right to freedom and bodily security, and the women's right 
to physical and psychological integrity.218 Judge Nel thus concluded that the 
common-law rules of vicarious liability must be adapted to give effect to the 
aforementioned constitutional rights and consequently held Naspers 
vicariously liable for sexual harassment. Judge Nel quoted with approval the 
judgment of Judge Souter in a much-celebrated American case of Faragher v 
214 Ibid. 
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City of Raton219 that developed the law of sexual harassment in the United 
States: 
Older cases, for example, treated smoking by an employee during working hours as 
an act outside the scope of employment, but more recently courts have generally held 
smoking on the job to fall within the scope ... It is not that employers formerly did not 
authorize smoking but have now begun to do so, or that employees previously 
smoked for their own purposes but now do so to serve the employer. We simply 
understand smoking differently now and have revised the old judgments about what 
ought to be done about it.220 
It is submitted that smoking is different from sexual harassment. 
Smoking during office hours can be said to be an act within the scope of 
employment because an act of smoking may serve to boost the morale of the 
worker, to alleviate stress and helps the worker relax thus enabling the 
worker to better serve the employer.221 There is a close nexus between the 
agent's conduct and serving the employer. Smoking is a permitted leisure at 
work and it benefits the employer in that the employer reaps the benefits in 
the service of a productive relaxed worker. It is argued that sexual harassment 
on the other hand, falls short of serving the employer in that it is not an act 
which progresses towards serving the employer and 'the general rule is that 
sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of 
employment' .222 Sexual harassment is rather an act whereby an employee 
deviates from the purpose of serving the employer but may be within the 
scope of employment. 
It is submitted that as much as the employer benefits in work well 
done by a smoking employee, the employer must face liability for the work 
not done by a harassing employee.223 It is suggested that an employee who 
219 Supra (n82) at 797. 
220 Supra (n211) at 217. 
221 See Rodgers v Kemper Construction Co 50 Cal App 3d 608, 124 Cal Rptr 143 (1975). The court 
noted that where social or recreational pursuits on the employer's premises after hours are 
endorsed by the employer and are conceivably of some benefit to the employer or, even in the 
absence of proof of benefit, if such activities have become a customary incident of the 
employment relationship, an employee engaged in such pursuits after hours is still acting 
within the scope of his employment. 
222 Ellerth supra (n82) at 744. 
223 In Taber v Maine 67 F 3d 1029 (2d Cir 1995) the court held that drinking by service members 





















engages in sexually harassing conduct is neglecting to perform his master's 
work properly and is deviating from the instructions of the employer.224 It is 
suggested that sexual harassment is causally linked to the execution of duties 
because the harassing employee thereby breaches his delegated authority in 
committing sexual harassment. 
Judge Nel embarked on a creative judicial process and developed 
South African law on sexual harassment in line with developments in 
common-law jurisdictions to the extent that vicarious liability of employer was 
upheld to protect the victims of sexual harassment. In so doing he invoked the 
powers conferred on him in terms of section 173 of the Constitution which: 
... vests the inherent power in the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal 
and High Courts to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the 
common-law, taking into account the interests of justice. 
The court stated that the issue was whether the law should regard 
sexual harassment by an employee as falling within the risks, which 
employers should assume by conducting business. The court held that the 
employer was vicariously liable for the conduct of its supervisor. The court 
thus did not find it necessary to explore the 'scope of employment' test to 
found liability on the employer. Instead, the court applied the enterprise risk 
approach as a new test for establishing vicarious liability on the employer, 
which was adopted in Bazley.225 The enterprise-risk principle adopted by 
Judge Nel was developed in Bazley226 by McLachlin J, who identified that the 
opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her 
power was a factor of pivotal importance. 
The 'scope of employment' and 'enterprise risk' tests are interrelated 
yet mutually exclusive - in that both tests seek to achieve the same desired 
employee morale and customer relations. In the context of the military mission, the court held 
that an occasional drunken service member who leaves government premises and causes 
damage is a completely foreseeable event, in the sense that it is a reasonably obvious risk of 
the general enterprise. The court concluded that it did not think that it would be either unfair 
or the slightest bit unreasonable to impose that cost on the government. 
224 See NK (CC) supra (n7) at para 47. 























end of establishing vicarious liability on the part of the employer. An 
enterprise risk is an adaptation of the scope of employment test in that the 
courts look at the 'enterprise risk' to establish the scope of employment. It has 
been highlighted in chapter seven that the traditional test of scope of 
employment did not cope well with intentional wrongdoing. However, that is 
not a reason to abandon the much-established common-law test of vicarious 
liability in the light of section 39(2) of the Constitution, which enjoins the 
court to develop common-law in harmony with the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights. Similarly, section 8(3) of the Constitution is an important 
provision, which mandates the court to develop common law in accordance 
with the Constitution. 
It is proposed that the traditional 'scope of employment' test should be 
retained and not be replaced by the 'enterprise risk' test. Risk' is only relevant 
as a factor to be taken into account, which helps establish that the employment 
causally contributed to the commission of the wrong, and not as the ultimate 
test of vicarious liability for sexual harassment in the workplace. It is argued 
that the 'scope of employment' test helps acknowledge sexual harassment as a 
workplace event, which is not a private matter, thereby warranting legal and 
employer intervention. It is highlighted that after all, vicarious liability is a 
policy based principle, which is not a hard and fast rule - in that the courts 
have more recently adapted it to be consistent with the Constitution and 
common-law jurisdictions. 227 
It is argued that not every employer who confers power on a 
supervisor is liable for any conduct on the part of the supervisor. Under 
common-law vicarious liability, employer liability is limited by the causation 
element, which requires that the employment must materially aid the 
employee to commit the wrong, in the sense of substantially contributing to it, 
before it is just to impose strict liability. In other words, there must be a 
sufficiently close nexus between the employment and the wrong before 






















vicarious liability can ensue.228 Similarly, section 60 of the EEA does not 
impose an open-ended employer liability but is limited to the extent to which 
the employer failed to act against gender discrimination once it was brought 
to its attention, in which case the perpetrator's commission of gender 
discrimination, will be inferred to the employer. 
It may be that the plaintiff did not make use of the opportunity to 
report gender discrimination to the employer as required by section 60(1) of 
the EEA. The employer can thus not be automatically vicariously liable under 
section 60(3) of the EEA where gender discrimination was not reported to it 
and was thereby not given an opportunity to prevent and remedy sexual 
harassment. The affirmative defence in section 60(4) further insulates the 
employer from statutory vicarious liability where it did all that was reasonably 
practicable to eliminate gender discrimination. After all, if the employer had 
acted diligently, the allegation of gender discrimination would not have been 
brought before the court. 
Le Roux accepts the outcome of Grobler (C)229 with reservations. She 
asks 'whether there was no scope for the court to conclude that Naspers was 
directly, instead of vicariously liable for to failing to address Grobler's 
concerns at a much earlier stage'.230 It is established that the remedies are not 
mutually exclusive and there was obviously scope to argue personal liability 
based on the employer's non-delegable duty to ensure a safe environment. 
The court could only decide on personal liability if this was pleaded. This is 
evident in Media 24 Limited, Gasant Samuels v Sonja Grobler231 where breach of 
delictual duties was pleaded and the court found the employer personally 
liable for negligent breach of delictual duty to create and maintain a safe 
228 Ibid. 
229 Supra (n211). 
230 R le Roux 'Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Reflecting on Grabler v Naspers' (2004) 25 
IL/ 1897 at 1902. 






















working environment, and a duty to protect employees from psychological 
harm caused by sexual harassment. 
Le Roux further asserts that in terms of Grabler (C),232 'vicarious 
liability will not be imposed where sexual harassment occurs in a low or no 
risk or equal relationship' .233 It is submitted that on risk, Grabler (C)234 never 
distinguished between degrees of risk - a risk is always present in the 
employer-employee relationship and in the running of an enterprise. There is 
risk of abuse or misuse of authority by those in powerful positions and sexual 
harassment is an inherent risk in human interactions in the workplace. It is for 
this reason that an employer is under duty to take reasonable steps to create 
and maintain a working environment in which sexual harassment is 
unacceptable.235 The risk of sexual harassment is also present between co-
workers not just between supervisor and a subordinate employee. 
Furthermore, there is a risk of a hostile environment ensuing between co-
workers if the risk of sexual harassment is not managed properly. 
It is worth noting that 'risk' was not applied in vacuum in Grabler (C)236 
but the High Court took into account the following instructive policy 
considerations which will inform the law on sexual harassment in South 
Africa: 
(a) Developments in sexual harassment law in other common-law 
jurisdictions; 
(b) Opportunity presented by the enterprise to the harasser to abuse 
his authority; 
232 Supra (n211). 
233 Le Roux op cit (n230) 1902-3. 
234 Supra (n211). 
235 Item 6(2) 2005 Code. 





















(c) Nature of trust relationship between the harasser and the plaintiff 
which enhanced the risk of the commission of the wrongful 
conduct; 
( d) Vulnerability of the plaintiff to abuse of supervisory authority; 
(e) Sufficient connection between the wrongful conduct and the 
conduct authorised by the master; 
(f) The resultant tangible employment action suffered by the plaintiff; 
(g) The resultant post-traumatic stress disorder suffered by the 
plaintiff; 
(h) Rights violated by sexual harassment; and 
(i) Mandate in terms of the Constitution to develop common-law to 
promote the spirit of the Bill of Rights and to adapt the rules of 
vicarious liability to protect the dignity, freedom, security, and 
right of physical and psychological integrity of women in the 
workplace. 
Le Roux states that 'there is room to argue that employment relationships 
fall within the sphere of employment and that sexual harassment, albeit 
prohibited, still deals with conduct within the sphere of employment' .237 She 
further states that 'it may well be argued that following this (traditional) 
approach means that there is very little that the employer can do to avoid 
liability in the case of sexual harassment' .238 It is submitted that finding sexual 
harassment to be within the sphere of employment may impose an excessive 
burden on the employers. However, this risk is mitigated by the fact that 
sexual harassment is an endemic problem which is foreseen unlike an act of 
God or an act of State in that the employer can mitigate its effects by taking 
pro-active steps. A diligent employer will be immune from liability if it can 
prove that it took all the reasonable and practicable steps to prevent sexual 






















harassment and educate the staff members if the claim is under labour law 
provisions. If the claim is in delict, the only relevance of the reasonable steps 
taken by the employer would seem to be to exclude fault - negligence or 
intention. 
Whitcher239 supports the risk theory enunciated in Grabler (C)240 and 
rightly asserts 'the shifting of this sort of risk to the employer rather than 
expecting an innocent third party to bear the damages caused by sexual 
harassment is thus justifiable and fair'. She further asserts that even if the 
'strict supervisor test'241 were not to be applied, Naspers would still have been 
vicariously liable because the working relationship created the risk of 
harassment and there was a sufficiently close connection between the 
wrongful acts and the job Samuels was authorised to perform.242 Supervisory 
harassment always involves an element of quid pro quo in that victimisation or 
favouritism will ensue depending on compliance/non-compliance with the 
sexual demands. Furthermore, supervisory harassment is inimical to gender 
equality in the workplace and aggravates wrongfulness of the conduct 
because of the supervisor's power to discriminate on the employment 
benefits. 
Whitcher further opines that the victim of sexual harassment has optional 
remedies and nothing could have prevented Ntsabo from pursuing a civil 
route like the one Grobler did, provided 'the applicant is not seeking relief 
flowing from either the LRA or the EEA' .243 Whitcher favours the labour law 
remedy and asserts that 
The Labour Court is probably the safest route because there are clearly defined 
statutory provisions (and now case law) which, if violated, establish an essentially 
239 B Whitcher 'Two Roads to an Employer's Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment: S 
Grabler v Naspers Bpk en 'n Ander and Ntsabo v Real Security CC' (2004) 25 IL] 1907 at 1914. 
240 Supra (n211). 
241 In the United States, the strict supervisor test was established when the Supreme Court 
held in Ellerth supra (n82) and Faragher supra (n82) that an employer is strictly liable for 
sexual harassment by a supervisor that culminates in a tangible employment detriment, such 
as a raises, discharge, demotion or undesirable assignment. 
242 Whitcher op cit (n239) 1919. 





















subjective 'close connection' between the risk the company created and the wrongful 
act.244 
The labour law remedy is favourable for further reasons that sentimental loss 
can be claimed under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA, and statutory vicarious 
liability contained in section 60 of the EEA is not burdensome to establish 
compared to the common-law test for vicarious liability.245 
Calitz supports the outcome in the High Court case of Grobler246 and 
advocates a 'new test' of vicarious liability based on the 'enterprise risk' as 
'the basis for holding employer vicariously liable'. 247 Calitz suggests that to 
ground vicarious liability, 'harm must in general be foreseeable, and there 
must be a close nexus between the acts of the employee and the risk created 
by the enterprise'.248 It is argued that the problem with this reasoning is that 
Calitz imports foreseeability, which is a form of fault, into the picture. It is an 
established principle that fault on the part of the employer is not required for 
common-law vicarious liability. Calitz appears to be suggesting a type of 
negligence inquiry, which would not cover sentimental loss under the actio 
iniuriarum where intention is required. 
Judge Nel in Grabler (C)249 developed and revived the law on sexual 
harassment and gave it a new dimension since the traditional test of scope of 
employment was too restrictive and left the victims of sexual harassment 
unable to invoke vicarious liability on the part of the employer. Judge Nel 
gave new meaning to what was stated by Barlow: 
244 Ibid. 
The customs and beliefs or needs of a primitive time established a rule or formula. In 
the course of centuries the custom belief or necessity disappears but the rule remains. 
The reason, which gave rise to the rule, has been forgotten and ingenious minds set 
themselves to enquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought 
of then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons, which have been found for it, and 
245 See ch 6.2 on the discussion of the remedy of statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 
60 of the EEA and damages under the section 50 of the EEA. 
246 Supra (n211). 
247 K Calitz 'Vicarious Liability of Employers: Reconsidering Risk as a Basis for Liability' 
(2005) 2 TSAR 215 at 232. 
248 Calitz op cit (n247) 234. 





















enters on a new career. The old form receives a new content and in time even the 
form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.250 
7.7.2 Media 24 Limited, Gasant Samuels v Sonia Grobler251 
The employer's duty to provide and maintain a working environment that is 
free from hazards to health and safety of employees can be found in section 
8(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.252 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal developed this statutory duty in Grabler and held that the employer 
owes a common-law duty to its employees, as opposed to a moral obligation: 
(a) 'to protect them from physical harm caused by what may be called physical 
hazards,' and 
(b) 'to protect them from psychological harm caused, for example, by sexual 
harassment by co-employees.'253 
The court did not explore the principle of vicarious liability but instead 
decided the case on a negligent breach by employer of its personal duty to 
maintain a working environment free from sexual harassment. The court 
extended the employer's duty to provide a safe working environment to 
cover the duty to protect the psychological welfare of the employee. This gave 
effect to the constitutional right to psychological integrity, which is violated 
by sexual harassment.254 It is submitted that the protection of the 
psychological welfare of the employee is relevant in the light of the 
psychological trauma suffered by the victim of sexual harassment. 
The court held that the legal convictions of the community require an 
employer to take reasonable and practicable steps to prevent sexual 
harassment of its employees in the workplace. The employer is also under an 
obligation to compensate the victim for harm caused thereby should it 
250 TB Barlow The South African Law of Vicarious Liability (1939) at 9. 
251 Supra (n157). 
252 Act 85 of 1993. 
253 Supra (n157) at para 65. 






















negligently fail to do so.255 The court thus established that the employer is 
under a general delictual duty, which does not have to stem from the contract 
of employment or from the statute but stems from the legal convictions of the 
community.256 It has thus been established that the basis of the employer's 
duty to prevent and remedy sexual harassment arises out of the contract of 
employment, corporate governance, the common-law duty of care, a statutory 
remedy, and the legal convictions of the community. 
Farlam JA held that 'the respondent's alleged refusal to lay a charge or 
even make use of the grievance procedure against the second appellant 
precluded Tydskrifte from preventing her from being harassed'.257 This 
distinguishes common-law from labour law in that 'the reluctance of a harassed 
employee to take formal steps does not absolve the employer from its duty to 
provide a safe working environment'258 in terms of common-law. In labour law: 
[I]f a complainant is not willing to follow any procedures (not even the informal 
procedure) available in terms of the effectively communicated policy consistent with 
the 2005 Code, the employer might well escape liability in terms of the EEA.259 
It is submitted that the employer cannot evade responsibility for the 
harm that ensues from sexual harassment because of personal negligence that 
follows on failure to guard the workplace against the risk of sexual 
harassment. It is thus advisable for employers, since it is clear that they play a 
key role in eliminating unfair discrimination in the workplace, to act and take 
reasonable and practicable steps to rid the workplace of sexual harassment 
practices. 
Farlam JA held that the manager's (Van As) failure to act and deal with 
sexual harassment when it was reported to him by Grabler was 'culpable'260 
and 'his employer, was clearly vicariously liable for his failure to act in this 
255 Supra (n157) at para 68. 
256 Supra (n157) at para 70. 
257 Supra (n157) at para 71. 
258 R le Roux 'Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Matter of More Questions than 
Answers or Do We Simply Know Less the More We Find Out?' 2006 (10) Law, Democracy and 
























regard'261 (as opposed to Samuel's wrongful conduct of sexual harassment). 
Le Roux opines that this reasoning 'is rather strained': 
The employer is held liable in terms of its duty to provide a safe working 
environment for something that did not happen in the workplace at all on the 
assumption that the perpetrator would have responded in a certain fashion has the 
employer reprimanded him for his conduct in the workplace.262 
It is submitted that the court's reasoning is similar to section 60 of the 
EEA where the employer is held vicariously liable for failure to act once the 
alleged wrongful conduct has come to its attention. Perhaps the court 
correctly felt that had the employer taken remedial steps when sexual 
harassment came to its attention, sexual harassment would not have 
persisted. The significance of this finding is that the employer cannot be 
passive and expect gender discrimination to remedy itself without its 
intervention in the light of its duty of care to provide a safe working 
environment that is free from harassment, discrimination, and violation of 
human rights. It must be noted that Farlam J 'left open' the question whether 
the employer was vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of Samuels, the 
perpetrator .263 
It is argued that the court in finding that the employer was both 
personally and vicariously liable is not a contradiction but is proof that 
remedies for sexual harassment are not mutually exclusive. It must be noted 
that the court's reasoning is consistent with the basis for statutory vicarious 
liability in terms of section 60(3) of the EEA in terms of which the employer is 
held vicariously liable for its culpable failure to remedy gender discrimination 
once it has come to its attention. In such a case, the perpetrator's gender 
discrimination will be deemed the employer's gender discrimination in terms 
of section 60(3) of the EEA. 
It is suggested that the court in finding the employer personally liable, 
stresses the employer's non-delegable duty to prevent sexual harassment in 
261 Ibid. 
262 Le Roux op cit (n258) 54. 






















the workplace and encourages employers to be pro-active in enforcing zero 
tolerance to gender discrimination in the workplace. Furthermore, if negligent 
breach of delictual duty is in issue, then damages for psychological harm 
would seem to be confined to pain and suffering and emotional shock. It must 
be noted that sentimental loss of a broader nature flowing from insult of 
dignity requires existence of intention as opposed to negligence. This marks 
the difference between a delictual remedy and a labour law remedy, which 
should be noted by the plaintiff when deciding which remedy to pursue. 
The advantage with the labour law remedy is that fault - intention or 
negligence, is not a requirement in order to enable the court to award 
payment for damages for sentimental loss under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA. It 
is submitted that only a diligent employer will be exonerated from 
personal/ vicarious liability if it can show that it took pro-active and reactive 
steps to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace and dealt with it as soon 
as it came to its attention. 
7.7.3 K v Minister of Safety and Security264 
So don't be discouraged by those who say the law of sexual harassment doesn't 
work. Dr. King told his followers that justice does not take long 'because truth 
crushed to earth will rise again.' He said it won't take long because the arc of the 
moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.265 
The abovementioned quotation holds true in the light of the Constitutional 
Court judgment of K v Minister of Safety and Security.266 It is submitted that the 
law plays a key role in protecting the status of women in the workplace and 
the judiciary, in its creative role helps protect and restore the women's dignity 
in the workplace. In this case, the appellant (K) was raped by three policemen 
on duty and in uniform, who had offered her a lift from a night shop. The 
264 [2005] 3 All SA 519 (SCA). 
265 PY Price 'Eradicating Sexual Harassment in Education' in MacKinnon and Siegel op cit 
(n88) 65. 






















appellant sued the employer for damages on grounds that the employer was 
vicariously liable for the criminal acts of the rapist policemen. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's claim because deviation of the 
policemen from the course of employment was great that there was no 
justification upon which the court could find the employer vicariously 
liable.267 
The court reasoned that on the facts, the three policemen were on the frolic 
of their own and their conduct was motivated by self-gratification and the 
deviation was of such magnitude that 'that it cannot be said that in 
committing the crime of rape they were in any way exercising those functions 
or performing those duties'.268 The Supreme Court of Appeal therefore 
narrowly applied the 'scope of employment', in total disregard of the 
following: 
a) K's violated rights; 
b) The policy considerations underlying the common-law vicarious 
liability; and 
c) The constitutional mandate in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution 
which enjoins the court to develop common-law to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
The court thus excluded a frolic of one's own, which on the facts of the 
case amounted to abuse, and mismanagement of policemen's duties whilst 
they were acting in the course and scope of employment. K appealed against 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal to the Constitutional Court. She 
argued that the common-law test of vicarious liability be developed in terms of 
section 39(2) of the Constitution as the outcome did not accord with the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Court stressed 
this point and held that the question of the protection of K's 'rights to security 
267 Supra (n264) at para 4-5. 





















of the person, dignity, privacy and substantive equality are of profound 
constitutional importance' .269 
The court then went on enquire whether the police conduct was 
sufficiently close to their employer's business to render it vicariously liable. In 
answering this question, the court took into account several factors to 
establish the close nexus between the rape and the employment. The court 
held that the three policemen's work and constitutional obligations were to 
ensure protection, safety and security of all South Africans and to prevent 
crime.270 These obligations are a creature of statute as contained in the Police 
Act271 and the Constitution.272 
In addition to their constitutional and statutory duties to protect the 
public, the police had offered to assist K by giving her a lift home and she had 
accepted their offer in good faith. She placed her trust in the policemen by 
virtue of their capacity and police mandate.273 On the facts, the policemen 
wore uniform so as to make them more identifiable to the members of the 
public who were in need of assistance. The police were thus doing what was 
demanded by their employment when they came to K's assistance. It is 
submitted that by raping K, the policemen not only violated K's .trust but also 
violated the public trust and eroded the community's confidence in the police 
integrity. 
The court274 adopted a two-leg test comprising of the subjective and 
objective element, which was applied and developed in Rabie.275 It is 
269 NK (CC) supra (n7) at para 18. 
270 Supra (n7) at para 51. 
271 The preamble to the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 provides that: 
whereas there is a need to provide a police service throughout the national territory to -
ensure the safety and security of all persons and property in the national territory; reflect 
respect for victims of crime and an understanding of their needs ... 
272 S 205(3) of the Constitution provides that: 
The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain 
public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to 
uphold and enforce the law. 
273 Supra (n7) at para 51. 






















submitted that both elements have to be satisfied. The subjective element 
enquires on the state of mind of the three policemen at the time of the 
commission of the offence whether they acted with the intention to serve the 
master. The objective element enquires whether on the facts there is a 
sufficiently close link between the three policemen acts for their personal 
interests and the business of the employer. In answering this question, the 
court held that it should consider the need to give effect to the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.276 
It is submitted that subjectively, the three policemen clearly intended 
to serve their sexual gratification and sexual desires. They exerted their power 
over the victim by exploiting the position of trust to their advantage. The 
policemen were clearly in deviation of their duties and did not intend to serve 
their master in committing the rape. However, the enquiry does not end 
there. One has to satisfy the objective element, which asks whether there was 
a sufficiently close connection between the delict and the business of the 
employer. 
It is argued that the subjective element must not be viewed narrowly to 
only look at whether the policemen intended to serve the master. It is 
suggested that it would be enough to infer on the facts that they intended to 
use their status as policemen to create the opportunity to commit the rape. 
Viewed narrowly, the subjective element would serve to exclude vicarious 
liability because it would be open to the employer to argue that the employee 
was on a frolic of his own thereby severing the close link between the 
employment and the wrongful conduct. 
The court correctly noted that the issue of commission and omission 
are both relevant in determining vicarious liability in as much as they are 
relevant in determining wrongfulness in a particular case.277 The court thus 
21s Rabie supra (n51) at 134C-E. 
276 Supra (n7) at para 44. 






















held that the three policemen when committing the rape were simultaneously 
omitting to perform properly their constitutional and statutory duties as 
policemen which they owed to the K.278 In committing the brutal crime of 
rape, the court held that the policemen .not only failed to protect K, but they 
also infringed on her rights to dignity and security of the person. 279 The crime 
of rape was thus a mismanagement of police duties. It was committed within 
the scope of employment at a time and place when the policemen were on 
duty in their capacity as the law enforcement agents and agents of the master, 
and this created a close nexus between the rape and the employment. The 
police had not abandoned the scope of employment but merely deviated from 
the instructions of the master within the sphere of employment. 
The court weighed up the totality of the factors and circumstances and 
concluded that there was indeed an intimate connection between the delict 
committed by the three policemen and the purposes of their employer.2so It is 
this close nexus between the employment and the rape, which led the 
Constitutional Court to conclude that the respondent was vicariously liable 
for the wrongful conduct of the policemen. It is argued that a finding of 
vicarious liability was a fair and just conclusion because by clothing 
policemen with power over K, the state materially enhanced a risk of abuse or 
misuse of such power. The extent of policemen's power over the victim was 
profound, and the vulnerability of the victim to the wrongful exercise of 
policemen's power made them an object of danger to the victim, the very 
person they were engaged to protect.281 The presence of this risk provided a 
strong link between the police's employment and the rape that ensued which 
was sufficient to ground vicarious liability on the part of the employer. 
278 Supra (n7) at para 48. 
279 Supra (n7) at para 57. 
280 Ibid. 
281 These are factors which the court considered in Bazley supra (n6) at para 41, to establish a 


















The outcome of NK (CC)282 is consistent with the Supreme Court of 
California judgment in Mary M v City of Los Angeles283 where a police officer, 
in uniform, stopped the plaintiff for erratic driving. Instead of taking her to 
the police station, he offered a lift to her house and raped her. The court held 
that the police officers are granted great power and control which includes 
power to detain persons at gunpoint, place them in handcuffs, remove them 
from their residences, order them into police cars, frisking them and in some 
circumstances, use deadly force.284 
The court found that 'in view of the considerable power and authority 
that police officers possess, it is neither startling nor unexpected that on 
occasion an officer will misuse that authority by engaging in assaultive 
conduct'.285 The court concluded that in carrying out these important 
responsibilities, the police act with the authority of the state and when police 
officers on duty misuse that formidable power to commit sexual assaults, the 
employer must be held accountable for their actions.286 
Sexual harassment might not be part of the job description but it can 
form part of the scope of employment when all the factors point to a close 
nexus between the wrongful conduct and employment. The Constitutional 
Court in NK took an opportunity to develop the common-law principle of 
vicarious liability especially the 'scope of employment' requirement, to accord 
with the purport, objects and spirit of the Constitution.287 It is argued that a 
strict application of vicarious liability in vacuum without reference to the 
Constitution, development in common-law jurisdictions and policy 
considerations, would have meant K's constitutional rights merely existed in 
letter and not in spirit. The Constitutional Court thus developed common-law 
in a way, which vindicated K's constitutional rights. 
282 Supra (n7). 
283 814 P 2d 1341 (1991). 
284 Supra (n283) at 1350. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Supra (n283) at 1352. 






















It is thus important that in applying the objective element of the test of 
vicarious liability, all relevant factors which include ubuntu, the Constitution 
and the legal convictions of the community must be taken into account. 
O'Regan J in NK (CC)288 relied on Canadian and English authorities289 and 
followed suit in developing the concept of frolic of one's own to cover 
negation of duty, which includes mismanagement of duties, and focused on 
the sufficiently close nexus between the wrongful conduct and the 
employment. It is submitted that mismanagement of duties, abuse of trust 
and power are the quintessence of the harm of sexual harassment in the 
workplace. The common-law test of vicarious liability developed in NK (CC)290 
is thus in harmony with the Canadian and English jurisprudence. 
7.8 Miscellaneous remedies 
In sexual harassment cases, the court may explore further alternative relief in 
terms of section 7 of the Domestic Violence Act and issue a protection order, 
which restrains the harasser: 
a) from committing an act of sexual harassment; 
b) from communicating with the complainant; 
c) from touching the plaintiff; and 
d) from posing a threat to the plaintiff's safety and security at work. 
Rubenstein rightly asserts that since sexual harassment 'may amount to a 
breach of contract, an action in the ordinary courts for a prohibitory 
injunction restraining future breaches might be worth considering'.291 
288 Ibid. 
289 Bazley supra (n6), Jacobi supra (n159) and Lister supra (n60). 
290 Supra (n7). 






















Guidance can be found in section 5 of the Domestic Violence Act,292 which 
gives the court power to issue an interim protection order against the 
respondent if there is prima facie evidence that the respondent is committing 
or has committed an act of domestic violence and undue hardship may be 
suffered by the complainant if the order is not issued. 
An interdict will thus be an alternative remedy to deter future acts of 
sexual harassment where there is no constructive dismissal on the part of the 
plaintiff and the perpetrator is not dismissed or relocated. Furthermore, an 
interdict has an effect of building Chinese walls between the plaintiff and the 
perpetrator, and restrains the perpetrator from further polluting the work 
environment with sexual harassment. 
7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted that the agency principle strictly applied is very 
narrow and employers would otherwise escape liability because sexual 
harassment would not be in the perpetrator's line of duty, mode of operation 
or within the scope of employment. The narrow approach to scope of 
employment is an example of a classic case cited by Barlow: 
A servant may be forbidden to pursue a certain line of conduct in the master' s office 
on the ground that it interferes with proper carrying on of the work, but if the 
forbidden act is one of a private nature it will not fall under the master' s control. A 
clerk can be forbidden to flirt with the lady typist as it is against the interests of the 
master to allow such conduct on the part of his staff. However, if the clerk carries on 
a flirtation with the master' s connivance, he cannot be held liable if the clerk kisses 
the typist, as his conduct with women is a matter over which the master cannot exert 
any control except to forbid it. 293 
The NK (CC) and Grabler cases294 must be applauded in giving a 
constitutional weight to the principle of vicarious liability to protect women. 
The outcome of Grabler (C)295 is of considerable importance for employers 
292 116 of1998. 
293 Barlow op cit (250) 128. 
294 NK (CC) supra (n7), Grabler (C) supra (n211) and Grabler (SCA) supra (n157). 








because it affirms the 'dim view our courts generally take of sexual 
harassment in the workplace and the employer who do not take the necessary 
steps to prevent or eliminate sexual harassment' .296 It is the first time that the 
High Court has found that sexual harassment does indeed form part of the 
scope of employment on the facts of the Grobler case.297 The High Court 
acknowledged the importance of enterprise risk approach in the context of 
sexual harassment whereby the employer's enterprise created and fostered 
the risk that ultimately led to the commission of the wrongful conduct.298 This 
is an important development of the law on sexual harassment in South Africa 
and is proof that the courts are willing to deliver the promise of equal 
protection before the law as enshrined in the Constitution. 
The 2005 Code has also made an important development of the law on 
sexual harassment by describing sexual harassment as conduct, which 
violates the rights of employees enshrined in the Bill of Rights.299 The 
Constitutional Court in NK300 stressed the policy dimension of vicarious 
liability and spelt out the relevant factors in a way that could be adapted to 
provide guidance for developing the scope of vicarious liability in cases of 
sexual harassment in the workplace, which include a minimum of the 
following guidelines: 
a) The mandate of the courts in terms of sections 8(3), 39(2) and 173 of 
the Constitution; 
b) The constitutional rights violated as a result of sexual harassment; 
c) The special fiduciary relationship which enhances the harasser's 
ability to exploit the trust and confidence of the plaintiff; 
296 C Mischke 'The Employer's Liability for Sexual Harassment - The High Court Makes New 
Law with Important Implications for Employers' (2004) 14 ContemporanJ Labour Law 5 at 10. 
297 Grabler (C) supra (n211). 
29s Ibid. 
299 Item 4 2005 Code. 








d) The extent to which the mismanagement of duties constitutes an 
improper way of executing authorised tasks or omitting to do that 
which the perpetrator is authorised to do; and 
e) Whether on the facts there is a sufficiently close link between the 
misuse of power and the employment. 
The South African, Canadian and English authorities have enhanced 
the principle of vicarious liability to stress a sufficiently strong link between 
the employment and the wrongful conduct - a nexus so strong that it would 
pass the limitation clause test in section 36 of the Constitution. In those 
instances (sufficiently strong link) it would be just and equitable to hold the 
employer vicariously liable in an open and democratic society. It has been 
established that the United States law on sexual harassment is well developed 
and the supervisor-approach to vicarious liability developed in quid pro quo 
cases attends to the core of sexual harassment in the workplace. Supervisory 
harassment is evidence that too much power leads to corruption of such 
power. The reality is that the supervisor is on a pedestal in the workplace and 
often uses his dominant organizational position to harass his subordinates 
because his comfort is that the fate of the plaintiff's career progress is in his 
hands.30l 
The Canadian approach in Bazley and Jacobi3D2 (close link between the 
wrongful conduct of the employee and the nature of employment) was 
regarded in NK (CC) 303 as compatible with the approach adopted in Rabie304 -
that is to say, 'sufficiently close link' (and not the enterprise risk approach) in 
Rabie. The development of sexual harassment law in Canada from the 
traditional 'scope of employment' test which served to exclude sexual 
301 See Ntsabo supra (n61) and Grabler (C) supra (n211) which involved supervisory 
harassment. 
302 Bazley supra (n6) and Jacobi supra (n159). 
303 Supra (n7) at para 43-4. 
















harassment claims as being 'personal'305 has been similarly abandoned in 
South Africa in Grabler (C).306 In South Africa, vicarious liability of employer 
has thus been expanded to take into account the context of the enterprise 
within which sexual harassment arises and making the employer accountable 
for the risks inherent in the running of that enterprise which enhances the 
probability of harm.307 
In English law, Lister3DB is an important authority for the fact that a 
negation of duty and doing the opposite of what the employee is ordered to 
do is still a breach of that duty and does not exclude vicarious liability. It is 
now established in English law that: 
[I]f the act of the servant which gives rise to the servant's liability to the plaintiff 
amounted to a failure by the servant to perform that duty, the act comes within 'the 
scope of his employment' and the employer is vicariously liable.309 
The South African courts in NK (CC)310 and in Grabler (C)311 have followed 
suit in viewing mismanagement of duties as falling within the scope of 
employment and law on sexual harassment has thus been developed to be in 
line with the English law. It is emphasized that the negation of duty approach 
is instructive in the context of sexual harassment. Lister312 is instructive 
because sexual harassment often involves abuse of power and taking 
advantage of the special position that the perpetrator holds in relation to the 
plaintiff. 
305 See Barrett v The Ship 'Arcadia' (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 535 (BCSC) where the court found that 
the defendant steamship company could not be held vicariously liable since the sexual assault 
on a passenger because the act was clearly separate and apart from, and unconnected with his 
employment as an passenger's steward. In a similar case, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
declined to impose vicarious liability in a sexual harassment case of Q v Minto Management 
Ltd (1986) 34 DLR (4th) 767 (Ont CA) where a tenant was raped in her apartment by the 
landlord's employee. The employee had access through his employment to the master keys 
for the apartment building. The court dismissed the claim for vicarious liability against the 
landlord for the sexual assault because it viewed the act of the employee as an independent 
personal act that was insufficiently related to the scope of employment. 
306 Supra (n211). 
307 Ibid. 
308 Supra (n60). 
309 Supra (n60) at para 59. 
310 Supra (n7). 
311 Supra (n212). 

















The effect of the illuminating developments in South Africa, Canada, 
United States and United Kingdom on the law of sexual harassment in the 
workplace has encouraged the employers to be more pro-active in preventing 
and remedying sexual harassment in the workplace whilst offering broader 
legal redress for victims of sexual harassment. In the light of recent judicial 
precedents in South Africa, the principle of vicarious liability can no longer be 
rigidly applied whilst ignoring the constitutional mandate313 and rationale 
behind vicarious liability. 















Chapter Eight - Jurisdiction 
8.1 Outline 
The aim of this chapter is to deal with jurisdictional issues facing the plaintiff 
in the case of sexual harassment who must therefore choose which court will 
entertain her case. This will also depend on whether the cause of action is 
based in delict or in labour law. The jurisdictional defence in terms of the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act1 ('COIDA') which 
deals with the substitution of compensation for other legal remedies will be 
scrutinized and discussed. 
8.2 The scope of the jurisdiction of the courts 
Le Roux, Orleyn and Rycroft submit that 'if the cause of action is unfair 
discrimination, the EEA is the appropriate law under which to institute 
proceedings; if the cause of action is a delict, the common-law is the 
appropriate law, and the two are not in conflict'.2 Unfair discrimination is 
unlawful conduct, which is also in violation of section 9 of the Bill of Rights. 
The action for unfair discrimination could be grounded in delict and brought 
before the High Court, and not the Labour Court. In some matters, there is an 
overlap and the Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High 
Court, and not mere absence of conflict. 3 
Remedies under the LRA for unfair labour practice 'are not exhaustive 
of the remedies that might be available to employees in the course of the 
employment relationship' since sexual harassment can 'constitute both an 
"unfair labour practice" (against which the Act provides a specific remedy) 
1 130 of 1993. 
2 R le Roux, T Orleyn and A Rycroft Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and 
Processes (2005) at 77. 


















and it also might give rise to other rights of action.'4 O'Regan J correctly held 
in Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Capes that' as there is no 
general jurisdiction afforded to the Labour Court in employment matters, the 
jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted by s 157(1)' of the LRA 'simply 
because a dispute is one that falls within the overall sphere of employment 
relations'. Similarly, the Labour Court has 'concurrent jurisdiction' with the 
High Court in respect of any labour matters where a constitutional dispute is 
raised.6 The plaintiff therefore has an option to institute proceedings in either 
the Labour Court or the High Court, and the High Court's jurisdiction will 
only be ousted in respect of matters that 'are to be determined' by the Labour 
Court in terms of section 157(1) of the LRA.7 
If the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the statutory claims of 
unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA and unfair dismissal (and unfair 
labour practice) in terms of the LRA, then the claims are based on causes of 
action that do not exist at common-law and for which relief is not available at 
common-law.s The High Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to entertain 
the aforementioned claims, unless the cause of action is founded on common-
law principles.9 The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction on causes of 
action based on the LRA provisions or in terms of any other labour matters to 
be determined by the labour court.10 Therefore, if both the EEA (and/ or the 
LRA) and delict claims are brought by the plaintiff, then two separate courts 
will hear the matter. 
4 United National Public Servants Association of South Africa v Digomo NO (2005) 26 ILJ 1957 
(SCA) at para 4. 
5 2002 (2) SA 693 (CC) at para 40. See also s 157(1) LRA which reads: 
Subject to the Constitution and section 173 [which deals with the Labour Appeal 
Court], and except where this Act provides otherwise the Labour Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in terms of 
any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court. 
6 Transnet Limited v PNN Chinva [2006] SCA 131 (RSA) at para 6. 
7 Fredericks supra (n5) at para 40. 
8 Orr and another v University of South Africa (2004) 25 ILJ 1484 (LC) at 14901-lA. 
9 Orr supra (n8) at 491A. 


















If the cause of action is statutory unfair discrimination in terms of the 
EEA, then the plaintiff's claim is based in labour law and the labour court is 
the appropriate forum to hear the case.11 This means that the plaintiff has 
based her claim of statutory compensation and damages in terms of section 50 
of the EEA. Similarly, a plaintiff can bring a claim for vicarious liability under 
the provisions of section 60 of the EEA (Labour Court jurisdiction) and/ or 
frame her claim in terms of the common-law principles of vicarious liability 
(High Court jurisdiction).12 
The advantage with a claim of sentimental loss and gender 
discrimination under the EEA is that the award for compensation and 
damages is not capped in that the Labour Court can make any appropriate 
order that is just and equitable where the employee has been unfairly 
discriminated against.13 It must be noted that a delictual claim for iniuria is 
also not capped under the actio iniuriarum. The advantage of pursuing the 
remedy in labour law is that the Labour Court will be more inclined to 
uphold the values underlying the EEA taking into account the discriminatory 
effect and the discriminatory context (workplace) in which sexual harassment 
occurred. 
The High Court could refer to the EEA' s protection against unfair 
discrimination when determining unlawfulness of conduct as a determinant 
of legal convictions of the community. If a claim is based on unfair dismissal 
and unfair labour practice in terms of the LRA, the award for compensation is 
capped at an equivalent of 12 months remuneration for an unfair dismissal 
and at 24 months remuneration for an automatically unfair dismissal.14 In 
Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt15 the court made a distinction between a cause 
of action based on fairness of conduct, a matter to be adjudicated by the 
11 Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) and Christian v Colliers Properties [2005] 5 
BLLR479. 
12 Le Roux et al op cit (n2) 77. 
13 Ss 50(1)-(2) EEA. 
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Labour Court; and a cause of action based on unlawfulness of conduct, a 
matter which can also be adjudicated by the High Court. 
It is submitted that in delict, 'unlawfulness' is judged against the 
objective standard of the bani mores of the community viewed against the 
backdrop of the letter and spirit of the Constitution with a view of protecting 
the rights of the plaintiff against unfair discrimination and gender inequality 
in the workplace. 'Unfairness' in labour law is not defined. However, 
guidance on the meaning of 'fairness' can be found in NEHA WU v University 
of Cape Town and Others16 where the Constitutional Court held that, in the 
context of the meaning of the concept of 'fair labour practice', 'what is fair 
depends upon the circumstances of a particular case and essentially involves 
a value judgment. It is therefore neither necessary nor desirable to define this 
concept' .17 The court further held that 'in giving content to this concept the 
courts and tribunals will have to seek guidance from domestic and 
international experience' .1s The court concluded that the focus of the 
constitutional right to fair labour practice is: 
The relationship between the worker and the employer and the continuation of that 
relationship on terms that are fair to both. In giving content to that right, it is 
important to bear in mind the tension between the interests of the workers and the 
interests of the employers which is inherent in labour relations. Care must be taken to 
accommodate, where possible, these interests so as to arrive at the balance required 
by the concept of fair labour practices. It is in this context that the LRA must be 
construed. 
This means that in the context of the LRA, fairness involves a weighing 
up and balancing process of competing interests of the employee and 
employer, taking into account the precepts of equity and reasonableness in 
the totality of circumstances. It is argued that the Constitution has unified the 
standard used when determining 'fairness' in the LRA and 'unlawfulness' in 
delict. This is so because sections 8(3), 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution 
mandate the courts when interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
common-law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
16 2003(2) BCLR 154 (CC). 
17 NEHAWU supra (n16) at para 33. 





















In Media 24 Limited, Gasant Samuels v Sonja Grobler,19 relying on 
Wolfaardt2D, the court rejected the claim that Grobler' s case was unfair labour 
practice to be heard by the Labour Court in terms of the LRA. The court 
further held that a dispute about the unlawfulness of an employer conduct as 
opposed to unfairness was not a matter to be heard by the Labour Court, and 
the High Court jurisdiction was thus not ousted. Grogan correctly submits 
that whether the distinction in Grabler (SCA)21 based on unlawfulness and 
actions based on unfairness holds merely because of the adjective 'unfair' is 
debatable.22 
The court in Grabler (SCA)23 reasoned its rejection for a case of 'unfair 
labour practice' out of context when it relied on the Wolfaardt24 principle 
based on the adjective 'unfair'. One of the jurisdictional defences raised was 
that Grobler' s case was unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA and as such 
the Labour Court was the appropriate court to hear the matter in terms of 
section 10 of the EEA. This defence was rejected because the EEA was not yet 
in force at the time the cause of action arose.25 It is therefore interesting to 
enquire what would have been the court's reasoning in rejecting the 
jurisdictional defence based on 'unfair discrimination' if the EEA had been in 
force at the time the cause of action arose. 
It is argued that Grobler' s cause of action was based in delict because 
the employer had negligently remained passive and permitted a hostile 
environment to ensue in breach of its legal obligation to protect the plaintiff 
and to ensure safe working conditions at its workplace.26 It is for this reason 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal correctly rejected the jurisdictional defence 
19 [2005] 7 BLLR 649 (SCA) at para 76. 
20 Supra (n3). 
21 Supra (n19). 
22 J Grogan 'Damages for Sexual Harassment: When Employers are Liable' (2005) 21 
Employment Law 11 at 16. 
23 Supra (n19). 
24 Supra (n3). 
25 Supra (n19) at para 75. 




















that the Labour Court was the appropriate court to hear this matter and not 
merely on the differentiation between 'unlawfulness' and 'unfairness'. 
Grogan rightly submits that a finding that a person has committed 
unfair discrimination is therefore a finding that a person had acted 
unlawfully.27 However, the Supreme of Appeal in Wolfaardt noted the 
relevance of the plaintiff's cause of action by stating that where the subject of 
the employee's complaint is 'unlawfulness', it matters not that coincidentally 
the conduct might also be 'unfair' because that is not the gist of the 
employee's complaint.28 It is submitted that it is not considered that an 
employee's right to claim damages at common-law based on an employer's 
vicarious liability for sexual harassment be excluded in cases where a remedy 
in terms of the EEA is available. 
Furthermore, statutory and common-law remedies exist side by side in 
the context of discrimination against employees. However, the minority 
judgment in Wolfaardt29 indicates why this is by no means self-evident in the 
context of dismissal. Froneman AJA, outlined the central importance of the 
Constitution and noted that the LRA gives content to the constitutional right 
to fair labour practice by way of a right not to be unfairly dismissed.30 
Furthermore, Froneman AJA, felt that it is inconceivable how an unlawful 
dismissal would not also be an unfair dismissal and that dismissal on grounds 
of unlawful breach of the contract of employment by an employer is unfair 
dismissal which must be exclusively dealt with by the Labour Court in terms 
of the LRA. 31 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal correctly entertained 
Grobler's case on 'unlawfulness' because the subject matter of her complaint 
was 'unlawfulness' (delict) and not 'unfairness' (labour law). She could 
27 Grogan op cit (n22} 16. 
28 Supra (n3) at para 27. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Wolfaardt supra (n3) at para 32. 




















therefore not be forced to seek statutory remedies in terms of the LRA and the 
EEA on 'unfairness' when her grounds of complaint were clearly set out and 
based on common-law principles of 'unlawfulness'. This is distinguishable 
from the position in the United Kingdom, where common law remedies are 
no longer available in relation to the fairness of dismissal and 'a common law 
right embracing the manner in which an employee is dismissed cannot 
satisfactorily co-exist with the statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed' .32 
Exceptionally, the employee is not precluded from bringing common law 
claims for damages arising from the manner of dismissal which flow directly 
from the employer's failure to act fairly when taking steps leading to 
dismissal because 'the employee has a common law cause of action which 
precedes, and is independent of, his subsequent dismissal' .33 
8.3 Jurisdictional defence in terms of the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 ('COIDA') 
The employer often raises the jurisdictional defence to bar the employee from 
bringing a civil claim against the employer. Section 35(1) of the COIDA deals 
with the substitution of compensation for other legal remedies and provides 
as follows: 
No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for recovery of 
damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement 
or death of such employee against such employee's employer, and no liability for 
compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of 
this Act in respect of such disablement or death. 
The scope and application of the jurisdictional defence was confirmed 
in Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour intervening)34 
where the Constitutional Court held that the COIDA is an exclusive remedy 
which serves to remove the employee's right to claim common-law damages. 
32 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13 at para 2. 
33 Eastwood & another v Magnox Electric Plc; McCabe v Cornwall County Council & others [2004] 
UKHL 35 at para 29. 





















The court further held that payment of compensation is not dependent on the 
employer's negligence or ability to pay nor is the amount subject to reduction 
by reason of the employee's contributory negligence.35 This reasoning is 
consistent with the United States authority in Sheehan v Delaney,36 where the 
court held that the mischief 'underlying the workers' compensation system is 
that, in exchange for prompt payment of income and medical benefits to 
injured workers, employers are immune from tort liability' and 'both 
employers and employees are entitled to the benefits of the Act without 
regard to fault'. 
Rycroft and Perumal recommend that in the light of serious delays and 
legal costs involved, litigation is an inefficient alternate dispute resolution 
mechanism.37 The writers proceed to outline the merit of the workers' 
compensation in sexual harassment claims in terms of the COIDA whereby 
the plaintiff employee will acquire 'the right to compensation without the 
expensive and complicated process of establishing negligence and liability' .38 
Rycroft and Perumal have a point that not everyone has access to the common-
law courts and can afford costly and lengthy legal proceedings. Furthermore, 
no fault has to be proved in the COIDA claim. However, it is suggested that 
workers' compensation for sexual harassment would serve to trivialise the 
harm of sexual harassment and cause regression in combating sexual 
harassment in the workplace. Sexual harassment is contrary to the spirit of 
corporate governance and employers must exercise due diligence by taking 
responsibility for sexual harassment which should not be reduced to a case of 
workers' compensation. 
A disadvantage with the jurisdictional defence can be found in section 
22(1) of the COIDA which states that compensation shall be payable 'if an 
35 Supra (n32) at 146. 
36 238 Ga App 662,521 SE 2d 585 (1999) at 663. 
37 A Rycroft and D Perumal 'Compensating the Sexually Harassed Employee' (2004) 25 ILJ 




















employee meets with an accident resulting in his disablement or death'. It is 
submitted that sexual harassment affects the psychological well-being of the 
plaintiff but does not necessarily result in serious disability (which must be 
verified by the medical report)39 or death. Absence of serious disability or 
death because of sexual harassment would leave the plaintiff without remedy 
in terms of the COIDA. 
The relevance of the jurisdictional defence in sexual harassment is 
doubtful because sexual harassment violates public policy40 and bani mores. 
Even if sexual harassment were to be found to fall under the COIDA, the 
plaintiff would still be left without remedy since the COIDA compensates for 
pecuniary loss only.41 In terms of Jooste, 42 section 35(1) of COIDA deprives the 
plaintiff of the right to a common-law claim for damages yet the harm of sexual 
harassment often consists of non-pecuniary loss arising from violation of 
personality rights, which entails damage to the plaintiff's self-esteem, dignity, 
reputation, and privacy. 
It is emphasized that sexual harassment is neither an injury nor a 
disease as intended by the legislature; nor does sexual harassment arise 
because of an 'accident' in the sense of a mistake or a catastrophe.43 Sexual 
39 S 42 COIDA. 
40 See Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc v Sequoia Ins Co 14 Cal App 4th 1595, 18 Cal Rptr 2d 692 Cal 
App 1 Dist (1993) where the court held that the public and statutory policy against sexual 
harassment of employees, would not be well served by a ruling which would exonerate a 
perpetrator from payment of damages for his own wilful act of sexual gratification, by 
shifting such liability to an insurer. See also B & E Convalescent Center v State Compensation Ins 
Fund 8 Cal App 4th 78, 9 Cal Rptr 2d 894 (1992) where the court held that indemnification by 
insurance for the conduct was precluded and that any other conclusion would undermine not 
only the strong statutory policy behind worker's compensation, but also the substantial and 
firmly established polices embodied in the anti-discrimination statutes that were alleged to 
have been violated. 
41 See Popovich v Irlando 811 P 2d 379 (Colo 1991) at 384, where the court held that the 
Workers' Compensation Act is designed to compensate an injured worker for a work-related 
injury or disease, along with associated medical and other costs, and the concomitant loss of 
earning capacity resulting in permanent or temporary industrial disability to the injured 
worker. 
42 Supra (n34) at para 14. 
43 See Employers Ins Co v Wright 108 Ga App 380, 133 SE 2d 39 (1963) where the court held that 
words 'arising out of' mean that there must be some causal connection between the 



















harassment is a premeditated act whereas occupational injuries arise because 
of accidents and are by their very nature employment disasters.44 This means 
that the jurisdictional defence of barring an action by a victim of sexual 
harassment in terms of the CO IDA cannot hold water. 
A jurisdictional defence set out in section 35(1) of the COIDA was 
raised in Grabler (SCA).45 The first appellant pleaded that the respondent's 
action was one envisaged by section 35(1) of the COIDA and that the 
respondent was barred from bringing an action against her employer other 
than in terms of the COIDA. The court held that the psychological disorder 
from which the respondent has been suffering was ultimately contracted 
because of the harassment, did not occur in the course of employment but 
rather while she was engaged in her own private activity, namely trying to 
sell her flat to the second appellant.46 
The Supreme Court of Appeal thus dismissed this defence as being 
without merit and held that the present action was not one brought in terms 
of the COIDA.47 It is argued that the jurisdictional defence in the COIDA 
would not have succeeded even if the Supreme Court of Appeal had found 
the incident to be in the course of employment and not whilst engaged in a 
private activity, because in terms of the COIDA the incident must also 
simultaneously arise out of employment. Both elements must be satisfied48 
reasoned that an accident must be one resulting from a risk reasonably incidental to the 
employment and that a risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to, or is 
connected with, what a workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service. 
44 In SCI Liquidating Corp v Hartford Ins Co 272 Ga 293, 526 SE 2d 555 (2000) the court held that 
the worker's compensation did not apply where a claim originated from a sexual harassment. 
45 Supra (n19). 
46 Supra (n19) at para 77. 
47 Ibid. 
48 The difference between the terms 'in the course of' and 'arising out of' employment was 
explained in Popovich supra (n41) at 383, where the court held that: 
In the "course of employment" generally refers to "the time, place and circumstances 
under which the injury occurred" .. .. The "course of employment" requirement is 
satisfied when it is shown that the injury occurred within the time and place limits of 
the employment relation and during an activity that had some connection with the 
employee's job-related functions .... The term "arising out of'' is narrower than the 



















since 'these are two distinct concepts' and 'arising out of employment is the 
wider of the two concepts' .49 
In Ntsaboso the employer raised a jurisdictional defence and argued that 
the post-traumatic stress suffered by Ntsabo was a condition that should be 
dealt with in terms of the COIDA. The court dismissed the jurisdictional 
defence raised by the employer under the COIDA and noted as follows: 
The condition of the Applicant was clearly brought on by conduct which fell outside 
the boundaries of the duties, directly and indirectly, of both Mr Dlomo and the 
applicant. The conduct of which the applicant complained did not fall anywhere 
within the job description of Mr Dlomo or that of the applicant. Consequently the 
condition of the applicant does not fall within the confines of the COIDA as it did not 
involve a condition listed in Schedule 3 thereof and neither did it arise from or in the 
course and scope of her employment (nor indeed his) .51 
The court in Ntsabo52 reasoned that since sexual harassment was not in 
the course of employment in the sense that it fell outside of the perpetrator's 
job description, then the wrongful conduct fell outside the confines of the 
COIDA. It is worth comparing Ntsabo53 with K v Minister of Safety and 
Security54 where the Constitutional Court held that rape was indeed within 
the scope of employment because there was a close nexus between the delict 
committed by policemen and the purposes of the employer. The court 
reasoned that at the time of commission of rape, the policemen were 
simultaneously failing in their constitutional and statutory duties to protect K, 
and they infringed her rights to dignity and security of the person.ss 
One asks oneself what will be court's reasoning in future when 
dismissing the jurisdictional defence in terms of the COIDA if the 
employment when it has its origin in an employee's work-related functions and is 
sufficiently related thereto as to be considered part of the employee's service to the 
employer in connection with the contract of employment. 
49 C Thompson and P Benjamin South African Labour Law (2006) 2 at Hl-16. 
so Supra (nll). 
51 Supra (nll) at 97. 
52 Supra (nll). 
53 Ibid. 
54 [2005] 8 BLLR 749 (CC). 






















Constitutional Court in NK56 has now found sexual harassment to be in the 
course and scope of employment contrary to the strict traditional approach 
that sexual harassment was not part of job description. In Grabler (SCA)57 
Farlam JA noted that 'it may well be that employees who contract psychiatric 
disorders as a result of acts of sexual harassment to which they are subjected 
in the course of their employment can claim compensation under section 65'. 
Even though Grabler (SCA)58 found sexual harassment to be 'in the course of' 
employment and did not discard the possibility of the jurisdictional defence 
being successfully invoked, the COIDA remedy will fail because sexual 
harassment does not 'arise out of' and 'in the course of' employment. For the 
purposes of the COIDA an accident59 or a disease60 must 'arise out of' and 'in 
the course of' employment- 'in workers' compensation law, the terms "in the 
course of" and "arising out of" are not synonymous' .61 
Although decided in terms of earlier statutes, case law illustrates that both 
requirements must be independently satisfied to give substance to the 
meaning of 'arise out of and in the course of employment' in terms of 
COIDA.62 The criteria used was substantially identical in deciding whether 
the accident 'arose out of and in the course of employment' in the terms of the 
section 25 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941. In Human v 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner63 Ramsbottom J held that the question 
whether an accident arose out of or in the course of a workman's employment 
may be a pure question of fact, or it may be a question of law, and in the latter 
case it may be a question as to the interpretation of the Act. 
56 Supra (n54). 
57 Supra (n19) at para 77. 
ss Supra (n19). 
5951 COIDA. 
60 S 65(1)(a) COIDA. 
61 Popovich supra (n41) at 383. 
62 See Augustyn v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1948 (1) SA 115 (T); Ward v Workmen's 
Compensation Commissioner 1962 (1) SA 728 (T); and Western Platinum Ltd v Santam Insurance 
Ltd. 1994 (1) SA 480 (W). 



















In Ward v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,64 Hiemstra J held that 
control by the employer is the correct test to establish the 'course of 
employment'. It is submitted that in the context of CO IDA, the course of 
employment assesses whether the employee was at the employer's beck and 
call at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the nexus between the accident 
and the employment must be sufficiently strong as to bring the accident 
within the scope of employment.65 Rumpf£ JA defined the term 'arise out of 
employment' in Minister of Justice v Khoza66 to mean 'in a broad sense a causal 
relationship between employment and accident' . Rumpff67 JA went on to list 
exceptions of what would not 'arise out of employment', as follows: 
It is in any case clear that the causal connection for the purposes of the Act will be 
absent, inter alia, if the accident is of such a nature that the workman would have 
sustained the injuries even if he was at a place other than that required by his 
employment or when the workman by his own act removes the relationship between 
the accident and employment or when the workman is intentionally injured by 
another and the motive for the assault has no relationship with the duties of the 
workman. 
Rumpf£ JA' s judgment in Khoza6B is of relevance in the context of sexual 
harassment in that it involves intentional wrongdoing, which has no causal 
correlation to the employee's duties and the employment to conclude that it 
arose out of employment. The fact that sexual harassment occurred in the 
workplace is incidental and the employment is not a sine qua non of sexual 
harassment, and is thus not sufficient to 'arise out of employment'. The causal 
link contemplated by COIDA between sexual harassment and the 
employment is demonstrably absent; sexual harassment is not part of the 
modus operandi of the employment activities in order to form part of the terms 
and conditions of employment. In order to 'arise out of employment', 
Mureinik69 emphasized that 'the employment need only be a sine qua non of 
the accident'. It is argued that sexual harassment does not arise out of 
64 1962 (1) SA 728 (T). 
65 Augustyn v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1948 (1) SA 115 (T) at 118. 
66 1966 (1) SA 410 (A) at417D. 
67 Khoza supra (n66) at 417G-H. 
68 Ibid. 
69 E Mureinik 'Workmen's Compensation and the Mugging that Arose "out of" Employment' 

















employment because 'as a matter of policy, sexual harassment is not a risk 
inherently connected to the employment relationship' .7o 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted that the plaintiff is at liberty to frame her remedy 
in any area of law and the defendant cannot object to her preferred remedy 
merely because it coincides with another course of remedy. It has also been 
shown that any attempt to substitute the jurisdictional defence for the 
common-law remedies must be discouraged. Sexual harassment does not 'arise 
out of employment' and is not compensable in terms of the COIDA because 
sexual harassment is 'specific to the victim'71 and is not' attributable to neutral 
or unexplained sources which would have injured any person who happened 
to be in the position of the claimant at the time and place in question' .72 It is 
clear from the pre-amble of the COIDA that its purpose is to provide 
compensation for disablement or death caused by occupational injuries or 
diseases and 'nothing in the Workers' Compensation Act suggests that it is 
intended to cover injuries resulting from sexual harassment'73 and 'nowhere is 
sexual harassment expressly addressed in the Act' .74 The jurisdictional 
defence under the COIDA is in fact an inefficient loophole for the non-diligent 
employer who wants to evade his common-law duty of care and statutory 
obligations in the EEA. 
70 Horodyskyj v Karanian 32 P 3d 470 (Colo 2001) at 476-7. 
71 Popovich supra (n41) at 383. 
72 Ibid. 

















Chapter Nine - Criminal Remedies 
9.1 Outline 
Women simply want to be left alone in the workplace to do their jobs. Women don't 
want to use the law to gain advantage, to get revenge or to put themselves in 
positions of power. In virtually every case in which a woman has turned to the courts 
for help, she has done so in desperation after other efforts to solve the problem have 
failed.1 
The victim of sexual harassment may have recourse in criminal law because 
the elements of what constitutes 'sexual harassment' are specific offences in 
themselves in our criminal law, and thus warrant prosecution. This chapter 
discusses an overlap between the harm of sexual harassment and various 
specific offences in the criminal context. 
9.2 Specific crimes involved in sexual harassment 
The conduct of sexual harassment can potentially include specific offences2, 
which are: 
a) Indecent assault; 
b) Common assault; 
c) Crimen iniuria; 
d) Rape;and 
e) Extortion. 
It is submitted that under these crimes, there is no question of vicarious 
liability on the part of the employer for the wrongful act committed and the 
accused is liable personally under the principles of criminal law in that he 
1 W Petrocelli and BK Repa Sexual Harassment on the Job 4ed (1998) at 1. 
2 See also para 4.6.3.2 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 85 (Project 107) 
'Sexual Offence: The Substantive Law' (1999) which states that: 
The actions included in the definition of sexual harassment may constitute criminal 
charges, for example, indecent assault, assault, crimen iniuria or even rape. 



















himself is answerable for the sexual offence and crime committed. The state 
prosecution has to discharge the onus beyond reasonable doubt and is heavier 
than the onus in a civil suit where the plaintiff has to prove her case on 
balance of probabilities. 
9.2.1 Indecent Assault 
The crime of indecent assault consists in 'an assault, which by nature or 
design is of an indecent character'3 and is directed with intent to assault 
indecently4• This is a crime of a sexual nature, which is prevalent in sexual 
harassment cases as in Ntsabo v Real Security cc,s where the harasser 
unlawfully touched the victim's breasts, thighs, buttocks, genitals and 
simulated a sexual act on her, which resulted in him ejaculating on her skirt. 
On the facts, Ntsabo could have proceeded criminally against the perpetrator 
on grounds of indecent assault. 
9.2.2 Common assault 
Common assault is another extreme form of sexual harassment in that it 
involves use of physical violence or threat of physical violence. The crime of 
assault consists in 'unlawfully and intentionally: 
a) applying force to the person of another, or 
b) inspiring a belief in that other person that force is immediately to be 
applied to him or her'. 6 
3 J Burchell and J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) at 691. 
4 Burchell and Milton op cit (n3) 698. 
s [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC). 





















In Ntsabo7 case the essentials of a crime of assault were satisfied in that the 
defendant entered the guardroom where Ntsabo was having her lunch, and 
closed the door with a piece of wire. He proceeded to put his firearm, on the 
table near where she was seated and threatened to shoot her if she broke her 
silence and screamed. It is submitted that Dlomo aroused fear on the victim 
that physical force was about to be applied on her. 
9.2.3 Crimen iniuria 
The crime of crimen iniuria consists in 'unlawfully and intentionally impairing 
the dignity or privacy of another person'.s These personally rights are also 
entrenched in section 10 and 14 of the Bill of Rights. The need for a criminal 
sanction (as opposed to civil redress for impairment of dignity) is actuated by 
the seriousness of impairment in that 'there are some insults to the dignity of 
a human being that are so gross as to evoke public outrage and to call for 
public denunciation through criminal law'.9 
9.2.4 Rape 
Rape is an extreme case of sexual harassment, which displays 'total contempt 
for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim'; and 'short of 
homicide, it is the ultimate violation of self' .10 Rape exists along with other 
forms of sexual assault and 'it belongs to that class of indignities against the 
person that cannot ever be fully righted, and that diminishes all humanity' .11 
7 Supra (n5). 
8 Burchell and Milton op cit (n3) 746. See ch 5.2 on the discussion of the common-law remedy 
for an impairment of dignity under the actio iniuriarum. 
9 Burchell and Milton op cit (n3) 747. 
10 Coker v Georgia 97 S Ct 2861 (1977) at 2869. 



















The crime of rape consists in 'intentional unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
woman without her consent' .12 
9.2.5 Extortion 
It is argued that extortion is prevalent in quid pro quo sexual harassment where 
the harasser intimidates his victims by promising good career prospects if 
they comply with his sexual demands and threatens a tangible employment 
detriment for non-compliance. The crime of extortion consists in 'taking from 
another some patrimonial advantage by intentionally and unlawfully 
subjecting that person to pressure, which induces him or her to submit to the 
taking' .13 The mischief of the crime of extortion seeks to outlaw blackmail or 
intimidation to obtain an advantage, which is not lawfully due to the extorter. 
An extraction of an advantage is thus a material feature in the crime of 
extortion, 'whether or not such advantage is of a patrimonial nature' .14 
12 Burchell and Milton op cit (n3) 699. See also K v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] 8 BLLR 
749 (CC) where the employer was held vicariously liable for the rape of K by policemen. The 
gender-specific definition of the common-law offence of rape is currently in the process of 
substantial reformation in terms of the Criminal Law (Sexual and Related Matters) 
Amendment Bill [BSOB-2003] and replacing it with a new expanded statutory offence of rape, 
applicable to all forms of sexual penetration without consent, irrespective of gender. 
13 Burchell and Milton op cit (n3) 826. 
14 In Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v ], S v Von Molendorff1989 (4) SA 1028 (A) at 10411-
2A, the court saw no need to distinguish between instances where intimidation is applied to 
secure a patrimonial or a non patrimonial advantage. The court thus held that: 
According to communis opinio ... which runs through our common-law like a golden 
thread, the benefit in extortion should either be money or a patrimonial benefit. If 
there is a need in the community for extortion to be extended, it is a matter of policy 
for the consideration of the Legislature. 
The common-law crime of extortion has been developed and the advantage in extortion can 
now be non-patrimonial in nature as provided for in sl of the General Law Amendment Act 
139 of 1992 which states that: 
At criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with extortion it shall with 
respect to the object of the extortion be sufficient to prove that any advantage was 

















9.3 Past sexual history 
In criminal law, the 'defendant's belief in consent' is 'assessed exclusively 
from the defendant's point of view'.15 Evidence about the victim's past sexual 
history is often admitted 'as being relevant to both the honesty of the 
defendant's belief in consent and the credibility of the victim's assertion that 
she did not consent' .16 Zeffertt has correctly submitted the cautionary 
approach to be adopted as follows: 
What is called for ... is an enlightened attitude, on the one hand, that eschews baseless 
and archaic beliefs, such as that, because a victim consented to intercourse with X she 
was the kind of person who would consent to it with Y, or that, because a woman 
consented to intercourse with X on one occasion, she did so on another; but on the 
other hand, the courts should realize that sexual conduct may sometimes have a 
relevance. Since no two cases are exactly alike, ' precedents' must be handled with 
caution.17 
The court has discretion to admit past sexual history of the 
complainant if it is satisfied, that such evidence or questioning is 'relevant'.18 
This is similar to Federal rule of evidence 412(a) which creates a presumption 
that past sexual history is inadmissible by stating that evidence of an alleged 
victim's 'sexual behaviour' or 'sexual predisposition' is inadmissible, with 
limited exceptions, in all 'civil or criminal proceeding[ s] involving alleged 
1s S Jagwanth, PJ Schwikkard and B Grant Women and the Law (1994) at 76. 
16 Ibid. See also S v Zuma 2006 (7) BCLR 790 (W) at para 37, Van der Merwe J admitted cross 
examination and evidence on the complainant's past sexual history and reasoned as follows: 
In my judgment the purpose of the cross-examination and the evidence the defence 
wanted to lead concerning the complainant's behaviour in the past was not to show 
that she misbehaved with other men. In fact it was aimed at showing misconduct in 
the sense of falsely accusing men in the past. The cross-examination and evidence are 
relevant to the issue of consent in the present matter, the question of motive and 
indeed credibility as well. It was not aimed at showing that the complainant was a 
woman of questionable morals. It was aimed at the investigation of the real issues in 
this matter and was fundamental to the accused's defence. 
17 DT Zeffertt, AP Paizes and A St Q Skeen The South African Law of Evidence (2003) at 247. 
18 Past sexual history of the plaintiff maybe only be admissible as evidence with the 
permission of the court in terms of section 227(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as 
amended which states that: 
Evidence as to sexual intercourse by, or any sexual experience of, any female against 
or in connection with whom any offence of a sexual nature is alleged to have been 
committed, shall not be adduced, and such female shall not be questioned regarding 
such sexual intercourse or sexual experience, except with the leave of the court, 
which leave shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that such evidence or 
questioning is relevant: Provided that such evidence may be adduced and such 





















sexual misconduct' .19 Rule 412(b)(2)20 in a civil case creates an exception that 
'otherwise admissible' evidence may only be introduced if the proponent can 
show that 'its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to 
any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party'. 
In Wolak v Spucci21 the court held that rule 412, which explicitly 
includes civil cases involving sexual misconduct, encompasses sexual 
harassment lawsuits. The court held that the evidence of plaintiff's sexual 
behaviour was inadmissible because it was of marginal relevance. The court 
concluded that: 
Whether a sexual advance was welcome, or whether an alleged victim in fact 
perceived an environment to be sexually offensive, does not turn on the private 
sexual behaviour of the alleged victim, because a woman's expectations about her 
work environment cannot be said to change depending upon her sexual 
sophistication. 22 
It is submitted that evidence of the plaintiff's sexual conduct whilst 
'on-duty, at the workplace, and with the named defendants is relevant'.23 
Evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual history is not relevant in the context of 
sexual harassment in the workplace (unless the plaintiff had an intimate 
relationship with the defendant). It is suggested that the plaintiff's behaviour 
in her private life is very different to her expected professional and ethical 
behaviour in the workplace. In the workplace, the plaintiff expects her labour 
and constitutional rights to be protected because violation thereof would 
threaten her livelihood and career progress. 
It is highlighted that past sexual history of the complainant with the 
accused is relevant to establish 'consent', complainant's credibility and the 
accused honest comprehension of consent. However, evidence of the 
plaintiff:s sexual conduct 'while she was off-duty, outside the workplace and 
which did not involve conduct with the named defendants' is not 
19 Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 412, 28 USCA (1978) as amended in 1994. 
20 Ibid. 
21 217 F 3d 157 (2d Cir 2000). 
22 Wolak supra (n21) at 160. 

















admissible.24 Therefore, 'other evidence, such as non-workplace conduct, is 
irrelevant and inadmissible' .25 
9.4 Conclusion 
A criminal remedy is essential in ensuring that the perpetrators pay for their 
crimes through punishment 'exacted by the State rather than the victim of the 
crime'.26 The victim can then seek compensation and damages through civil 
redress against the employer. The essence of this chapter has shown that it is 
logical for the perpetrator to be punished for the crime he has committed 
because in many instances he is a man of straw who is unlikely to be 
financially able to pay for civil damages. It has been noted that criminal 
remedies are less viable to pursue because of the onerous burden of proof in 
criminal law requiring the state to prove beyond reasonable doubt before the 
court can find the perpetrator liable. Furthermore, the judiciary is accustomed 
to dealing with traditional instances of crimes as specific offences and thus 
may be reluctant to recognize the crime of sexual harassment within the 
existing framework of these crimes. 
24 Supra (n23) at 136. 
25 Holt v Welch A llyn Inc 2000 WL 98118 (NDNY 2000) at 1. 





















Chapter Ten - Conclusion 
If the first woman God ever made was strong enough to turn the world upside down 
all alone, these women together ought to be able to turn it back, and get it right side 
up again! And now they is asking to do it, the men better let them.1 
The cumulative effect of this thesis has highlighted that sexual harassment 
must not be viewed as an isolated and independent act but must be examined 
in the context and circumstances in which it occurs. The thesis has provided 
evidence that in many instances, a harasser is not a stranger to his master and 
on a frolic of his own but harasses in his capacity as a supervisor, confidant or 
caretaker. It is concluded that the challenge of accomplishing gender equality 
is the same as that facing South Africa after the apartheid era in that people's 
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviours have to be re-socialised to instil 
principles of democracy, equality, and ubuntu. 
The solution to eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace does 
not only lie in the remedies enunciated in this thesis - but in the role of 
education in transforming people's attitudes and enhancing respect for other 
employee's dignity/ ubuntu and a comprehensive campaign by both the 
employees and employers to ensure a 'harassment free' environment. It is 
essential that every company have a sexual harassment policy, which forms 
part of the conditions of employment, and breach thereof should constitute 
misconduct warranting dismissal. 
The employer must not only adopt a reactive approach and respond to 
sexual harassment as and when it occurs because that signifies lack of 
commitment to the elimination of gender discrimination. The reactive 
approach falls short of putting safeguards against gender discrimination and 
taking preventative steps, which would help, educate, and change the 
employees' attitudes to the harm of sexual harassment. Failure to adopt a pro-
active approach and an uncompromising stance by the employer on sexual 
1 Sojourner Truth' Address to the Women's Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio' (1851). 
277 
harassment may result not only in costly lawsuits which will serve to tarnish 
the good corporate governance and public image of the employer, but will 
also result in a low worker morale characterized by decline in productivity 
and constructive dismissal. It is concluded that it is the employer's non-
delegable duty to ensure a state of 'wellbeing', stability, and harmony in the 
workplace marked by respect of dignity/ ubuntu and rights of employees. 
It is suggested that companies must be pro-active and educate their 
staff on the contents of the sexual harassment policies and must give clear 
examples of prohibited conduct.2 Examples of prohibited conduct and 
management interaction with employees during training programmes will 
help distinguish between what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in 
the workplace. Another important aspect of education is empowering women 
to be assertive and to unapologetically learn to say 'no' to unwanted sexual 
attention and discard the notion that they are helpless, inferior to men and 
thus submissive. 
Of importance is the judicial test used to assess whose perception of 
the nature of sexual harassment is decisive. The aim of the research has been 
to explore various tests - the reasonable man; the reasonable woman; the 
reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics; and the 
reasonable person in the position of the victim test. It is concluded that the 
judicial test, which should be adopted, is the 'reasonable person in the 
position of the victim' test. This test is gender neutral (includes not only 
opposite-sex harassment but same-sex harassment as well) and is objectively 
determined. 
The 'reasonable person in the position of the victim' test is also in 
harmony with the Constitution in that the objectionable conduct must exceed 
the bounds of reasonable behaviour considered tolerable in an open and 
2 Items 5.3.1.1-3 2005 Code - examples of verbal, non-verbal and physical conduct which 










democratic society and must undermine the precepts of dignity, equality and 
ubuntu. It has been argued that the objective test to sexual harassment guards 
against a floodgate of frivolous claims whilst taking into account the legal 
convictions of the community and the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. Furthermore, the reasonable person in the position of the victim test is 
relevant in the context of vicarious liability. It is concluded that the objective 
test will help keep liability of the employer within manageable and 
reasonable bounds. 
Sexual harassment as gender discrimination underscores the attendant 
harm caused by sexual harassment, which includes violation of constitutional 
rights; economic harm through constructive dismissal; treating women in 
total disregard of their productive capacity in the workplace; work sabotage; 
institutionalizing gender stereotypes; and relegating women to a status of 
sub-humans through impairment of dignity/ ubuntu. It has been highlighted 
that sexual harassment is learned human behaviour, which can be controlled 
and eliminated, and thus the fight against sexual harassment can be won. The 
case for regarding sexual harassment as a form of unfair discrimination in 
terms of section 6(3) of the EEA is what captures the essence of what is wrong 
with sexual harassment. It has been shown that sexual harassment amounts to 
gender discrimination because women are sidelined; disadvantaged; and 
discriminated against in the context of employment conditions, terms and 
benefits, in a way that men are not. 
A central theme of the thesis is that the future of the law on sexual 
harassment lies in the adoption of a multi-dimensional approach, which 
focuses on dignity/ ubuntu. The essence of a multi-dimensional approach 
recognizes that the harm of sexual harassment gives rise to various remedies 
in delict, labour law, constitutional, and criminal law, which are not mutually 
exclusive, and the plaintiff can use one or more of the available remedies. At 
the heart of the proposed expansive approach, lies an emphasis on 

















first comprehended as being inimical to dignity/ ubuntu, which is an essential 
pillar in the celebration of freedom, self-autonomy, and humanity in a 
democratic society. 
The emphasis on 'ubuntu' in the context of sexual harassment is the 
absence of discrimination, indignity and inequality in the workplace and 
underscores promoting morality ('harassment free' environment) and treating 
women as co-workers, equals and fellow human beings. A central focus of 
ubuntu in eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace is that it promotes 
'wellbeing'; humanity; integrity; consideration; unity; selflessness; respect; 
and moral norms and values. An inescapable conclusion is that women can 
thus never enjoy and assert their equality as a class, if they are not liberated as 
autonomous individuals but rather treated as sex-objects subjected to unfair 
discrimination in violation of their human worth, ubuntu and self-respect. The 
essence of ubuntu and dignity thus involves enabling women to live life to the 
fullest as free individuals capable of making their own choice of intimate 
partners and being masters of their own career paths and success -
unhindered by obstacles of gender discrimination in the workplace. 
A central focus of the thesis has been the discussion of the delictual 
remedy under the actio iniuriarum and the constitutional protection of dignity. 
South Africa is distinguished and developed in its protection of dignity 
compared to the United States where dignity is not specifically protected in 
the Constitution but is conceptualized and protected as an affront to equality 
or privacy. Hence as highlighted in the thesis, many of the tort cases in the 
United States have to fit the sexual harassment claims into the existing 
pigeon-holes of action for slander, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of 
emotional harm, intrusion of physical solitude, battery and invasion of 
privacy. Dignity is of fundamental importance in South Africa because it is 

















It is concluded that there can never be equality without respect for 
dignity hence sexual harassment in the workplace has been conceptualized as 
an affront to dignity and as such an obstacle to gender equality. This factor 
will be one of the key determining features in the assessment of damages for 
sentimental loss both under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA and the actio 
iniuriarum since sexual harassment involves a violation of the constitutional 
rights. It is emphasized that equality and other rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights do not exist in vacuum but are informed by the value of dignity. This 
means that dignity is essential in the celebration of human existence and self-
worth because women cannot be equal when their personhood is violated. 
The courts will therefore be more inclined to protect victims of sexual 
harassment and deliver the protection and promise of the Constitution by 
restoring ubuntu and dignity violated by an act of sexual harassment. It is 
concluded that even though the right to dignity is not absolute, it is unlikely 
that a limitation clause contained in section 36 of the Constitution will be 
reasonable and justifiable. Similarly, in delict the concept of dignity is 
qualified by the concept of 'reasonableness' when dealing with the objective 
test of dignity outlined in De Lange v Costa.3 
The focus of the thesis has also been on statutory vicarious liability in 
terms of section 60 of the EEA, which it is argued, is a more effective remedy 
than common-law vicarious liability. It has been highlighted that the advantage 
with statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA is that the 
common-law rules of 'scope of employment' are not part of the test. Section 60 
of the EEA is broader than common-law vicarious liability in that it creates a 
unique type of statutory vicarious liability, which contains an element of, 
deemed personal liability on the part of the employer for failure to take steps 
and ensure compliance with the EEA. It is thus neither an accurate reflection 
of common-law liability nor equivalent to common-law vicarious liability. 













It is concluded that the affirmative defence in section 60(4) of the EEA 
will serve to keep statutory vicarious liability within reasonable bounds in that 
the employer is offered a shield against vicarious liability if he can prove that 
he took reasonable measures to prevent and remedy sexual harassment. 
Therefore, statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA is not 
an open-ended liability but is curbed by the affirmative defence, which is not 
similarly available to the employer under the common-law vicarious liability. It 
is concluded that if the claim were in delict, the only relevance of the 
reasonable steps taken by the employer would seem to be to exclude fault -
negligence or intention. Fault is not one of the elements of a section 60 
enquiry but is deemed in terms of section 60(3) of the EEA. 
A caution has been emphasized through the discussion of statutory 
vicarious liability that the employer is under a legal obligation to encourage 
its employees to 'keep all communications and behaviours strictly 
professional' and reprimand them that 'any sexual remarks, pictures, jokes, or 
innuendo should be taboo at work' .4 Similarly, it has been shown that the 
strict rules of agency, which were interpreted by the courts to consider sexual 
harassment as a frolic of one's, own and so excluded from the scope of 
employment, do not apply to the EEA. The requirements for establishing 
section 60 liability, are less demanding than in the case of the plaintiff who 
chooses to pursue a common-law remedy of vicarious liability. 
It has been emphasized that another added advantage in pursuing 
statutory vicarious liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA is that 
sentimental damages can be claimed under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA. The 
plaintiff is not barred from simultaneously pursuing the remedy for unfair 
dismissal in terms of the LRA, and for unfair discrimination in terms of the 
EEA. It has been shown that a joint claim under the LRA and the EEA is 
advantageous in that compensation in terms of section 194 of the LRA is 















capped to a maximum of 12 months (unfair dismissal) and 24 months 
remuneration (automatically unfair dismissal). The award for compensation 
and damages in terms of section 50 of the EEA is discretionary ( as it used to 
be under section 46(9)(c) of the old LRA). 
It has been highlighted that the 2005 Code has made a valuable 
contribution in outlining the nature of sexual harassment, the scope of 
employer duties and guidelines on how to deal with sexual harassment in the 
workplace. It has been noted that the 2005 Code is instructive as a 'guide' only 
and does not give rise to enforceable legal rights and obligations. However, 
compliance with the 2005 Code is relevant as evidence when establishing 
unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA and in determining the extent to 
which the employer discharged its duty of care and obligations in accordance 
with the provisions of section 60(2) of the EEA. 
The 2005 Code has thus been effective in promoting the letter and spirit 
of the EEA, which is aimed at the eradication of gender discrimination as a 
form of unfair discrimination in the workplace. However, a shortcoming has 
been identified in item 4 of the 2005 Code in that it only defines sexual 
harassment as unwelcome conduct 'of a sexual nature' and does not refer to 
other forms of conduct which are not of a sexual nature. In order to 
conceptualize the harm of sexual harassment properly, it is proposed that its 
definition must include 'non-sexual' forms of harassment, which are gender 
related, and affect women as workers and human beings (not as merely 
sexual beings). 
The 2005 Code states that 'the conduct should constitute an 
impairment of dignity, taking into account the circumstances of the employee; 
and the respective positions of the employee and the perpetrator in the 
workplace' .5 An impairment of dignity under the EEA is thus inferred from 
circumstantial evidence stemming from sexual harassment. However, the 















factors which are taken into account when assessing damages for sentimental 
loss under section 50(2)(b) of the EEA are the same as those taken into account 
under delictual assessment of impairment of dignity. It has been shown that 
the EEA offers discretionary payment for damages for impairment of dignity 
thereby alleviating the need for the plaintiff to pursue the actio iniuriarum. It is 
concluded that another fundamental advantage of the EEA is that a subjective 
test of sexual harassment is adopted - even if a broad interpretation is taken of 
'scope of employment' under common-law vicarious liability. 
The thesis has also examined the historical development of the remedy 
of vicarious liability in South Africa, United States, United Kingdom and 
Canada. It has been highlighted how the courts have narrowly and rigidly 
applied the principle of vicarious liability to deny protection to the victims of 
sexual harassment for what is perceived as a 'frolic of one's own', 'personal', 
or 'not within the job description' of the perpetrator to harass employees. It is 
concluded that it would be contrary to ubuntu, public policy, the legal 
convictions of the community, and the spirit of anti-discrimination legislation 
(which includes both the Constitution and the EEA) if sexual harassment was 
considered to be within the scope of employment only if it was the 
perpetrator's designated duty to sexually harass women. 
It is concluded that the use of the term 'personal' is often used to justify 
sexual harassment as a natural phenomenon and serves to trivialise it by 
removing it from the spotlight and public arena, justifying lack of legal and 
employer intervention to the problem of sexual harassment. Furthermore, 
recognizing sexual harassment as a 'frolic of one's own', 'isolated incident' or 
'personal' serves to perpetuate male dominance and maintains the status quo 
of gender discrimination in the workplace - and amounts to failure to 
















It is concluded that the essence of sexual harassment lies in the overlap 
between execution of duties and mismanagement of those duties in that 
mismanagement involves an omission or failure to carry out duties. 
Mismanagement of authorised tasks or acting contrary to the employer's 
instructions does not make sexual harassment an independent act or mere 
frolic of one's own. The nature of modern employment goes 'beyond the 
principal parties to the contract of employment' and includes a 'complex 
mixture of tasks and intimate relationships' which are often improperly 
conducted.6 It is submitted that the United States supervisor-approach to 
vicarious liability has truly captured the essence of the risk of abuse inherent 
in the supervisor's delegated power. This is so because the authority in 
implementing economic decisions in the workplace always aids a supervisor. 
It is concluded that sexual harassment has far more to do with the 
corruptive and abusive exercise of supervisory power or abuse of a trust 
relationship, than with mere sexual conduct. Sexual harassment is thus an 
expression of masculine and organizational power. Deemed personal liability 
in terms of section 60(3) of the EEA is also justifiable in the context of 
supervisory harassment in deeming gender discrimination committed by the 
perpetrator to have been committed by the employer since the supervisor is 
always aided by organizational power in committing sexual harassment. It is 
thus emphasized that it is the employer's duty to ensure that the supervisor's 
powers are not left unchecked or mismanaged to engage in acts of sexual 
harassment. 
In choosing a suitable remedy, it has been highlighted that the plaintiff 
is also faced with jurisdictional issues. It has been established that for all the 
statutory claims based on the LRA and the EEA, the proper court to hear the 
matter is the Labour Court, and the High Court does not have a jurisdiction in 
such instances (unless the cause of action is grounded on common-law 
6 R le Roux, T Orleyn and A Rycroft Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and 











principles).7 A distinction has been drawn between scope of compensation in 
delict and in contract. The same set of facts may give rise to a claim for 
damages in delict as well as one in contract and allow the plaintiff to elect the 
action to employ against the employer.s It has been highlighted that an action 
for breach of contract will entitle the plaintiff to pure economic loss suffered 
and the plaintiff cannot recover damages (as in delict) for pain and suffering 
(intangible loss).9 
In some causes of action, there is an overlap and the Labour Court has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court. It is concluded that the plaintiff 
therefore has an option to institute proceedings in either the Labour Court or 
the High Court, and the High Court's jurisdiction will only be ousted in 
respect of matters that 'are to be determined' by the Labour Court in terms of 
section 157(1) of the LRA. It is concluded that the plaintiff is at liberty to 
choose how to ground her cause of action by taking into account the 
advantages and disadvantages of each remedy available. Furthermore, the 
plaintiff cannot be forced to frame her cause of action in another alternative 
area of law merely because it coincides with her chosen remedy. 
The distinction in the scope and content of delictual and the 
constitutional protection of dignity has been noted as it is relevant in choosing 
the appropriate remedy. The plaintiff has been cautioned that it may not be 
feasible for the courts to create a constitutional delictlO because the primary 
purpose of a constitutional remedy is 'to vindicate guaranteed rights and 
prevent or deter future infringements'.11 The award of damages for a 
constitutional wrong is a secondary objective to the constitutional remedy and 
thus not appropriate for the plaintiff whose primary goal is to seek damages 
for impairment of right to dignity, which in any event, is adequately 
7 Orr & another v UniversihJ of South Africa [2004] 9 BLLR 954 (LC) at para 16-7. 
8 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers 1985 (1) SA 448 (AD). 
9 Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (AD). 
10 Dendy v University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and others [2005] 2 All SA 490 (W) at para 
23. 











protected at common-law under the actio iniuriarum.12 However, damages 
could be an appropriate relief in a constitutional case where 'the only 
appropriate relief that, in the particular circumstances of the case, would 
appear to be justified is that of "constitutional" damages' .13 It is concluded 
that it is unlikely that the courts will make this exception in sexual 
harassment cases by granting constitutional damages because there are quite 
a number of alternative and overlapping remedies available to the victim of 
sexual harassment. 
A central focus of this thesis is that sexual harassment is not 
compensable in terms of the COIDA because sexual harassment does not 
'arise out of employment' (even though it occurs in the course of 
employment). For the purposes of the COIDA, the occupational injury and an 
accident must 'arise out of' and 'in the course of' employment. It is concluded 
that sexual harassment does not arise out of employment because it is 
'specific to the victim'14 and is not attributable to the employee's terms and 
conditions of employment or job description - and is not causally connected 
thereto as to be considered part of the plaintiff's service to the employer in 
fulfilling the contract of employment. 
In any event, the COIDA compensates for physical injuries, medical 
costs and pecuniary benefits which are capped in terms of minimum and 
maximum amounts payable and not for non-pecuniary loss (which consists of 
violation of personality rights which entail damage to the plaintiff's self-
esteem, dignity, reputation and privacy) often sustained in sexual harassment 
cases. Therefore, the COIDA is not a viable remedy and it is proposed that 
any attempt to raise the jurisdictional defence to remove the plaintiff's right to 
common-law damages must be discouraged. 
12 Ibid. 
13 President of the Republic of South Africa and others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd [2004] 3 All 
SA 169 (SCA) at para 43. 











It is concluded that the value of criminal remedies cannot be 
understated because in many instances, the perpetrator is a man of straw and 
it will be a futile exercise to pursue a civil claim against him. It has been 
established that the criminal remedy against the perpetrator serves to ensure 
that he pays his due for the crime by being punished by the state. The civil 
remedies discussed in the thesis are often brought against the employer [civil 
action can be brought against either employer or employee] on grounds of 
personal liability, statutory vicarious liability in terms of the EEA or common-
law vicarious liability. 
The development of the law on sexual harassment in South Africa has 
also been critically reviewed in the light of the historical development and 
current law on sexual harassment. It is concluded that great strides have been 
made by the judiciary to review, develop, and improve the common-law 
principle of vicarious liability to offer protection to the victims of sexual 
harassment. It is emphasized that K v Minister of Safety and Security15 enhanced 
the common-law remedy of vicarious liability by adopting a broader approach 
to 'scope of employment' when it found for the first time in South African 
history, that rape could form part of the scope of employment. The message 
has been noted that sexual harassment can no longer be shunned whilst it 
violates the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Therefore, it is concluded that 
intentional wrongdoing and frolic of one's own can indeed fall within the 
scope of employment where there is a strong link between the employment 
and the wrongful conduct. 
It has been shown how O'Regan J in NK (CC)16 relied on Canadian and 
English authorities.17 This was done by broadening the 'scope of employment' 
test to include approaches compatible with an abuse of power and trust; 
'frolic of one's own'; enterprise risk; mismanagement of duties; and abuse of 
1s [2005] 8 BLLR 749 (CC). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bazley v Cum; [1999] 2 SCR 534, Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 2 SCR 570 and Lister and others v 













supervisory authority - and focused on the sufficiently close nexus between 
the wrongful conduct and the employment. It is concluded that the context of 
mismanagement of duties is the key factor in overcoming the argument that a 
supervisor or a fellow employee who sexually harasses a co-worker is merely 
on a frolic of his own and his conduct falls outside the scope of employment. 
It is observed that the South African, Canadian, and English authorities 
stress a sufficiently strong link between the employment and the wrongful 
conduct - a nexus so strong that it would pass the limitation clause test in 
section 36 of the Constitution. In those instances (sufficiently strong link), it 
would be just and equitable to hold the employer vicariously liable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. NK 
(CC)18 is thus in harmony with Canadian and English law. It is concluded that 
the causal link (sufficiently close nexus) is essential in curbing the scope of 
common-law vicarious liability and so as not to make it an open ended liability 
since it is a no fault liability and will therefore keep the application and scope 
of the principle of vicarious liability within reasonable bounds. 
It is concluded that common-law vicarious liability is more onerous to 
establish in that the plaintiff must prove a nexus between the wrongful 
conduct and the employment, a nexus so strong as to lead the court to 
conclude that the employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment 
committed by the employee. However, NK (CC)19 has established that rape 
may be within the course of employment and in so doing, has opened up 
some possibilities for common-law vicarious liability in the context of sexual 
harassment. 
NK (CC)20 also stressed the policy dimension of vicarious liability and 
spelt out the relevant factors in a way that could be adapted to provide 














guidance for developing the scope of vicarious liability in cases of sexual 
harassment in the workplace, which include a minimum of the following: 
a) The mandate of the court in terms of sections 39(2) and 173 of 
the Constitution; 
b) The constitutional rights violated as a result of sexual 
harassment; 
c) The special fiduciary relationship which enhances the harasser's 
ability to abuse the trust and confidence of the plaintiff; 
d) Enterprise risk; 
e) Supervisory harassment between a supervisor, who is in a 
dominant position to effect a tangible employment action, and a 
subordinate with no organizational power.21 
f) The extent to which the mismanagement of duties constitutes an 
improper way of executing authorised tasks or omitting to do 
that which the perpetrator is authorised to do; and 
g) A sufficiently close link between the conduct and the 
employment. 
The risk approach adopted in Grobler v Naspers Bpk & Another22 
accounts for the reality of modern employment, and how supervisors or 
caretakers can be an instrumentality of danger to the people under their care 
and supervision at work. The enterprise risk thus creates a nexus between the 
employment and the wrongful conduct in that the courts will examine the 
extent to which the enterprise materially contributed to the commission of the 
wrongful conduct as noted by the Canadian and English authorities.23 It is 
concluded that risk is only relevant as a factor and any attempt to replace 'risk' 
21 See also Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) and Grabler v Naspers Bpk & Another 
2004 (5) BLLR 455 (C) which involved supervisory harassment. 
22 Ibid. 

















as a new test to ground vicarious liability must be discouraged. A more 
expansive approach to common-law vicarious liability in South Africa is thus 
welcomed only within the existing principles of vicarious liability .24 There is 
no reason for the scope of employment test to be abandoned because section 
39(2) of the Constitution enjoins the courts to find creative ways to develop 
common-law with due regard to the spirit, objects and purport of the Bill of 
Rights. It is concluded that the 'scope of employment' test must be retained so 
as to help underscore that sexual harassment is a workplace event, which 
occurs within the scope of employment. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Media 24 Limited, Gasant Samuels v 
Sonja Grobler25 reached a significant finding when it extended the scope of the 
employer's duty to take reasonable steps to protect employees from physical 
harm caused by physical hazard, to include a duty to protect employees from 
psychological harm caused by sexual harassment. This gave effect to the 
constitutional right26 to psychological integrity, which is often impaired by 
sexual harassment. Grabler (SCA) has further extended the basis of an 
employer's duty to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace and to 
compensate the victim for harm negligently caused, to the legal convictions of 
the community, which are not dependent on the contract of employment or 
statutory remedy.27 The effect of this finding was therefore to communicate to 
employers a message of zero tolerance for sexual harassment in the 
workplace. It has therefore been established that the basis of the employer's 
duty to prevent and remedy sexual harassment arises out of the contract of 
employment, corporate governance, the common-law duty of care, a statutory 
remedy, and the legal convictions of the community. 
24 NK (CC) supra (n15). 
25 [2005] 7 BLLR 649 (SCA) at para 65. 
26 S 12(2) Constitution. 



















Employers face the risk of a finding of personal negligence in the light 
of Ntsaba v Real Security cc2s for failure to guard against the foreseeable risk 
of sexual harassment. Both Ntsaba29 and Grabler (SCA)30 cases have sent a 
strong message that the employer is under a non-delegable duty to be pro-
active and provide a sexual harassment-free work environment to all 
employees. All the recent judicial precedents of Ntsaba, Grabler (C), Grabler 
(SCA) and NK (CC)31 have laid a foundation for the future direction and 
development of the law on sexual harassment. These judgments have been 
landmark judgments, which have received media attention and thereby 
promoted consciousness of the harm of sexual harassment in the workplace. 
The aforementioned cases have strengthened legal protection against gender 
discrimination in the workplace and in turn restored confidence in the role of 
the judiciary in protecting victims of sexual harassment. It is therefore 
concluded that the law has the potential to deal adequately with sexual 
harassment cases in the workplace but only if attention is paid to the 
proposed emphasis and suggestions made in the thesis. 
28 Supra (n21). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Supra (n25). 
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